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NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN 
















Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of the threat or use of force in the 
pursuit of policy since the dawn of strategic thought, the utility of seapower beyond 
warfighting is poorly understood and articulated.  The classical theorists who have 
investigated seapower in peacetime have invariably done so through the lens of hard 
power effects such as coercion and deterrence; commentaries on engagement, 
interoperability and the use of maritime forces to forge friendships are largely 
conspicuous by their absence.  The central question of this research is how naval 
diplomacy, a subset of general diplomacy and a means of communication by maritime 
actors in pursuit of their national interest, can be better understood for use in the 21st 
century.   
 
This thesis defines diplomacy from the sea and investigates its use before, during and 
after the Cold War.  Existing theoretical frameworks are deduced from the works of 
leading naval theorists, critically analysed and found wanting.  The most widely known 
model, described in Sir James Cable’s seminal book Gunboat Diplomacy, provides a 
good benchmark, but even the most recent edition ends its period of analysis in 1991; 
huge geopolitical changes have since taken place.   
 
A qualitative and quantitative review of over 500 incidents from 1991 to 2010 is 
undertaken and the thesis draws on this empirical evidence to determine that the 
common understanding of naval diplomacy does not fit with contemporary reality.  An 
alternative foundational model, drawing on basic communication and stakeholder 
theories, is offered and subsequently tested.  The implications of the research can be 
addressed in three broad and overlapping categories: its contribution to theoretical 
debate, including its potential to ‘update’ Cable; its meaning for policy makers in their 
consideration of national and international security; and, finally, its utility for 
practitioners, including state, semi-state and non-state actors.    
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Following the end of the Cold War the purely military, war-fighting role of navies, 
particularly Western, ‘post-modern’ navies,1 has arguably diminished as their principal 
focus.  With no peer competitors the combined fleets of the West effectively exercise 
command and control of the oceans with few regional powers capable of contesting the 
seas even locally.  A logical deduction would be that in the absence of a credible threat 
the role of great navies has shifted along the spectrum of conflict from major combat 
operations to constabulary and diplomatic tasks.2  However, this shift in emphasis may 
be more nuanced than initial conjecture implies and is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon; it could be considered a return to the historical place of navies as 
peacetime policy instruments of the state and the tools of grand strategy, as well as the 
fighters of wars at sea.  Oliver Cromwell famously declared that ‘a man-o-war is the 
best ambassador’; a twenty-first century equivalent shows the United States Navy 
depicted in posters and on t-shirts as an aircraft carrier over the caption ‘90,000 tons of 
diplomacy.’  The images may be different but the message is the same. 
 
Naval diplomacy may be a recognisable term but it has no universally accepted 
definition.  Indeed, is it naval (of ships) or maritime (of the sea)?  Is it diplomacy in the 
                                               
1
 Till alludes to the characteristics of post-modern ‘maritime services’, discussing their pre-
occupation with sea control, expeditionary operations, humanitarian assistance, good order at 




 Booth suggests a ‘trinity’ of naval roles – military, policing and diplomatic.  This model has 
since been adopted by numerous Western navies and incorporated into doctrine.  See Booth, 




sense of codified discourse between recognised states, or is it part of a wider wielding 
of influence from the sea by both state and non-state actors?  Is it coercion or 
deterrence in the nineteenth century sense of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, or is it the co-
operation and assistance increasingly common in the globalised, interdependent world 
of the twenty-first century?  This thesis will argue that naval diplomacy is, of course, all 
of the above, and more. 
 
A Theoretical Starting Point 
 
The topic certainly deserves attention. Though mentioned (if not explicitly, then 
implicitly) by many naval commentators, there has been little serious in-depth academic 
study of this important aspect of seapower.  The ‘classical’ writers such as Mahan, 
Corbett and Richmond who did much to shape naval theory tended to do so through 
analyses of warfare, but they did also acknowledge the requirement for effective 
peacetime strategies for naval forces, including being vehicles of national prestige, co-
operation and statecraft.3   
 
Naval diplomacy did come under scrutiny in the 1970s in both East and West when it 
was openly acknowledged as a role of military navies.  Amongst others the Soviet 
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov explored it in The Sea Power of the State, writing about the 
ambassadorial and coercive functions of navies whilst also highlighting how allies could 
be ‘held in check’ by the leading maritime powers.4 Edward Luttwak offered a more 
                                               
3
 See, for instance: Mahan, Alfred, T.  The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.  (Mineola, NY: 
Dover, 1987), p22.  First published Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1890; and McLennan, Bruce.  
“The Historical Lessons and Intellectual Rigour of Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond.” 




 Gorshkov, Sergei.  The Sea Power of the State.  (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p2. 
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specific description in his naval ‘suasion’ discourse in The Political Uses of Sea Power, 
identifying deterrent, supportive and coercive modes of both ‘active’ and ‘latent’ 
deployment of forces,5 but it was Sir James Cable’s seminal work,6 Gunboat Diplomacy, 
which arguably became the standard.   
 
Cable gave four classifications of force (the definitive, purposeful, catalytic and 
expressive) whilst resolutely dismissing routine ‘showing the flag’ deployments and 
‘good will’ visits from his analysis of the topic.7  More recent works, such as Geoffrey 
Till’s categorisation of coercive (incorporating deterrence and compellence), picture 
building and coalition building roles of naval ‘presence’,8 or Christian Le Mière’s 
coercive, co-operative and persuasive elements of maritime diplomacy,9 have gone 
some way to redress the balance, but despite their contribution the gap in post-Cold 
War analysis is stark.  Malcolm Murfett’s comments in 1999 that whilst Cable’s work 
was ‘convincing’, other theorists had ‘modified but not overturned’ his ideas,10 perhaps 
remains valid today. 
 
                                               
 
5
 Luttwak, Edward, N.  The Political Uses of Sea Power.  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1974), p7. 
 
6
 Eric Grove pointed out the importance of this book.  It was, he stated “a landmark, one of the 
most significant works on maritime power of the twentieth century.”  See Grove, Eric. “Cable, Sir 
James Eric Sydney Skelton (1920–2001).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. (2005).  
http://www.oxforddnb.com/index/76/101076361 
(accessed 26 March 2011) 
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 Till, Geoffrey. Seapower, 2
nd
 Ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p257. 
 
9
 Le Miere, Christian.  Maritime Diplomacy in the 21
st
 Century: Drivers and Challenges.  
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 7-15. 
 
10
 Murfett, M. “Gunboat Diplomacy: Outmoded or Back in Vogue?” in The Changing Face of 
Maritime Power, ed. Dorman, Andrew, M., Smith, Mike Lawrence & Uttley, Matthew R.H. 




In the post-Cold War era the increasing number of littoral states with some form of 
maritime capability, be that naval, coast guard or commercial, and the growing number 
of non-state actors in the maritime domain, both legitimate and otherwise, result in a 
complex mix of stakeholders with a multitude of interactions.  Faced with this picture the 
existing understanding of naval diplomacy needs to be challenged to incorporate 
activity beyond that of traditional inter-state relations.    
 
The Period In Question 
 
An understanding of the Cold War itself is important because it defines the period which 
followed.11  There is no academic certainty about when the Cold War ended, or even 
began.  Ken Booth gives an excellent account of competing definitions from the 
thematic to the chronological.  He states that the historical view, for instance, puts the 
Cold War as just one stage in the adversarial relationship between the West and the 
Russian power on the Eurasian landmass.  The long view is more ideological than 
geographical and encompasses the clash between communism and capitalism from the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 until the collapse of the Soviet state in 1991.  Conversely, 
the short view is that the Cold War really only lasted from 1947 until 1953 and was 
characterised by the global rivalry of Joseph Stalin and Harry S Truman.  Alternatively, 
there is the first Cold War which lasted from the effective defeat of the Nazis in 1944 
and the subsequent manoeuvre for primacy amongst the ‘big three’ until the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962; following that reasoning the second Cold War ran from the end of 
détente through the convergence of the ‘fundamentalist’ Reagan and Brezhnev 
                                               
11
 However, it should be noted that the Cold War here is treated as a period of time which was 
characterised by East-West confrontation but also included many other geopolitical happenings.  
The post-Cold War period followed, but the phenomena which occurred then were not 




premierships until the period of glasnost and perestroika began in 1987.  Finally, Booth 
describes the systemic Cold War, which he states has ‘probably the widest usage’ and 
lasted from the defeat of Hitler passing through various stages of confrontation and 
easing of tensions, ending with the winding up of the USSR in 1991.12   
 
Raymond Garthoff, a retired US ambassador, scholar and writer offered a slightly 
different perspective.  He stated that ‘there is a general consensus that it [the Cold War] 
began in 1946-7 and ended in 1989-90.’13  However, he also notes that ‘a more precise 
illustrative landmark’ would be ‘from Winston Churchill’s address at Fulton College on 5 
March 1946…. to the breaching of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.’14  Garthoff’s 
definition is clearly precise and certainly symbolic but, for the purposes of this thesis, 
Booth’s systemic designation will be used.  The definition is broadly accepted and, 
importantly for the analysis of naval diplomacy, it corresponds with the end of Cable’s 
period of study in what is currently the most influential book on the topic.  The post-Cold 
War era under investigation here, therefore, will be assumed to be the twenty year 
period from 1991 to 2010, inclusive.   
 
Was that period any different to the one which went before? To some, the end of the 
Cold War meant an increased interest in intervention and human rights, increased 
nationalism, a rise in the number of nation states and a refinement of the institutions 
                                               
12
 Booth, Ken.  “Cold War States of Mind.” In Booth, Ken (Ed).  Statecraft and Security: The Cold 
War and Beyond.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp30-31. 
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making up the international system.15 The ‘rise’ of interventionism may well be a 
Western-centric view – a rise in the number of interventions by those powers previously 
hamstrung by their direct involvement in the Cold War.  To others, however, the 
implications of the end of the Cold War have been overstated.  Nicholas Wheeler and 
Justin Morris, for example, dispute the claim of a rise in humanitarian intervention in the 
early 1990s, countering the conventional wisdom with examples of similar numbers of 
cases in the 1970s.16  Similarly, writing in 2011 and using data from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, Andrew Mack pointed out that by 2008 there were a third fewer 
conflicts than in 1992; preventive diplomacy, he stated, was often talked about but little 
practised.17  Arguably, both viewpoints could be correct; the rush to make sense of the 
new world order in the first decade after the Soviet collapse did not allow sufficient time 
for the geopolitical reality to become clear.  It may not even be so in 2015; the 
increasing tension between the West (represented variously by the United States, 
NATO and the EU) and Russia could mean that the quarter of a century following the 
end of the Soviet Union was nothing more than an interlude in a much longer 
confrontation.  
 
The incidence of military intervention is clearly a topic which merits further research 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but what is apparent is that ‘as the various conflicts 
which have occurred since the end of the Cold War have testified, the role of force 
                                               
15
 Fawn, Rick & Larkins, Jeremy, “Introduction.” In Fawn, Rick & Larkins, Jeremy (Eds).  
International Society after the Cold War.  (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp9-21. 
 
16
 Wheeler, Nicholas and Morris, Justin, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the 
End of The Cold War.” In Fawn, Rick & Larkins, Jeremy (Eds).  International Society after the 
Cold War.  (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p142. 
 
17
 Mack, Andrew.  “A More Secure World?” 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/07/andrew-mack/more-secure-world 




remains a significant feature of domestic and world politics.’18  Surprisingly, however, 
the use or threat of force and ‘normal’ diplomacy are not always considered 
complementary means of policy implementation.  Discussing the changes at the end of 
the Cold War, for example, Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins drew a clear distinction 
between warfare and diplomacy,19 a distinction which this thesis disputes.  If force is an 
instrument of policy and if the threat of force is a means of communication, then it 
follows that naval diplomacy can be valid policy tool for a maritime state to adopt in the 




If naval diplomacy is little understood, it is perhaps because it is a subset of a broader 
topic which, despite a long history and great study, remains remarkably ill-defined.  The 
common perception of diplomacy is one of formal state-to-state communication.  That is 
certainly the meaning given in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations20.  
Indeed, Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan echo many in the field of International 
Relations when they state that diplomacy is ‘the entire process through which states 
conduct their foreign relations’21; but what then, exactly, is meant by foreign relations?  
The same authors talk of diplomacy as ‘the means for allies to co-operate and for 
                                               
18
 Baylis, “The Continuing Relevance of Strategic Studies in the Post-Cold War Era”, p1.  
 
19 Fawn & Larkins, International Society after the Cold War, pp7-8. 
 
20
 United Nations. ‘The Vienna Contention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.’ 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. 
(accessed 6 March 2011). 
 
21
 Griffiths, Martin & O’Callaghan, Terry (Eds).  International Relations: The Key Concepts. 




adversaries to resolve conflicts without force’22 which does go some way to answering 
the question, but such an explanation rather limits the scope of what diplomacy is and 
what it has to offer.  It is not simply codified discourse.   
 
A broader view situates diplomacy at the very heart of international relations and the 
theorists John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens offer what at first reading 
appears to be a reasonable contemporary definition: 
 
In foreign policy it refers to the use of diplomacy as a policy instrument possibly in 
association with other instruments such as economic or military force to enable an 
international actor to achieve its policy objectives.  Diplomacy in world politics refers to a 
communications process between international actors that seeks through negotiation to 





Baylis, Smith and Owens are careful not to limit diplomacy to recognised states and 
they place it alongside ‘other instruments’ of policy though, interestingly, they see it as 
separate and discrete.  Yet, like Griffiths and O’Callaghan, they narrow the field again 
by connecting it directly to conflict resolution. International actors may indeed rely on 
diplomatic means to resolve conflict but this is just one part of the whole.  Similarly, the 
assertion that diplomacy operates ‘short of war’ needs to be challenged.  Paul Sharp, a 
leading figure in the study of diplomatic theory, neatly counters this: ‘When force is 
resorted to, diplomacy need not necessarily come to an end… In the age of total war 
                                               
22
 Ibid., pp79-81. 
 
23
 Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, Owens, Patricia, Globalization of World Politics, 4
th
 Ed. (Oxford: 




diplomacy continued, with even the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki having their 
communicative components spelled out by unofficial and third party contacts.’24   
 
Relating diplomacy to the exercise of power is one way to potentially clarify its role and 
purpose.  If Joseph Nye’s description of power as ‘the ability to influence the behaviour 
of others to get the outcomes one wants’ 25 is accepted, then perhaps a more accurate 
assessment would be to refer to diplomacy not in terms of conflict resolution, but as a 
communications process that seeks to further the interests of an international actor, 
whatever those interests or whoever that actor might be.   
 
Baylis et al do acknowledge that diplomacy has grown to become a ‘profession’ and, by 
extrapolation, a profession requires professionals; these we call diplomats.  Paul Sharp 
states that ‘we can find an uneasy consensus around the idea that diplomacy is 
whatever diplomats do, but it quickly falls apart again around the question of who are 
the diplomats.’26  He investigates the notion of diplomacy and diplomats in the formal 
sense, that is, as international actors on the world stage.  He looks at the topic through 
the perspective of the major IR theories, particularly the English school,27 and contends 
                                               
24
 Sharp. Paul.  Diplomatic Theory of International Relations.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p186. 
 
25
 Nye, Joseph, S.  Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics.  (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004), p2. 
 
26
 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory, p75. 
 
27 The English School is a school of thought within international relations suggesting that there is 
a ‘society of states’ or an ‘international society’ between pure state-to-state relations.  For further 
research and details on the English School see Buzan, Barry.  The English School: A 
Bibliography (Version 7 August 2010).  
http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/es-bibl-10.pdf. 




that quite what diplomacy is remains a mystery.28 However, he does acknowledge that 
at a practical level diplomacy consists merely of people doing the normal things of 
human interaction such as bargaining, representing, lobbying and, of course, 
communicating that we find in all walks of life.29  In this informal sense we are all 




Viewed this way, diplomacy can be exercised in a near-infinite number of ways, 
adapted as required to best suit the circumstances of the case.  Some actors, be they 
individuals, organisations or states, by virtue of their particular strengths, weaknesses, 
interests and culture may favour one or more methods over another and the can 
develop a methodology to serve their particular purpose.   
 
Andrew Cooper coined the term ‘niche diplomacy’ in the mid-1990s and, at state level, 
he discussed a range of ‘middle powers’ and how they differ in their diplomatic 
approach to international relations.  For example, he explained how Canada tends to 
apply low-key institution building policies30 whilst Argentina forges economic ties with its 
neighbours to gain influence31 and Turkey emphasises its strategic geographical 
position.32  Of non-state actors Cooper has more to say: ‘a wide range of NGOs, 
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especially those with an interest in issues such as human rights and the environment, 
such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, have worked to secure their own 
niches in international relations……… Greenpeace has a greater influence on world 
policy than, say, the government of Austria.’33   
 
Cooper’s thesis is compelling.  Diplomacy need not be limited to recognised states; 
international bodies such as the European Union and United Nations certainly 
participate in diplomacy, as do de facto administrations such as Hezbollah or Hamas 
which, whilst not universally recognised as legitimate governments, effectively control 
territory and have a part to play on the world stage.  Whether Greenpeace and Amnesty 
International fall into a similar category is debateable but the fact that they have global 
strategies, operate across state boundaries and influence events is not. 
 
For the purposes of this research diplomacy will be assumed to be a communications 
instrument used in power relationships to further the interests of the international actors 
involved.  Actors with particular relative strengths will seek to use them; it would be 
counter-intuitive to think otherwise.  It is a logical deduction, therefore, that military force 
may be a niche which some actors will seek to exploit for diplomatic purposes. 
 
The Diplomatic Use of Military Force 
 
Though the raison d’etre of military forces, warfighting is just one extreme manifestation 
of their utility.  Joseph Nye describes a ‘spectrum of behaviour’ in international relations 
along which sit different types of power.  Under ‘hard power’, within which he tends to 
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place military action, comes coercion and inducement, whilst under ‘soft power’, which 
he defines as ‘getting others to want the outcomes you want’,34 comes agenda setting 
and attraction.  Initially, a reader may assume that military forces are absent in the 
exercise of soft power.  However, Nye is sufficiently astute to note that there is 
overlap.35  Addressing the role military forces in particular, he states that: 
 
The military can also play an important role in the creation of soft power.  In addition to 
the aura of power that is generated by its hard power capabilities, the military has a 





Alongside Nye’s ‘spectrum of behaviour’, and closely associated with the widely 
accepted wisdom of the ‘spectrum of conflict’,37 there is a corresponding spectrum 
along which military force can be used to support political objectives, a classically 
Clausewitzian premise.38  In operations other than war this spectrum includes such 
activities as coercion, deterrence, reassurance, humanitarian relief, stabilisation, peace 
support and what in the United Kingdom has come to be termed ‘defence diplomacy’.  
In the absence of warfighting, whether in total or more limited conflicts, it is the activities 
along this spectrum which generally provide effective day-to-day employment for the 
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world’s armed forces.  The American scholar Robert Art captures the essence of this 
situation, particularly the ‘hard’ end, well: 
 
Military power can be wielded not only forcefully but also ‘peacefully.’  […..] To use 
military power forcefully is to wage war; to use it peacefully is to threaten war.  Only 
when diplomacy has failed is war generally waged.  Mainly in the hope that war can be 
avoided are threats usually made.  For any given state, war is the exception, not the 
rule, in its relations with other countries, because most of the time a given state is at 
peace, not war.  Consequently, states use their military power more frequently in the 




Coercive Diplomacy: Deterrence, Coercion and Compellence 
 
Notwithstanding Nye’s soft power thesis, Art directly links the peaceful role of military 
power with the use of threat.  From Sun Tzu through Machiavelli to the present day 
much has been written on the utility of threatened force and it is important to distinguish 
between the positive and negative variants of this: coercion and deterrence. The 
difference is perhaps summed up best by Gordon Craig and Alexander George:  
 
Whereas deterrence represents an effort to dissuade an opponent from undertaking an 
action that he has not yet initiated, coercive diplomacy attempts to reverse actions which 
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Both coercion and deterrence are methods by which interests may be pursued without 
resort to all-out conflict.  British Defence Doctrine adopts very similar definitions for the 
terms and emphasises their positive and negative connotations by connecting coercion 
with the word persuade and deterrence with the word dissuade.41  However, some 
commentators use coercion as an umbrella term to cover both deterrence (the 
negative) and compellence (the positive) variants42 and thus coercion and compellence 
can sometimes be read to mean the same thing.  Whether coercion is the opposite of 
deterrence, or whether it describes both deterrence and compellence is debateable, but 
the academic pursuit of any difference between them inevitably results in a 
concentration on the ends rather than the ways and means of conflict resolution in an 
international relationship. At the military level, the threat or use of force may be enacted 
in exactly the same way, for example by the forward positioning of troops, whether it is 
meant to coerce/compel or deter.   
 
The main body of contemporary academic literature on coercion, deterrence and 
compellence stems from the bi-polar world of the last century with deterrence, 
particularly nuclear deterrence, most often coming to the fore.  An influential work of the 
period is Deterrence and Strategy by the French soldier-scholar Andre Beaufre.  
Beaufre discusses the ‘laws of deterrence’ and defines the concept quite simply: ‘The 
object of deterrence is to prevent an enemy power taking the decision to use armed 
force.’43 The effect Beaufre describes must be psychological, requiring the recipient of 
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the ‘threat’ to calculate risk, determine that the likelihood of escalation is so high and 
the impact so unacceptable that the decision to use armed force is never taken.  Given 
the nuclear backdrop at the time of his writing, it is unsurprising that Beaufre talks of 
‘fear’ being engendered through deterrence.44  Deterrence theory dominated politico-
military strategy and major power diplomacy for almost half a century through 
successive arms races, the presumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and 
arms limitations talks.45  The theory is important and well documented but, for the 
purposes of this research, deterrence will be considered alongside coercion / 
compellence and the term coercive diplomacy will be used to cover all. 
 
Sir Lawrence Freedman has written that ‘the study of coercion in international relations 
remains dominated by work undertaken in the United States in the Cold War period and 
distorted through the preoccupation with deterrence.’46  If coercion and deterrence are 
actually near-identical in means then that criticism of distortion could be a moot point.  
However, Freedman does offer his own definition of coercion as ‘the deliberate and 
purposeful use of overt threat to influence another’s strategic choice.’47  Freedman’s 
definition is significant because, like Beaufre’s deterrence, it identifies coercion as a 
cognitive tool.  As such it need not necessarily threaten ‘war’ as Robert Art suggests, 
rather, it is about influencing another’s choice.  Logically, then, coercion need not even 
be the ‘overt’ act that Freedman contends; subtlety in international relations can be a 
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powerful alternative methodology.  Furthermore, a threat need not be kept below the 
threshold of force; limited physical action leaving the recipient with the understanding 
that there could be ‘more to come’ can be a very effective strategy.  A less pithy but 
potentially more accurate definition of coercion, which can be extended to encompass 
deterrence and which will be used in this research, is provided by Yezid Sayigh: it is 
‘the threat or actual use of punitive capability to mould behaviour.’48  
 
The work which ‘laid the foundation’ of the Cold War study of coercive diplomacy was 
Thomas Schelling’s 1966 book Arms and Influence.49  A political economist inspired by 
game theory, Schelling laid down five theoretical conditions if a coercive strategy was to 
succeed.  He said the conflict must be zero-sum; the threat made must be potent and 
convince the adversary that non-compliance would be too costly; the threat must be 
credible (ie through a convincing combination of will and capability); the coercer must 
assure the adversary that non-compliance will not simply result in more demands; and, 
importantly, the adversary must have time to comply.50   
 
Schelling’s conceptual theory was further developed by Alexander George who has 
been called ‘the foremost analyst of coercive diplomacy’.51  According to George the 
practical difficulty is that ‘the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy assumes pure 
rationality on the part of the opponent – an ability to receive all relevant information, 
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evaluate it correctly, make proper judgements as to the credibility and potency of the 
threat, and see that it is in his interest to accede to the demand made on him.’52  Such a 
rational actor does not exist in reality, of course, which makes predicting the outcome of 
coercive diplomacy a most inaccurate science.   
 
George used the term ‘complex interdependence’ to describe the modern world53 and it 
is this myriad of linkages and relationships, in concert with fickle human behaviour, 
which precludes any degree of certainty in advance of an action.  George, along with 
Gordon Craig, attempted to build on Schelling’s factors by identifying particular 
conditions required for the success of coercive diplomacy.  To them, the coercing power 
must create in the opponent’s mind a sense of urgency for compliance with a demand, 
plus a belief that the coercer is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demand than 
the coerced is to oppose it.  Finally, there must be a fear of unacceptable escalation if 
the demand is not accepted.54  Additionally, in his book The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy, written in conjunction with William Simons, George gives fourteen factors to 
be considered when judging likely success: the global strategic environment; the type of 
provocation; image of war; whether the action is unilateral or part of a coalition; the 
isolation of the adversary; the clarity of objective; the strength of motivation; the 
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asymmetry of motivation; a sense of urgency; strong leadership; domestic support; 
international support; any fear of escalation; and the clarity of terms offered.55 
 
That there are fourteen factors is indicative of the complexity involved.  By analysing 
these factors it can be seen that few are outwith the control of at least one of the actors 
involved, either the coercer or coerced, and that the initiative generally lies with the 
actor making the demand.  According to realist tradition relative strength is the 
paramount consideration in an inter-state relationship and, in military terms, this can be 
quite accurately determined.  Art again: 
 
It is more desirable to be militarily powerful than militarily weak.  Militarily strong states 
have greater clout in world politics than militarily weak ones.  Militarily strong states are 
less subject to the influence of other states than militarily weak ones.  Militarily powerful 
states can better offer protection to other states, or more seriously threaten them, in 




The message is clear.  At the ‘hard’ end of the spectrum strong military forces can be 
used as a means of influence to further the interests of an actor on the world stage.   
 
Preventive Diplomacy: The Military Contribution  
 
But what of the ‘soft’ end?  Therein lies the phenomenon known as ‘defence diplomacy’.  
In essence, preventive defence diplomacy professes to further national interests not 
through threat or the limited use of force but through outreach, international 
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engagement and conflict prevention.  It is achieved by the exchange of attachés and 
other military personnel, by education and training and it became a formal UK Military 
Task after the Strategic Defence Review of 1998.57  George Robertson, the British 
Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the SDR neatly, if somewhat flippantly, 
summed up the task: ‘Defence diplomacy is about the middle aged drinking together 
instead of the young fighting each other.’58   
 
Defence diplomacy, however, is not merely social exchange.  It requires resource and 
planning, strategy and policy.  It involves building relationships with an eye to the future, 
building capacity in allies and friends and building on the influence wrought through 
other instruments of policy.  However, it can also be preventive, assuring security for 
the user by attempting to shape the future behaviour of the recipient.  Martin Griffiths 
and Terry O’Callaghan have stated that the main focus of this type of discourse, 
preventive diplomacy, is to identify and respond to brewing conflicts in order to prevent 
the outbreak of violence.  They go on to say that it may take many forms ‘such as 
verbal diplomatic protests and denunciations, imposing sanctions, active monitoring and 
verification of agreements, peacekeeping, providing good offices and other forms of 
third party mediation.’59  However, defence diplomacy is also about prevention at the 
very earliest stages; it is about making friends, not just dealing with enemies. For a 
militarily powerful state with a military employed predominantly in the ‘peaceful’ role, 
defence diplomacy has the potential to overtake more formal diplomacy and become 
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the principal form of international relations in some areas.  Joseph Nye makes this point 
well: 
 
Indeed, some observers worry that America’s five military regional commanders 
sometimes have more resources and better access in their regions that the American 




This form of informal diplomacy is, of course, nothing new,61 but its formal adoption into 
policy as a means to achieve ends is certainly a product of post-Cold War thinking.  
Defence diplomacy can be seen as an attempt to synergise preventive diplomacy and 
military capability into a more powerful and potent weapon to achieve ‘the ultimate end-
state – security in the widest sense’.62 
 
The Particular Advantage of Naval Forces in Diplomacy 
 
Robert Art correctly identifies that in general military forces are used more frequently in 
the peaceful mode than the forceful, but he offers no quality judgement as to their value 
as political instruments.  The same is not true of naval strategists who tend to be quick 
to point out the particular advantage of naval forces in diplomacy; to some it is the 
prime example of their utility. In the classic Cold War text The Sea in Modern Strategy, 
for example, L.W. Martin stated that: 
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The essential quality of a military navy is obviously its ultimate capacity to engage and 
fight an enemy.  Yet, for the greater portion of its existence, a navy is not engaged in 
combat.  During this time of peace, however, a navy by no means fails to exert an 
influence upon international affairs.  This effectiveness short of war is difficult to 
characterise but is nevertheless pervasive and may well comprise the most significant 




Conventional wisdom ascribes a number of enduring ‘attributes’ to naval forces which 
help to explain their lead over land and air forces as diplomatic instruments. These 
attributes are reflected strongly and consistently in the academic literature64 and 
expressed in similar ways in the naval doctrine of numerous maritime states.65 They 
include such factors as flexibility of use, presence without commitment and 
independence, all of which afford political leverage to the employing power.  Air forces 
may have the advantage of speed of reaction within a given radius, assuming the 
availability of bases but, navalists argue, they lack persistence.  Land forces can 
provide a ‘human face’ but their time-consuming and burdensome deployment 
inevitably carries significant political risk on both the domestic and international stage.  
Naval forces, however, can poise indefinitely, do not necessarily require access, basing 
or overflight rights, can be either overt or ‘over the horizon’ and, importantly, can arrive 
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with a fanfare and depart in silence or vice versa.  The high seas, the global commons, 
provide a manoeuvre space that has traditionally been thought unavailable in other 
physical environments.  They offer respective governments a range of options across 
the spectrum of activity and are arguably the easiest and best military means of ‘soft’ 
influence through port visits, bilateral exercises and humanitarian assistance. 
 
Remarkably however, these enduring attributes of navies have gone largely 
unchallenged in the mainstream academic literature for several decades and their 
relevance to the post-Cold War global order is therefore worthy of consideration: a point 
returned to in Chapter 5.  However, for the purposes of this thesis, the conventional 
wisdom attributing certain enduring characteristics to naval forces will be accepted, 
particularly for the period 1991-2010.   
 
In short, the maritime domain offers international actors rich pickings for their 
communicative endeavours.  Maritime, or naval, diplomacy is therefore a niche that 
many choose to exploit.  It follows, then, that a reasonable definition of naval diplomacy 
is that it is a subset of general diplomacy and a means of communication by maritime 
actors, both state and non-state, in pursuit of their interests. 
 
Explanation of research questions 
 
A series of research questions has been identified which, when answered, will address 
the primary issue of the place of naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War global order, and 
the secondary questions of how emerging global concerns from terrorism to climate 
change, financial instability to ungoverned spaces are subject to influence from the sea.  
Interagency cooperation and multi-national coalitions and alliances are features of 
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contemporary maritime strategy and these too must be taken into consideration when 
trying to make sense of the political uses of seapower today.  The research questions 
are: 
 
(1) What is naval diplomacy?  How does it differ from or build upon other forms 
of military / defence diplomacy? 
(2) What are the traditional models of naval diplomacy? Who conducts it, how, 
with what aim and against whom?    
(3) What, if anything, is new in the post-Cold War era?  Have ‘globalisation’ and 
the perceived increasing importance of non-state actors affected naval 
diplomacy?  Has the incidence of naval diplomacy changed over time? 
(4) Are the existing models for naval diplomacy still valid?  To what extent do 
they require revision?  Do they appropriately encompass likely target 
audiences (potential adversaries, potential allies and domestic audiences)? 
(5) Can a new model be constructed?  If so, what should be its key tenets?  
What perspectives or bodies of literature should be used? 
 
The working hypotheses 
 
In attempting to answer the questions a series of hypotheses have been framed which 
are implicitly tested and refined through the course of the research.  The hypotheses 
relate to the nature of naval diplomacy itself and its correlation to the exercise of power 
in international relations.   
 
The first proposition of this research is that naval diplomacy is a subset of general 
diplomacy and not simply a ‘free good’ of military capability.  Of course, there is a direct 
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relationship between capability and credibility and this must be acknowledged.  As 
explained aboe, diplomacy is the formal and informal means of communication between 
international actors on the world stage.  Communication can be carried out in 
innumerable ways and actors will seek to communicate via the means which they have 
at their disposal.  Maritime states with naval forces will, therefore, engage in naval 
diplomacy.  
Hypothesis: naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and will be used as a 
means of communication by maritime states in pursuit of their national interest. 
 
Since most states experience varying degrees of peace more frequently than all-out 
war then, logically, armed forces are more often used in peaceful modes than for 
fighting a belligerent.  Ken Booth’s widely accepted ‘trinity’ of naval roles (military, 
policing and diplomatic)66 is a useful theoretical model for the understanding of naval 
power but it can be misinterpreted.  The roles are not equally balanced, nor are they 
mutually exclusive.  The prime reason to create and maintain a navy (as opposed to a 
coast guard) is for its military role.  However, a navy may rarely or even never exercise 
its military role in full.  The use of limited force and policing or constabulary 
responsibilities to maintain ‘good order at sea’67 therefore become a navy’s day-to-day, 
year-to-year employment; employment which inevitably has a communicative 
dimension.  Nevertheless, for understandable reasons, the warfighting role is the focus 
of most historical and theoretical writing on sea power. 
Hypothesis: the diplomatic role of naval forces is more prevalent than the literature 
suggests.      
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To many, naval diplomacy is synonymous with coercive ‘gunboat diplomacy.’68  
Coercion is certainly a possible use of naval power short of war but it is not the whole.  
Joseph Nye’s ‘spectrum of behaviour’ between international actors in which power is 
classified from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’,69 offers a simple framework for situating naval diplomacy.  
At the ‘hard’ end naval forces can be used inflict punitive damage on an actor in order 
to secure behavioural changes.  At the ‘soft’ end they can make friendly port calls and 
open their doors to visitors to impress, educate and influence, to foster relationships 
with partners and to build their capacity.  In between are countless possibilities for 
interaction which, in some way, further the interests of their state.   
Hypothesis: naval diplomacy spans a broad spectrum from hard to soft power. 
 
Few, if any, dedicated studies of naval diplomacy were undertaken until the 1970s 
when the study of limited war and military influence became of interest to both East and 
West.  The works published in that decade became a privileged discourse on naval 
diplomacy and, in the main, complemented each other.  However, they were written by 
academics and practitioners living with the political realities of the day and should be 
viewed with that in mind. 
Hypothesis: existing models of naval diplomacy were conceived in the Cold War and 
are products of their time. 
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The existing models of naval diplomacy assume bilateral, mechanistic relationships; 
that is, one party carries out an action against another party in order to produce a 
reaction which it calculates will be favourable to its own interests.  This action-reaction 
model, described by Cable in terms of an ‘assailant’ and ‘victim’, need not be limited to 
coercion and is applicable across the spectrum of naval diplomacy.  However, it is 
limited.  The reality of international relations is far more complex; multiple audiences 
and stakeholders exist within every communicative relationship.   
Hypothesis: existing models of naval diplomacy are limited by generally assuming a 
bilateral, mechanistic relationship between the actors involved. 
 
Different levels of communication in naval diplomacy can be explained by use of a 
sporting analogy.  If Team ‘A’ were playing against Team ‘B’ then the two teams are 
clearly the primary constituents of the game.  The approach of previous theorists to the 
sporting analogy would examine the action of ‘A’, the reaction of ‘B’ and declare one a 
winner, one a loser or an equal draw.  There are, however, many more interested 
parties all of whom are stakeholders in the wider competition.  Both teams will have 
supporters and, potentially, sponsors.  There will be other teams not involved in that 
particular fixture but who are competing in the same league; they will be interested in 
the game, as will their supporters and sponsors; the game could affect their own 
standing.  Relative positioning and context is important, as a draw for one team may 
mean the maintenance of its place in the league, whilst for the other a draw may result 
in relegation.  Importantly, the result for either team may determine who they play next.  
Returning to the military dimension, one side can win a battle but lose the war. 
Hypothesis: a revised model of naval diplomacy should not be solely event based but 





Acknowledging that naval diplomacy, though not the raison d’etre of navies, is a 
fundamental role has implications for politicians, planners and practitioners.  Force 
structures, capabilities, deployments and training could be adapted to maximise the 
potential benefits to be gained.  The requirements for naval platforms to perform 
constabulary tasks is well understood and is fuelling debate as the words of the former 
US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates demonstrate: ‘You don’t necessarily need a 
billion dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage 
pirates wielding AK47s and rocket propelled grenades.’70  A similar level of debate on 
the subject of naval diplomacy is needed.   
Hypothesis: an understanding of contemporary naval diplomacy can aid the 
development of appropriate force structures and capabilities of maritime states. 
 
Methodology and Research Design 
 
Research has been conducted by a logical progression of methods.  Firstly, an 
extensive literature review was undertaken in order to gain an appreciation of naval 
diplomacy within the context of wider political, military and maritime strategy.  Primary 
sources included government documents and official doctrinal publications; secondary 
sources included books, monographs, papers, theses, academic journals and online 
resources.  In particular, the literature review highlighted the use of international 
diplomacy as a means of political discourse and introduced the concept of the 
diplomatic use of military force.  It situates key terms such as diplomacy, deterrence, 
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coercion and  compellence, as well as the contemporary theories on hard, soft and 
smart power.   
 
The second stage of the literature review unravelled the works of each of the major 
theorists in order to produce practical ‘models’ of naval diplomacy.  Models are simple 
‘representations of reality’ which, Clarke and Primo have written, can then be used to 
investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, to generate comparative statics and to 
understand the conditions under which certain outcomes might be expected.71 
Modelling notions of naval diplomacy from the existing literature, therefore, is a 
significant element of this research.  Clarke and Primo identify four types of model 
which can serve different roles – foundational, organizational, exploratory and 
predictive.72 The type of modelling used in this thesis is ‘foundational’; that is, it takes 
disparate generalisations of known facts under a single framework and provides an 
overall insight into the topic.73 It can serve as a basis for further model building and 
provide a framework ‘flexible enough to be adapted to answer different kinds of 
questions.’74 Though the words and terminology used differ from writer to writer and 
from era to era, a careful interpretation of their works can find threads of similar 
meaning throughout the body of naval and strategic thought over the past century and a 
half.  As might be expected, the development of ideas has been evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary and certain enduring themes can therefore be identified. These 
                                               
71
 Clarke, Kevin & Primo, David.  “Modernizing Political Science: A Model Based Approach.”  
Perspectives on Politics 5, No 4 (2007): pp741-742. 
 
72 Clarke, Kevin & Primo, David.  A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of 
Representation.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p83. 
 
73
 Clarke & Primo,  “Modernizing Political Science: A Model Based Approach”, pp742-743. 
 




themes, or traits, are collated in order to produce ‘composite’ classifications of types of 
naval diplomacy.     
 
Next, a quantitative analysis was undertaken.  An empirical survey of naval diplomacy 
between 1991 and 2010 was conducted and over 500 incidents catalogued.  In part, the 
thesis survey provides an extension of the chronological survey published in the three 
editions of Cable’s Gunboat Diplomacy, but it also applies the composite classification 
criteria, derived from legacy writings, to contemporary data.  In doing so it seeks to 
determine whether reality corresponds to theory and whether there are types or 
variations of naval diplomacy during the period in question which are not adequately 
reflected in existing literature.  When constructing the survey primary sources were 
used wherever possible; examples of naval activity fitting the thesis definition were 
taken from the official publications of eight significant maritime states – the United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Russia, China, India and Japan. 75 If those 
countries deemed an example of their navy’s employment worthy of mention in 
operations databases, White Papers and reports to their respective legislatures then 
they are included in the survey. These states were chosen because their records are 
openly published and accessible, they are geographically dispersed and they field naval 
forces at differing scales, but all harbour regional or global ambition. It is entirely 
probable that by extending the review to include other states’ official publications more 
examples would be uncovered; this is another area for potential research in future. 
Finally, secondary sources including books, academic journal articles, specialist and 
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generalist open media reporting and online resources were used to corroborate the 
‘official’ version of an incident and to provide additional examples not revealed 
elsewhere.  The thesis does not aim to be the definitive word on every example of naval 
diplomacy cited.  Instead, it seeks patterns and assesses that patterns are discernible 
in the incidents included. 
 
In order to determine whether the immediate post-Cold War era really was different to 
the Cold War itself, two ‘control’ periods were included to provide a suitable benchmark.  
Therefore, whilst the main part of the empirical research provides a survey of the years 
from 1991 to 2010, a further section contains over 100 incidents of naval diplomacy 
which took place from 1960 to 1964, and from 1980 to 1984.  Though this thesis 
accepts the systemic definition of the Cold War, these control years were selected 
because they represent, respectively, the culmination of the first Cold War around the 
time of the Cuban missile crisis, and the period of heightened tensions during the 
Reagan-Brezhnev second Cold War following the end of detente.76 They are also 
separated by time and, when set against the main survey, offer periods for analysis at 
twenty year intervals. Selection criteria for the ‘control’ and main surveys were identical. 
 
From the quantitative analysis a number of case studies were then selected for more 
detailed investigation.  George and Bennett state that specific cases should be chosen 
not simply because they are easily researched; rather, they should form an integral part 
of a good research strategy to achieve well defined objectives.77  The cases used in this 
research, therefore, were selected to represent a range of actors and methods and to 
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illustrate the period and macro-trend which they embody.  This approach could 
potentially leave the research open to a criticism of selection bias.  However, it is 
justified on the grounds that the case studies employ variables of theoretical interest 
(time, place, actor, purpose, method),78 and that the relatively large number of 
examples used reduces the risk of over-generalisation of results which might be 
inherent in single case research.79  
 
Within and between the case studies, comparative analysis was conducted using ‘most 
similar research design’ in order to determine shared features and trends.80  This 
controlled comparison satisfies George and Bennett’s requirement for structure and 
focus.81  The case studies are ‘structured’ because they reflect the research objectives 
and are comparable; they are ‘focused’ because they deal in detail with only certain 
aspects of the historical evidence, ie those relating to naval diplomacy.  Baxter and 
Jack, drawing on the work of other qualitative researchers, categorised case studies as 
explanatory, exploratory, descriptive, intrinsic, instrumental or collective.82  Following 
their categorisation, the cases used in this research are deemed to be both descriptive 
and instrumental; that is, they describe phenomena and the real-life context in which 
they occurred, and they provide insight into an issue in order to help to refine a theory.83 
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The results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses were combined in order to 
update and revise the models derived from the existing literature.  Combining methods 
in this way is termed ‘triangulation’ and can increase validity because one method 
serves as a ‘check’ on another.84  A new foundational model, asking questions of who?, 
what?, how? and why?, was then proposed against which to test the research findings.  
Using the same evidence to both create and test a theory is an invalid approach in 
research design – it exacerbates the risk of confirmation bias.85  Therefore, the cases 
chosen to test the new model were not the ones cited in the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses.  Instead, the theoretical framework was tested against further examples of 
naval diplomacy from earlier and later periods.  A renowned case study of naval 
diplomacy from the height of the Cold War was chosen, as were a further three 
examples from the period 2011-2015, representing state-on-state confrontation, the 
involvement of non-state actors, and trans-national concerns respectively.  These cases 
were selected for their diversity rather than their resemblance to any ‘typical’ example of 
naval diplomacy of the past century.  Each test case was divided into two brief sections: 
the first provides historical and geopolitical context by outlining key events; the second 




The thesis comprises themed chapters based on the methodological approach outlined 
above.  The Introduction sets the scene, placing naval diplomacy in the context of 
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political action, military power and grand strategy.  The major writers on the topic are 
introduced, the timeframe under investigation explained, key terms are defined and the 
research questions outlined.  Thereafter, a brief synopsis of the hypothesis is given, 
along with an explanation of the methodology used in the research, the thesis structure 
and an indication of broad findings and conclusions made. 
 
Chapter 2 forms the bulk of the topic’s literature review.  The historiography of naval 
diplomacy is approached in three broad phases: pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold 
War; Western, Eastern and non-aligned writings are evaluated, as are the more recent 
contributions of contemporary commentators. A qualitative comparative analysis of 
existing models of naval diplomacy, deduced from academic writing and the published 
maritime doctrine of major state actors around the world, is presented and key common 
themes (and differences) are identified; these are subsequently applied in the latter part 
of the chapter, which concentrates on change, particularly the change in the 
international system which led to the re-evaluation of the place of naval diplomacy.  The 
meaning and effects of globalisation, the relative rise of non-state actors in the global 
system, particularly at sea, and the likely ‘targets’ for diplomacy at sea are also 
investigated.    
 
A chronological index of the empirical survey of post-Cold War naval diplomacy (and 
the two Cold War ‘control’ periods) and a thematic analysis are presented in Chapter 3.  
Findings discussed include the forging of amity and enmity, the role of international 
engagement and disengagement, prestige and symbolism and the numerical incidence 
of naval diplomatic events in the period studied.  A discussion of continuity and change 





Chapter 4 expands on the evidence provided in the empirical survey by drawing on a 
series of case studies of incidents of naval diplomacy since the end of the Cold War.  
Each example considers a different aspect of naval diplomacy during a time in which 
the global order underwent drastic and rapid change.  Fragmentation and the uncertain 
security situation, nationalism and opportunism, Pax Americana and resistance to US 
hegemony, and the return of great power rivalry are all considered.  It also includes 
examples of the political use of the sea by non-state actors to further their own agenda.   
 
Chapter 5 critically assesses the relevance of the models discussed in Chapter 2 in light 
of the changes explained in Chapter 3 and the case studies discussed in Chapter 4.  It 
concludes that existing ‘assailant-victim’ models are not appropriate to the twenty-first 
century and an alternative based on an interdisciplinary application of communication 
and stakeholder theories is proposed.  This new ‘foundational’ model is then tested 
against a series of case studies drawn from the Cold and post-Cold War periods. 
 
Chapter 6, the Conclusion, builds on the previous analysis and reports the thesis’ 
findings.  It provides answers to the research questions outlined above, comments on 
the hypotheses and discusses potential implications for theory, policy and practice. 




The main findings and conclusions of the research may be broken down into six key 
areas.  Firstly, it defines naval diplomacy as the use of naval and maritime assets as 
 48 
 
communicative instruments in international power relationships to further the interests 
of the actors involved.   
 
Secondly, it reports that only around a quarter of the incidents of naval diplomacy in the 
post-Cold War period could be described as indicative of enmity between the parties 
involved.  Conversely, some 90 per cent have some degree of amity, or friendship 
forging, in their purpose.  The sum is more the whole because the two are not mutually 
exclusive and purposes are rarely binary; in complex relationships signals of enmity and 
amity can be, and are, made concurrently. 
 
Thirdly, there are varying degrees of engagement and disengagement within naval 
diplomacy and the state of a relationship can often be assessed by the type of activity 
practised.  At the lowest end of the scale goodwill visits can be means of ongoing 
‘relationship maintenance’ between established allies or symbolic first forays for those 
with a more adversarial relationship.  Complexity and interoperability progressively 
increase until only the very closest allies are capable of fully integrated operations in 
difficult scenarios.  
 
Fourthly, the thesis identifies that the incidence of non-state actors making use of the 
seas to exert influence is increasing.   Fifthly, and closely linked, the incidence of naval 
forces being used for humanitarian assistance is also on the rise.  These two findings in 
particular offer confirmatory evidence to support assumptions that have become widely 
held since the end of the Cold War. 
 
Finally, the research concludes that existing models and frameworks for naval 
diplomacy are, essentially, event-based approximations of state actors’ use of the 
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‘spare capacity’ inherent in military navies when not at war to influence other state 





APPROACHES TO NAVAL DIPLOMACY  
 
Chapter 1 led to the definition of naval diplomacy as a subset of general diplomacy and 
a means of communication by maritime actors, both state and non-state, in pursuit of 
their interests.  This chapter builds on that definition with a comparative analysis of the 
works of key strategists and writers.  Though the analysis is based on the works of 
individual authors, it is categorised here according to three broad but unequal eras 
delineated by the Cold War.  In choosing to analyse the pre-Cold War era the aim is not 
to summarise the whole of naval history before the mid-1940s. Rather, because the 
overriding feature of the world order before the Cold War was multi-polarity, habitually 
with one dominant power or hegemon, the period is sufficiently dissimilar from the bi-
polar world of 1946-1991 to be worthy of separate consideration.  It might also give 
clues to the nature of international relations and naval diplomacy to the third era, the 
world after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
Some of the authors considered (for example, James Cable, Edward Luttwak, Ken 
Booth, Geoffrey Till and Christian Le Mière) provide models or frameworks which neatly 
define their interpretation of the topic; others do not and their conceptual understanding 
must be deduced from published works which may or may not unequivocally label ideas 
as naval diplomacy.  As Chapter 1 explained, models can be useful analytical tools, 
simple ‘representations of reality,’ which Clarke and Primo have written can be used to 
investigate and illuminate causal mechanisms, to generate comparative statics and to 
understand the conditions under which certain outcomes might be expected.   
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The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to take the existing literature and construct a series 
of models which represent the age in which it was written. The type of modelling used is 
‘foundational’; that is, it takes disparate generalisations of known facts under a single 
framework and provides an overall insight into the topic.1  Thus, the thesis suggests a 
‘classical’ pre-Cold War model born out of the writings of Mahan, Corbett and 
Richmond.  The seminal work by Cable stands alone to provide a ‘standard’ model 
against which others may be compared.  Cable’s near contemporaries (Turner, Luttwak, 
Booth and Gorshkov) collectively provide a broader ‘Cold War’ model, whilst the later, 
post-Cold War theories of Till, Mullen, Widen, Le Mière and Nye offer a ‘post-modern’ 
representation of naval diplomacy.  As might be expected, the development of ideas 
has been evolutionary; hard power concepts such as coercion and deterrence feature 
heavily throughout the literature, but it is the later writers who place the greatest 
emphasis on the soft power concepts of cooperation, assistance and persuasion.  
However, all tend to fall into the twin traps of state-centrism and the assumption of two 
party ‘action-reaction’ relationships.   
 
The chapter finishes with a short analysis of common ‘threads’, organising them as 
enduring themes.  It concludes that the models can be viewed according to construct 
and content and that there are striking commonalities between them all, with shifting 
balances between hard and soft power effects as time progresses.  Distilled to its raw 
elements, naval diplomacy has generally been viewed from a realist, state-centric 
position, assuming a mechanistic relationship between the parties involved.  There is 
clearly scope for an alternative perspective.   
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THE ‘CLASSICAL’ MODEL: NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE PRE-COLD WAR PERIOD     
 
The classic naval texts of and about the era are essentially Western and Atlanticist in 
nature, reflecting the concentration of maritime power firstly in Europe and then in North 
America.  Nonetheless, they offer generic principles which are applicable globally.  
Perhaps the most influential naval writer, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, focused 
his thesis in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History primarily on navies at war, 
particularly the most powerful navies of England, France and Holland in the age of sail, 
and he did not specifically mention naval diplomacy.  However, peppered throughout 
his work are examples and comments on the utility of threat and limited force by navies.  
In fact, pre-empting Martin’s point made over half a century later, he acknowledged the 
importance of navies in peacetime, observing that the requirement for naval strategy 
differs from a land-centric military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as it is in 
war.2 
 
Like Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett’s focus was predominantly on war.  Indeed, in a 2012 
assessment of his work, J.J. Widen wrote: ‘Corbett’s theory applies mainly to military 
and naval matters in times of war, almost completely ignoring the ends and means in 
times of peace.  Consequently, operations concerned with naval diplomacy, deterrence, 
policing and naval presence are rarely if ever dealt with.’3 
 
However, it is possible to identify strands of thought related to naval diplomacy in his 
works and he was certainly cognisant of the diplomatic role of naval power: ‘the first 
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function of the fleet is to support or disrupt diplomatic effort.’4 His concept of ‘limited 
war’, borrowed from Clausewitz,5 was not confined to physical action but could be 
applied to either the ‘contingent’ or the ‘object’;6 it could thus be germane to scenarios 
in which the belligerents were not at ‘war’ in the conventional sense.  Indeed, Corbett’s 
concept of ‘war’ was quite broad; he paraphrases Clausewitz in his description of the 
spectrum of operations in the land environment, drawing parallels to the maritime: 
 
So he [Clausewitz] concludes there may be wars of all degrees of importance and 
energy from a war of extermination down to the use of an army of observation.  So also 
in the naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy or 
hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade.
7
    
 
It can be argued, therefore, that Corbett’s theories on blockade, both naval and 
commercial, and on the strategies of fleet-in-being and demonstration could be applied 
at different points on the spectrum of naval operations, and hence be used as part of a 
diplomatic mission.   
 
Detailed examination of Mahan’s work for reference to naval diplomacy reveals two 
broad themes.  In the contemporary language of hard and soft power discussed earlier, 
Mahan could arguably be said to view navies both as instruments of coercive diplomacy 
and as agents of national reputation or status.  In the early sections of his major work, 
                                               
4
 Corbett, quoted in Till, Geoffrey. Seapower (2
nd
 Ed), p253. 
 
5
 Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, p38. 
 
6
 By ‘contingent’ Corbett meant the composition of the naval force; by ‘object’ the objective of the 







for instance, Mahan talks of ancient Rome during the time of the Carthaginian wars, 
discussing how the Roman Fleet was positioned to ‘check’ Macedonia, an ally of 
Hannibal, and was so successful that ‘not a soldier of the phalanx ever set foot in Italy.’8  
The principle employed by this threatening naval force was one of prevention and 
deterrence.   
 
In a collection of articles published at the turn of the twentieth century, Mahan applied 
his own thesis to contemporary events.  The Boxer Rebellion against Western 
imperialism in China, for example, threatened free trade and risked ‘the interest of the 
commercial nations and of maritime powers.’9  Without resorting to total war, force was 
used extensively and an eight nation alliance mounted naval policing and stabilisation 
expeditions along the Chinese coast and inland into the major river systems, particularly 
the Yangtze, to quash the uprising.10 Of course, one ‘positive’ aspect of this form of 
naval diplomacy, alliance and coalition building, which was seen on the coasts and 
waterways of China did not last in this instance.  The eight nations were at war less 
than a decade and a half later. 
 
Nonetheless, Mahan did espouse the political benefits of the ‘prestige’ that a 
government might gain from having a powerful navy capable of worldwide, 
expeditionary operations.  This, of course, was at a time when navies were the most 
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powerful military forces in the world. He was a favourite of Roosevelt, himself a navalist, 
and undoubtedly influenced the decision to sail the Great White Fleet in 1907.11  
Mahan’s ‘prestige’, or the power of ‘attraction’ in the more recent words of Joseph Nye, 
is about image and perception, not truth.  Mahan again: 
 
The decline of prestige may involve as much illusion as its growth; therefore its value, 





For Mahan, if naval ‘prestige’ was to be perceived to be of political utility to government 
it needed not only to be widely recognised but also carefully targeted by timely 
geographical presence.  Though outlining his thesis in the context of the colonial 
powers of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe there is unambiguous read 
across to other ages, including our own.  His point is that national security in peacetime 
can be aided by a ‘decided preponderance at sea.’13 
 
A near contemporary and ‘disciple’ of Corbett was British Admiral and theorist Sir 
Herbert Richmond.14 ‘Sea power, in its full expression,’ he wrote, ‘is a form of national 
strength capable of giving weight to national policy.’15   Like his antecedents, 
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Richmond’s focus on war dominates his work, but his thoughts on the peacetime utility 
of naval force can be found in the pages of his publications.  He attributed the 
expansion of the British Empire to naval power and saw it as a means to national 
greatness and, ultimately, peace: 
 
All the greater naval nations assure the world that a great navy is the surest guarantee 





Unlike Mahan and Corbett, Richmond also alerted his readers to other, non-military, 
naval roles such as humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation and peace 
enforcement, albeit under different terms,17 which fit the broad continuum of naval 
diplomacy. It has been argued that Richmond’s greatest contribution to naval strategy 
was his ‘methodology for intellectual thought’; he taught about the relation of force to 
diplomacy and the ways that navies could be used as ‘instruments of statecraft.’18  
 
It is evident that the writers of the classic naval texts understood the utility of naval 
forces in non-war situations, even if they did not always shine the torch of their attention 
there.  Terminology may have changed but ‘flying the flag’ and ‘prestige’, ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ and ‘demonstration’ equate to soft and hard power, defence and coercive 
diplomacy respectively.  Writing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, however, neither Mahan nor Corbett could possibly place their work 
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in the context of a pre-Cold War world; as far as they were concerned they were 
recording for posterity the enduring principles of maritime strategy.  With the benefit of 
hindsight later historians added a different perspective but the views of Mahan and 
Corbett generally stood the test of time. 
 
However, one aspect of ‘peacetime’ naval operations strikingly absent from the classic 
texts is their use beyond inter-state power relationships.  Internal, domestic conflict 
could also be potentially resolved by coercion from the sea.  Richard Hill gave a good 
example of this in his War at Sea in the Ironclad Age in which he describes how British 
ships were repositioned from South America in 1857 and contributed greatly to the 
suppression of the Indian Mutiny.19  Flexibility of response and demonstration of intent, 
of course, are not uniquely maritime traits and armies have long been used to keep in 
check their fellow subjects, including during the Indian Mutiny.  Nonetheless, Hill’s point 
is a good one – navies are not always targeted at other states. 
 
Multi-polarity in global affairs was often not as anarchic as might at first be assumed; it 
was generally accompanied by one dominant power.  From the eighteenth century until 
at least the early twentieth that dominant power was Britain and the Royal Navy 
effectively enjoyed command of the sea.  Robert Keohane coined the term ‘hegemonic 
stability theory’ to describe the situation in which a wider peace is the result of the 
diplomacy, coercion and persuasion of the leading power;20 during the period of 
Britain’s dominance this was commonly referred to as the Pax Britannica. 
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Jeremy Black acknowledged the role the naval forces of a hegemonic power could play 
in maintaining the world order: ‘throughout much of the nineteenth century, foreign 
expectations and fears about British power allowed Britain to get grudging unofficial 
recognition of the Pax Britannica, the doctrine of the Royal Navy keeping the peace of 
the sea for all to benefit’.21  Some writers have labelled the British use of seapower 
during the Pax Britannica as ‘altruistic’22 but this rather misses the point.  Britain 
maintained her leading position in the world through economic strength supported by 
military, predominantly naval, might.  The use of British seapower during the period was 
very much directed in the national interest and thus as an instrument of state power; it 
was all the more effective for rarely having to resort to force.  It communicated strength.  
 
However, Britain’s naval supremacy did not go unchallenged.  The pre-First World War 
naval arms race with Germany has already been alluded to and is well documented, 
with both sides resorting to use their fleets for geopolitical gain; in Germany Tirpitz’s 
vision of maritime ascendancy inspired the national leadership23 and Kaiser Wilhelm 
gave an ‘imperial performance’ to mark Germany’s intent to be a world power whilst at 
Tangier during a Mediterranean cruise in 1905.24  In the United Kingdom the ‘Navy 
Scare’ of 1909 (the news of the acceleration of German naval build programme) was 
used to justify huge increases in Royal Navy Dreadnought numbers.25  At the same 
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time the United States also sought to claim its place as a first-rank power largely 
through the expansion of its own navy.  Henry Hendrix documented the rise of this 
aspiring power in his book Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy which uses a series 
of case studies to demonstrate the utility of the naval forces available to the 
government.  Many are coercive in nature, such as the defence of the Panamanian 
Revolution in 1903 when the province was attempting to gain independence from 
Colombia,26 and the heavy-handed deployment of a squadron to Tangier after the 
kidnapping of an American citizen in Morocco in the same year.27  In Mahanian terms 
these examples show the character of a young state increasingly willing to act in an 
‘expeditionary’ manner but, in themselves, they cannot achieve Roosevelt’s aim.  The 
crowning glory of the US Navy at the time and the balanced counter to its ‘negative’ 
coercion was its ‘positive’ defence diplomacy in the sailing of ‘The Great White Fleet.’  A 
combination of hard and soft power is the most effective means of achieving a grand 
strategic aim. 
 
The Cold War was not born out of a long peace and naval diplomacy continued through 
the two world wars of the twentieth century.  Detailed analysis of the instances of naval 
diplomacy in those conflicts is beyond the remit of this research, but it is worth 
mentioning one case which has become a classic of its type.  The Altmark incident took 
place in early 1940 when British naval forces under Captain Vian in HMS Cossack 
intercepted a German auxiliary, the Altmark, in Norwegian territorial waters.  The case 
is interesting because of the complexities of the tripartite situation.  Britain and 
Germany were at war but, at the time, Norway remained neutral.  Britain did not want to 
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antagonise a neutral state, especially one of such strategic importance, but had limited 
time to liberate the prisoners if they were not to be lost for the remainder of the war.  
Germany likewise professed to observe Norwegian neutrality yet were in breach of it by 
transporting prisoners of war through territorial waters.  The eventual outcome, after 
protests from Norway and the presence of Norwegian warships, was that Cossack used 
limited force against Altmark and the prisoners were recovered.  The norms of naval 
diplomacy were well expressed in the orders to Vian from Winston Churchill: ‘Suggest 
to Norwegian destroyer that honour is served by submitting to superior force.’28   
 
Churchill’s words, quoted in James Cable’s seminal work Gunboat Diplomacy, are 
significant.  The act of naval diplomacy was not the limited force used between the 
British and German protagonists, but the leverage exerted on the Norwegians to ensure 
non-interference, and it was the result of a power relationship.  Churchill, it could be 
surmised, would have been very comfortable with Cable’s assertion that ‘gunboat 
diplomacy is traditionally a weapon employed by the strong against the weak.’29  
 
Connecting the ideas of pre-Cold War naval theorists, it is possible to build a generic 
‘classical’ model of naval diplomacy.  Grouping the whole under Mahan’s banner of 
‘navies in peacetime’ offers a convenient starting point, though ‘peacetime’ should 
probably be defined by what it is not (traditional warfighting) rather than what it is (the 
range of actions up to and including the use of ‘limited’ force).  This thesis argues that 
the use of the term ‘navies in peacetime’ would be acceptable to Corbett, Richmond 
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and others as a recognisable alternative for ‘limited war’ and ‘statecraft’; beneath this 
banner can be found three major constituents of classical naval diplomacy. 
 
Mahan’s ‘check’ can be directly equated with Corbett’s ‘demonstration’ and Richmond’s 
‘guarantor of peace’.  Each term or phrase suggests a situation in which a naval force, 
whether concentrated together to achieve a particular result or dispersed more widely to 
provide latent effect, supports grand strategy by preventing total war.  Similarly, the 
military strategic benefits brought by a ‘fleet-in-being’, that existential force which limits 
an adversary’s freedom of action and decision making, can be considered in the same 
way.  Taken together, therefore, the first constituent part of classical naval diplomacy is 
deterrence; one reason why a government might choose to maintain a navy is to deter. 
 
Mahan talked of ‘prestige’ and ‘flying the flag’ whilst Richmond promoted the 
importance of navies in displaying ‘national greatness’.  At the time the classical writers 
shaped their theories warships were the most complex pieces of machinery on earth 
and truly effective navies were a tool only available to those who could afford the 
expense.  Like the ventures into space or the nuclear weapons ‘club’ to follow, active 
participants in a naval ‘race’ were signalling their economic strength and national 
prowess for the world to see.  The second reason for a government to invest in a 
powerful navy, therefore, was to claim status or rank amongst competitor states.   
 
Support to allies, the building of relationships, coalitions, partnerships and the spread of 
goodwill are also significant factors in the established employment of navies in 
peacetime.  Mahan wrote at length about ‘co-operation’, emphasising state-to-state 
benefits; less well known but equally valid, the non-military roles described by 
Richmond could be argued to be agencies of intervention which influence perception 
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and which therefore affect a government’s wider national interests.  The third 
constituent of naval diplomacy, then, is the naval force’s ability to deliver harmony 
amongst states; this could be termed ‘amity’. 
 
Of course, not all of the classicists’ points fall naturally into one of the three categories 
identified and the generic model proposed below is certainly a simplification.  Corbett’s 
‘blockade’ for example, might be considered a form of acute deterrence or coercion but 
the link is more tenuous than the other constituent parts.  However, this thesis argues 
that there are sufficient commonalities to construct a generic, ‘classical’ model of naval 
diplomacy. 
 
However, these three pillars, deterrence, status and amity, need not be mutually 
exclusive.  Indeed, they could be seen operating almost as a virtuous circle.  By 
building alliances, aggression might be deterred.  By being perceived as strong in 
battle, friendships, whether real or of convenience, might be won.  By balancing 
popularity and fear a certain status might be achieved.  By occupying high rank in the 
pecking order of states, the more aggression is deterred and the more partnerships 
may be attracted.  It might be more appropriate, therefore, to acknowledge this 
interdependency and display the classical model differently.  However it is displayed, 
the pre-Cold War naval thinkers readily admitted that there is a place for naval power in 













Figure 2.1: Inter-dependent Classical Naval Diplomacy 
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INTO THE COLD WAR: THE ‘STANDARD’ MODEL 
 
The political climate of the Cold War perhaps placed more stringent limits on the use of 
force, certainly between the major blocs, as the strategic focus turned to nuclear 
deterrence.  Though greater utility was attached to the non-forceful role of the military 
instrument little academic attention was directed that way; one exception to this was the 
work of Sir James Cable.30  Cable was instrumental in moving the understanding of 
naval diplomacy forward but he was, essentially, a Cold War writer.  Although the 
period of his analysis, reported over three editions of his book, ran from the end of the 
First World War to the early 1990s, it was inevitably viewed through a prism of binary 
state-to-state relations.  Coercive by definition, gunboat diplomacy was always ‘done’ 
by one side to another.  It is telling that Cable chronicled each of the incidents through 
the seven decades of his study in terms of an ‘assailant’ and a ‘victim’.  Yet, as the 
Altmark case demonstrates, the reality can be more complex; the forces of three states 
were directly involved, the rest of the world was watching and there were domestic 
audiences on all sides eager for good news in the progress of the war.  Binary, it was 
not. 
 
However, it must be borne in mind that the scrutiny given to naval diplomacy during the 
Cold war was set in the context of a global politico-military atmosphere of strategic 
deterrence.  Emphasis was invariably on the coercive element, not the ‘mere flag 
waving’ at the softer end of the spectrum that Cable dismissed, and the focus tended to 
be limited to the state actors involved.  Again in the words of Cable, ‘gunboat diplomacy 
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is something that governments do to foreigners’,31 not all of which had to be abroad.  
His definition sets the tone: 
 
Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of 
war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an 
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the 
jurisdiction of their own state.
32
   
 
The robust language used by Cable, a professional diplomat, is an enduring 
characteristic of his work.  He believed that coercion was implicit in most aspects of 
international relations and that if a government was willing to ‘reward friends and to 
punish enemies its wishes will at least receive careful consideration.’33 This realist 
approach reflects the dominant thinking of the latter half of the Cold War and echoes 
Schelling’s wider theories.   
 
To be coercive a threat must be more than a generalised prediction of disastrous 
consequences, however plausible, in the immediate future.  It must express readiness to 
do something injurious to the interest of another government unless that government 




The realist tradition also provided a framework for Cable’s explanation of coercion at 
sea.  To Cable, gunboat diplomacy could be categorised into four modes which he 
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discussed in descending order of effectiveness.  Definitive force he explained as the act 
or threat of force which possessed a definitive purpose apparent to both sides.  The 
intent of the employing force must be recognised as being limited and must be 
considered tolerable by the recipient.  A tolerable result, he explained, would be one 
which in the eyes of the ‘victim’ is more desirable than resort to war:35   
 
A government embarking on an act of genuinely limited force should thus have a 
reasonable expectation that force initially employed will be sufficient to achieve the 
specific purpose originally envisaged without regard to the reactions of the victim, whose 
options are thus confined to acquiescence, ineffectual resistance or a retaliation that can 
only follow, and not prevent, the achievement of the desired result.  In such cases, the 




Cable offered the Altmark incident as one example of definitive force; for another he 
discussed the USS Pueblo incident of 1968.37  Pueblo was a surveillance vessel 
operating off the coast of North Korea.  She was approached and eventually fired on by 
North Korean warships and, being unarmed, gave way and was escorted into port.  The 
ship’s company was held captive for eleven months before being released.  The use of 
force by North Korea was limited and definitive in that it had a readily identifiable goal of 
‘humiliating’ the United States and putting an end to ‘spying’ on its coasts.  Against the 
backdrop of the war in Vietnam the assailant’s calculation that the outcome was 
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preferable to further escalation and therefore tolerable in the eyes of the US was proved 
correct.38 
 
Purposeful force, according to Cable, is less direct and less reliable than definitive.39  
He explained it as limited naval force applied in order to change the policy or character 
of a foreign government.  In itself, he wrote, the force does not do anything, it acts to 
induce the recipient to take a decision that would not otherwise have been taken.40 One 
example he used for purposeful force was that of the actions of the superpowers in the 
Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973.  Israel was a ‘client’ state 
of the US whilst Egypt and Syria looked to the Soviet Union for support.  Following a 
Soviet threat to intervene on the Arab side the US Sixth Fleet was reinforced and 
concentrated to the south of Crete on high alert.  The Soviets responded with a series 
of provocative anti-carrier exercises which included the training of weapons on the 
American ships but, ultimately, they did not resort to combative intervention and the war 
ended.41 
 
Catalytic force was described by Cable as when limited naval power ‘lends a hand’ to 
act as a catalyst in a situation the direction of which has yet to be determined.42  Cable 
is rather ambiguous about the use of catalytic force and labels few of the incidents in 
his chronological appendix as such.  In essence, he explained it as an act undertaken 
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when there is an underlying feeling that ‘something is going to happen’.43 Less effective 
than either definitive or purposeful force, it is more likely to result in failure.  The 
bombardment of targets in Beirut by USS New Jersey in 1983 when peacekeeping 
forces were under threat ashore is cited as an example,44 though this, and other cases, 
could be just as easily be placed in one or other of Cable’s categories. 
 
The final mode of Cable’s gunboat diplomacy, where warships are employed to 
emphasize attitudes or to make a point, is expressive force which Cable readily 
dismissed as ‘the last and least of the uses of limited naval force’ with vague and 
uncertain results.45  Cable explained how the purposeful can descend into the 
expressive, such as in the Beira patrol of the 1960s when the British attempted to 
prevent the import of oil to Rhodesia,46 or it can be discrete and standalone.  As an 
example of the latter he recounted how, after newspaper reports that Spain was no 
longing pressing its claims to Gibraltar, a Spanish aircraft carrier and twelve escorts 
anchored in the Bay of Algerciras, supposedly as an expression of their government’s 
continued determination.47 Cable’s justification for including expressive force as a 
category in his analysis was simply because it was commonly employed, affording 
governments the visual manifestation of their position with little political commitment.  
Effectively, his justification underlined the particular advantages of naval forces as 
communicative tools. 
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The first edition of Gunboat Diplomacy was published in 1971 and was met with positive 
praise which was still alive thirty-five years later.  Richard Hill, for instance, opined that 
Cable’s work ‘sharpened to a point the theory and experience of ‘effectiveness short of 
war’ and reminded navies of what they had been doing rather than what they had been 
training for.’48   
 
‘Setting the Standard’ 
 
Cable’s work on naval diplomacy is certainly seminal.  Eric Grove stated that it was ‘a 
landmark, one of the most significant works on maritime power of the twentieth 
century,’49 and Malcolm Murfett wrote that it had been ‘modified but not overturned,’50 
by later theorists.  However, the extent to which it influenced others in the study of the 
diplomacy at sea is perhaps best summed up in the words written in his obituary in the 
Daily Telegraph in 2001: 
 
Post-Cold War naval thinking, especially in Britain and America, is replete with implicit 
and explicit references to Cable’s ideas about the political influence of naval force.
51  
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A review of the current doctrinal publications of maritime powers shows this claim to be 
accurate.  Cable clearly had an impact in his native United Kingdom; so close were his 
ties with the naval establishment that the Foreword to the Third Edition of Gunboat 
Diplomacy was written by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald, who had retired as the 
First Sea Lord and professional head of the Royal Navy just the year before its 
publication.52  The most recent (fourth) iteration of the official publication British 
Maritime Doctrine53 has no direct attribution to Cable, though his influence is 
discernible,54 but its antecedents all did.  For instance, the third edition of the doctrine, 
published in 2004, includes a discussion of naval diplomacy in which Cable’s work is of 
notable influence;55 it also includes a bibliographical essay on doctrine and the 
development of British naval strategic thought which references Cable extensively and 
recommends his works to practitioners for further professional reading.56 
 
The Royal Australian Navy similarly produces a professional reading list and that, too, 
includes two of Cable’s books (Gunboat Diplomacy and Diplomacy at Sea).57 Australian 
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Maritime Doctrine also acknowledges Cable in its treatment of operations short of war.58  
Canadian doctrine attempts to distance itself from ‘gunboat diplomacy’ which it calls a 
‘pejorative’ term, preferring instead the more modern term naval diplomacy which it 
believes to be comprised of preventive deployments, coercion, presence and symbolic 
use of naval power.59  The terminology used in Canada may not be Cable’s but many of 
the ideas are and, again, he is formally acknowledged in the publication.60 It is not only 
the Western navies which owe a debt to Sir James Cable for doctrinal development; his 
work can also be seen in, for instance, contemporary Indian maritime strategy, which 
states that the ‘main business of major navies …. is to use warships in support of 
foreign policy,’61 and which mentions Cable in the bibliography.62 
 
However, as the Daily Telegraph obituary stated, Cable’s work was especially important 
in the United States.  The American maritime vision paper, A Co-operative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower, does not contain a direct reference to Cable but it does discuss 
the concepts of deterrence at sea and forward presence with which he would have 
been very familiar.  Indeed, when the US Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) published a 
historiography of ‘capstone’ documents and books which shaped the development of 
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strategic thought it expressly listed Cable’s work as important in both the development 
of naval missions and as an influence on policy in the 1970s.63   
 
The CNA took Cable’s work seriously from the very start; one of its analysts produced a 
review of the first edition of Gunboat Diplomacy as a ‘Professional Paper’ in 1973.  
Acknowledging the paucity of attention paid to the topic at the time the analyst stated 
that ‘even to consider gunboat diplomacy for a book length treatment is rather daring.’64 
The review went on to add that Cable’s work can be traced back to limited war theory 
and that Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, was ‘attracted’ by gunboat 
diplomacy.65  The review ends on a precautionary note, stating that ‘critics of the 
defense [sic] budget will find grist for their mills in his [Cable’s] criticism of large 
expensive general purpose force navies.’66  It was the first time that Cable’s work was 
cited as a potential influence on the debate on naval force structures. 
 
Clearly present in official doctrine, Cable’s influence can also be traced in academia, 
from the Cold War period when his ideas were first published through to the present 
day.  He is referenced in Edward Luttwak’s The Political Uses of Sea Power written in 
1974,67 in the 1995 book Navies and Global Defense,68 and he can be found in the 
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more recent (2010) generalist text book Strategy in the Contemporary World,69 amongst 
many other acknowledgements.  Geoffrey Till’s Seapower, a more specialist guide for 
the student of maritime and naval operations, discusses Cable’s taxonomy of gunboat 
diplomacy,70 and he is mentioned several times in a chapter dedicated to naval 
diplomacy.71 Similarly, Ian Speller, contributing the chapter ‘Naval Warfare’ in the 2008 
book Understanding Modern Warfare reminds the reader of Cable’s categories when 
describing the diplomatic role as one of the ‘functions of navies’,72 and again in his 2014 
book Understanding Naval Warfare.73 
 
That Cable’s work can be traced through such wide and varied publications with direct 
influence on naval tactics, operations and strategy is of signal importance.  The model, 
this thesis argues, manifestly set the standard and, though it carries some 
shortcomings,74 regularly provides the starting point for consideration of naval 
diplomacy.  Later theorists may not have adopted all of Cable’s concepts, in particular 
his classification of the various ‘modes’, but they have generally been consistent with 
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his approach to gunboat diplomacy as an action taken by one state-centric actor 
against another. 
 
Cable’s Model as a Hierarchical Framework    
 
The model is, by Cable’s own admission, hierarchical.  The categories of political 
influence which he identified (Definitive, Purposeful, Catalytic and Expressive) are 
discussed in Gunboat Diplomacy in a descending order of efficacy, from the ‘fait 
accompli’ of definitive force,75 to the ‘last and least’ of expressive.76  Important to the 
understanding of the model is the realisation that Cable chose to classify his categories 
as adjectives; the instigating party would be attempting to achieve a definitive or 
purposeful result, would look to change the situation by the use of a catalytic naval 
force, or merely communicate its wishes by expressive means.  By classifying the 
categories in this way Cable unintentionally (or perhaps, intentionally) bounded his 
model to the original objective of the assailant with respect to the victim and not 
necessarily with any regard to wider stakeholders or thought for multi-layered 
messages. 
 
Displaying this hierarchy diagrammatically would result in a simple tiering based on 
effectiveness. Cable, however, does acknowledge that an action or incident of 
naval/gunboat diplomacy may fall into two or more categories,77 and that changing 
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circumstances may mean that an action initially designed to fit one category could 
migrate to another.78 The tiers in the diagram, therefore, are not discrete but show the 
possibility of movement up and down through the various modes.   
 
Finally, whilst Cable’s model does not span the full continuum of international relations 
and is situated very much at the coercive, harder end of the spectrum of behaviour, 
dismissing as it does the more benign applications of naval influence in preventive 
diplomacy, such as friendly port visits, the categories can be positioned relative to each 
other on an axis from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ power.  From this, it may be deduced that, in 
modern parlance, Cable’s model suggests that the application of hard naval power is 
more effective than soft. 
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Cable was adamant that Gunboat Diplomacy’s chronological appendix should not be 
used for mathematical or geographical analysis; he pointed out that the incidents he 
chose merely illustrated the range and did not represent an accurate cross-section of 
gunboat diplomacy.79  However, to accept such a rebuttal of one form of critical analysis 
of his work without question is perhaps short-sighted.  Cable based his arguments and 
his theories on the very examples he chose and therefore this thesis argues that an 
examination of those examples is a valid technique in assessing his work.  Moreover, 
Cable did so himself, identifying peaks and troughs in the frequency of his cases and 
stating that ‘for seventy years there has been no clear trend of change governing the 
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use of limited naval force or in the relative incidence of success or failure in its 
employment.’80   
 
What the examples do show the reader is that, in broad order, Cable chose to 
document relatively few incidents of naval diplomacy in the first two decades of the 
period of his study (though he did state that the number of incidents in China in the 
1920s was far larger than those shown81), fewer still in the Second World War and an 
increasing number as the Cold War progressed.  Of those Cold War incidents that he 
did record almost forty percent involved a state from one or other of the major blocs 
operating against a Third World or lesser developed state,82 perhaps informing his 
earlier assertion that gunboat diplomacy is carried out by the strong against the weak.83  
Even though Cable made a claim that definitive force, which he viewed as the most 
effective mode of naval diplomacy, is the ‘rarest form’,84 this is not borne out by his own 
choice of examples.  He chose to record only half as many incidents of definitive force 
as he did purposeful, but expressive force has fewer still and catalytic least of all.85  
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The conclusion drawn from this brief quantitative assessment, with the caveat that it is 
somewhat limited precisely because of Cable’s insistence that his examples were 
illustrative not exhaustive, is that Cable’s views on the relative effectiveness of his 
categories of gunboat diplomacy and on the nature of the actors involved reinforced his 
choice of example and vice versa.  That more were drawn from a period and a conflict 
in which he was most familiar and actively involved as a British diplomat is also telling. 
Cable’s model, though seminal, is still a product of the Cold War. 
 
Change and Trends  
 
In the third and final edition of Gunboat Diplomacy written in the aftermath of the Cold 
War Cable himself questioned the validity of the concepts he devised in the 1970s and 
1980s.86 Though he did not doubt that there would be a future for coercive diplomacy 
which ‘navies will usually find it easier than armies or air forces’ to practice, 87 he did 
dare to offer some early ‘impressions’ for the years to come.  Acknowledging the 
imprudence of such conjecture, he suggested that: 
 
… more governments use gunboat diplomacy today than occurred a century ago; that 
the roles of victim and assailant are now more equally shared between the great powers 
and lesser states; that warships must increasingly be used and not merely moved; that 
prestige in the 1980s had lost the potency it still possessed in the 1920s.  These are, 
however, essentially impressions.  They could be challenged on a different interpretation 
of history: they could be destroyed by the events of the coming decade.
88  
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In his analysis of change (which he termed The Altered Environment) Cable discussed 
both historical and political factors, but devoted a substantial number of pages to 
technology as a driver for change.  Clearly there are certain technological advances 
which fundamentally alter the military dimension of international relations; the 
development of nuclear weapons after the Second World War and the evolution of 
deterrence as a primary strategy being a pertinent example. Cable discussed nuclear 
deterrence and its potential to lessen the use of limited naval force, but concluded that 
the two need not be mutually exclusive.89   
 
However, an aspect of technological progress which Cable did expect to reduce the 
effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy was the improvement in ‘detection’ capabilities.  
Fixed defences, comprehensive picture building and early warning systems ‘may 
[Cable’s italics] operate to the detriment of gunboat diplomacy,’90 he wrote, presumably 
by limiting offshore manoeuvre and removing the element of surprise; this, if proven to 
be correct, would challenge the navalist’s faith in such enduring attributes as poise (see 
Chapter 5 for further discussion).   
 
It is perhaps surprising given Cable’s views on the importance of detection that he 
placed such low stock in the use of the submarine in gunboat diplomacy.91 This position 
was challenged in a US Naval Postgraduate School master’s thesis by Brent Ditzler, 
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who came to the reasonable conclusion that the submarine is, in fact, a credible and 
well used tool of naval diplomacy, able to be used for ‘strategic signalling’, as when the 
American SSBN USS Abraham Lincoln put to sea within 15 hours of Soviet missiles 
being found in Cuba during the 1962 crisis, 92 and subsequently when Soviet boats paid 
a series of highly visible visits to the island in the late 1960s and early 1970s.93   
 
Success and Failure 
 
If it is accepted that naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and that 
diplomacy is a means of communication between international actors, then Cable’s 
criteria for assessing the efficacy of action fits neatly into Schelling’s and George’s 
conceptual theories on coercive strategies discussed in Chapter 1.  Accordingly, 
Cable’s model bases its judgement of success against the original objective of the 
instigating party.94  As a rational actor the ‘assailant’ chooses to influence behaviour 
using naval force and the ‘victim’ responds in either the predicted manner, or if the 
calculation is wrong, does not.  Cable’s views, therefore, on the greater effectiveness of 
actions with clearly defined objectives, is a logical progression of his argument.  Vague 
or even long term incrementally-approached objectives are, almost by definition, more 
difficult to measure and are hence more likely to be viewed as failures, or at least not 
clear successes.  As a result of this perspective the measurement of success or failure 
of an action on, for example, third parties, allies, the international community, or 
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domestic audiences does not feature in Cable’s work.  As has been argued earlier, his 
approach is binary. 
 
To illustrate the point it is worth considering one of Cable’s own examples. Though of 
course conceding that the end result was ‘war and defeat’, Gunboat Diplomacy’s  
chronological appendix judges the original Argentinean seizure of the Falkland Islands 
in 1982 as a success of limited naval force.95  The action is deemed definitive, 
Argentina is judged the ‘assailant’ and Britain is categorised as the ‘victim’.  Clearly, 
considered against an original objective assumed to be sovereignty of the islands held 
in Argentinean rather than British hands, the immediate result was successful.  
However, this in itself then poses the question of timescale on measures of 
effectiveness: is the result to be judged without delay, after a month, a year, or following 
a ‘permanent’ change of situation?   
 
 
Applying Cable Today 
 
Does Cable’s model work in the twentieth-first century?  Michael Codner of RUSI has 
written that ‘it does not stand up to the test of strategic analysis and is not particularly 
useful for military practitioners.’96 However, this thesis argues that although changes 
have undoubtedly taken place on the world stage since Gunboat Diplomacy was last 
updated, the strengths and limitations of the model remain extant.  It could certainly be 
applied to contemporary incidents of naval diplomacy.  For example, the deployment of 
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US carrier battle groups during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 could be described as 
use of expressive force97, and Royal Navy operations off Sierra Leone against a non-
state actor during that country’s civil war in 2000 could be judged to be either definitive 
or purposeful;98 both would almost certainly be deemed successful against initial intent.  
However, the second example also demonstrates the limitations of the Cable model 
and narrowness of his definitions – that the ‘victim’ was not a state actor but a 
revolutionary movement does not fit the ‘standard’. 
 
This thesis argues that Cable was a useful starting point for the study of naval 
diplomacy in the Cold War era, but that even then it insufficiently captured the 
complexities and possibilities of coercive naval force; that it largely ignores the 
application of naval ‘soft power’ also limits its appeal for planners and practitioners in 
the twenty-first century.   
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THE ‘POST-CABLE COLD WAR’ MODEL 
 
In the years following publication of the first edition of Gunboat Diplomacy scholars from 
both East and West responded with works of their own on the topic. The most influential 
writings, those of Turner, Luttwak, Booth and Gorshkov, together shape what might be 
called the ‘Cold War’ model of naval diplomacy.    
 
In an influential article in 1974 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner USN explained what he 
saw as the US Navy’s four missions – strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of 
power ashore and naval presence, which he claimed were the products of an 
evolutionary process.99 Though a reader might question Turner’s historical analysis (he 
asserted that ‘the first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control’, and that 
‘warning and coercion .. [and] demonstrations of goodwill effectively began in the 
nineteenth century’100), the codification of naval presence as a core role was a seminal 
step in the development of theory.  The role, however, was akin to ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’,101 and consisted of either deterrent or coercive elements, which could be 
accomplished by preventive (a show of strength in peacetime) or reactive (responding 
to a crisis) deployments. The targets were to be the Soviet Union or its allies or 
unaligned third states.102  The potential for naval forces to contribute to alliance or 
capacity building, assistance or cooperation was not mentioned by Turner.  
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Many commentators cite Turner’s 1974 article when considering the development of 
naval diplomacy,103 but few discuss the genesis of his ideas. In 1970, on assuming the 
appointment of US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt initiated Project 
60, a plan of action for his tenure which aimed to put the US Navy at the highest 
feasible combat readiness in the face of the Soviet threat.104  It was in Project 60 
(admittedly drafted by Turner) that the naval mission of ‘overseas presence in 
peacetime’ was first revealed and its rationale was directly linked to the ‘emergence of a 
strong, worldwide deployed Soviet Navy.’105  
 
Today the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is as great as ours; 10 years ago 
it was negligible.  We devote fewer than 800 ship days a year to limited parts of the 
Indian Ocean; the Soviets’ reach over that area has gone from zero ship days to 2400 in 






All of a nation’s maritime capabilities bear on its influence around the world and its ability 
to establish a peacetime presence at a point of choice.  We need not look hard to see 
how the Soviets have translated their naval presence into diplomatic leverage.  Their 
strength in the Arab world today is not entirely attributable to the build up of their 
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Mediterranean fleet, but it was surely an important factor.  The Soviets have, in a sense, 




Crucially, however, the espousal of naval presence was not simply as a counter to a 
perceived threat.  Project 60 was also set against the realities of 1970s financial 
constraints, an unpopular war in Vietnam and a desire for allies to shoulder more of the 
burden.  For the latter the paper pointed out that ‘the commitment of even our closest 
friends will depend on their assessment of our naval power, compared with the 
Soviets.’108   American naval diplomacy of the 1970s, then, was to varying degrees a 
reaction to an adversary, a means to encourage allies and an attempt to keep budgets 
under control.  
 
Stansfield Turner provided a diagram to show how the four ‘interdependent naval 
missions’ were configured (see Figure 3.3, below).  Strategic deterrence was clearly the 
bedrock of his vision and was based, as would be expected of the dominant theory of 
the time, on the concept of nuclear deterrence and, in particular, on the ability to 
maintain an ‘assured second strike’ capability.109 This deterrence evidently had a strong 
communicative base and could itself be placed under the naval diplomatic umbrella as 
defined in this research.  However, it is the naval presence mission, which Turner 
defined as ‘the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives,’110 which 
demands the greatest analysis. 
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Figure 2.3: Independent Naval Missions (from Turner)111 
 
Turner framed his approach to naval presence on three levels.  Firstly, he offered the 
opinion that its use would be to achieve one of two broad ‘objectives’: it could ‘deter 
actions inimical to the interests of the United States or its allies’; or, it could ‘encourage 
actions that are in the interests of the United States or its allies.’112 The latter objective 
could equally be termed coercion or compellence. 
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Secondly, Turner explained the ‘tactics’ by which these objectives might be 
accomplished.  ‘Preventive deployments’ were those peacetime global dispositions 
which would be relevant to, and presumably targeted at, the areas in which ‘problems 
might arise’, they should not involve forces which were ‘markedly inferior to some other 
naval force in the neighborhood [sic],’  and they should be able to be reinforced if 
necessary.113  Turner did not explicitly provide examples of where preventive 
deployments might be targeted but, given his work’s origins in Project 60, it could be 
deduced that the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean would be priority regions. ‘Reactive 
deployments’ were described by Turner as those made in response to a crisis and 
which would need to possess ‘an immediately credible threat and be prepared to have 
its bluff called.’114 Preventive and reactive deployment can be directly aligned with 
Luttwak’s latent and active suasion discussed below.  Of note, they do not specifically 
include deployments designed to build amity or friendship amongst states. 
 
Thirdly, Turner outlined five basic ‘actions’ by and through which a naval presence force 
could achieve its aim: amphibious assault, air attack, bombardment, blockade, and 
exposure through reconnaissance.115 This objective-tactic-action approach can be 
criticised for not including the fleet-in-being concept, protection of trade, humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief and for not acknowledging the potential of submarines.116 
However, it did break new ground by providing the first framework to describe what 














naval diplomacy might do, rather than what had been done in the past (that is, through 
historical analysis). 
 




Figure 2.4: Turner’s Naval Presence Mission 
 
Edward Luttwak, an American military strategist, published The Political Uses of Sea 
Power in 1974.  The book, though short, ranges widely and debates the use of armed 
forces in general before settling on naval power.  Rather than be constrained by 
























his arguments.  Suasion, he wrote, is a ‘conveniently neutral term […] whose meaning 
suggests the indirectness of any political application of naval force.’117   
 
It could be argued that the ‘political application of naval force’ need not be ‘indirect’ as 
Luttwak states,118 but his point is accepted; ‘naval suasion’ is a more subtle phrase than 
‘gunboat diplomacy’, implying a degree of non-forceful influence rather than physical 
action.  In this respect it is perhaps more sophisticated than Turner’s hard power 
description of the naval presence mission. However, the phrase is not universally 
accepted. Michael Codner, in an adaptation of Luttwak’s typology written in 2009, 
substituted the word ‘inducement’ for ‘suasion’ because, he argued, it was ‘a word not 
widely used except amongst scholars.’119 However, this thesis argues that though 
‘suasion’ may not be instinctively understood by the casual reader, Codner missed the 
point; it better captures the concept which Luttwak was attempting to describe than 
does ‘inducement’, or any other words of similar meaning to be found in the thesaurus.  
Additionally, ‘suasion’ has a distinct advantage as a means of describing the cognitive 
effects and outcomes desired of naval diplomacy: the word is impartial and helpfully 
imprecise. Indeed, the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines suasion in a ‘moral’ sense, 
particularly useful in the peacetime application of naval diplomacy; it is ‘persuasion as 
opposed to force’.120 
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Acknowledging the imprecision of the term when applied to sea power, Luttwak 
explained that suasion pertains to ‘other’s reactions, and not the actions, or intent, of 
the deploying party,’121 a notable departure from Cable’s and Turner’s, approach. The 
assumption of rationality in the cognitive decision making process of all parties, 
articulated well in Alexander George’s works on coercive diplomacy,122 is also 
acknowledged: ‘Because suasion can only operate through the filters of others’ 
perceptions, the exercise of suasion is inherently unpredictable in its results.’123  
 
Under the umbrella of naval suasion Luttwak placed a spectrum of operations from 
routine deployments to deliberate action.  At what might be called the ‘softer’ end, 
where he situated routine deployments, navies could deliver local deterrent (with a 
small ‘d’) or supportive functions.  Luttwak labelled this end of the spectrum ‘latent 
suasion’ and it correlates well with Cable’s expressive force; later commentators might 
also subsume it into wider preventive and ‘defence diplomacy’.  Deliberate action, the 
‘active’ side of Luttwak’s spectrum corresponding to definitive or purposeful force in 
Cable’s terminology, was further broken down into the positive and negative elements 
of coercive diplomacy. 
 
Luttwak’s work was very much a product of the Cold War, quite obviously influenced by 
Cable and Schelling (both are acknowledged), but it is perhaps less politically impartial 
than either of the earlier writers.  Luttwak discussed differences in perceptions of 
military strength between the western and eastern blocs and US ‘self-denigration’,124 he 
                                               
121
 Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, p6. 
 
122
 George, ‘The Coercive Diplomacy’, p70. 
 
123
 Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, p6. 
 
124
 Ibid.,  pp44-45. 
 91 
 
criticised ‘declining ‘ American influence in the Middle East,125 and he identified 
increasing multi-polarity during 1970s détente,126 a conclusion which seems prescient if 
somewhat premature when read four decades later.   
 
Luttwak did not enjoy the same success amongst practitioners as Cable and Booth, 
whose work fed directly into the maritime doctrines of western navies, perhaps because 
the basis of his theory of ‘suasion’ was, in practice, its main limitation.  He robustly 
emphasised prestige, the importance of image and perception over capability, 
dedicating a whole chapter to ‘visibility and viability’ and arguing, for instance, that ‘to 
frighten South Yemen or encourage the Sheik of Abu Dhabi one does not need a 
powerful sonar under the hull or a digital data system in the superstructure.’127 The 
proposition had merit but did not necessarily fit into the political narrative of the time. It 
also falls into the trap of underestimating the target audience. Critics have dismissed his 
simplistic assertions with relative ease, pointing to a range of examples of perceived 
weaker navies who have succeeded over stronger maritime powers; a case in point 
was the success of the Icelandic Navy against Britain during the ‘Cod Wars’.128  
 
The reader of The Political Uses of Sea Power is assisted in understanding the concept 
by Luttwak’s own diagrammatic representation: 
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Figure 2.5: Luttwak’s Typology of Naval Suasion129 
 
As can be seen, Luttwak divided naval suasion into two broad fields, active and latent.  
The former, he contended, existed when the deliberate exercise of naval suasion was 
intended to elicit a given reaction from a specified party.130 This action-reaction 
relationship between parties, mechanistic but not as prescriptive as Cable’s ‘assailant’ 
and ‘victim’ thesis, has the benefit of acknowledging the existence of wider 
stakeholders, a concept returned to in Chapter 5: 
 
The exercise of ‘active’ suasion is defined as any deliberate attempt to evoke a specific 




The second category, latent suasion, is perhaps more interesting, constituting ‘the 
undirected, and hence possibly unintended, reactions evoked by naval deployments 
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maintained on a routine basis.’132  It is also a reasonable approximation of the effects 
desired of Turner’s preventive deployment tactic. Simplified, active suasion is the 
deployment of naval forces with a specific outcome in mind, whereas latent suasion is 
defined by the expected and unexpected outcomes gained from routine, day-to-day 
activity. 
 
A potential limitation of Luttwak’s model is that it discusses the political application of 
naval force in a qualitative manner and does not adequately capture the quantitative 
nature of practical sea power.  On initial reading the categories and subsets of naval 
suasion appear to be given equal weighting.  Luttwak does address this in a passing 
reference, stating that latent suasion is ‘the most general (in terms of intensity) and 
geographically the most widespread form of deterrence’133 but he does not weigh 
supportive suasion against coercive, nor the basics of latent against active.  The 
Luttwak model, then, despite his attempts in the final chapter of The Political Uses of 
Sea Power to relate his thoughts to naval tactics,134 is essentially a theoretical 
construct, as opposed to a discussion of practical experiences. 
 
Ken Booth’s Navies and Foreign Policy, published in 1977, drew on Luttwak’s ideas, 
which he acknowledged as ‘useful’135 but went further in the development of the topic.   
Booth became the architect of the best-known theoretical construct for the use of 
navies; his trinity of functions found its way into the official doctrine of navies, 
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particularly large navies, worldwide.136  In its simplest form the trinity explains how 
navies make use of the sea in military, policing and diplomatic roles: 
 
 
Figure 2.6: The Functions of Navies (from Booth)137 
 
The military and policing functions are not discussed at length in this thesis, but it is 
worthy of note that there is a degree of overlap between the categories.  Booth’s 
military role, for instance, can be divided into both peacetime and wartime activities 
including those under the heading of a ‘balance of power’ function, which Booth 
considered to be geopolitical or diplomatic tasks.  Likewise, his policing role includes a 
‘nation-building’ function which, though Booth chose to restrict ‘mainly’ to territorial 
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waters, can stretch onto the high seas and be used to further national interest.138 This 
aspect of seapower was particularly important to Booth as he claimed that for ‘over one-
third of the world’s navies, coastguard and nation-building responsibilities represent the 
extent of their functions (and ambitions).’139 In essence, Booth was acknowledging a 
different type of naval power, one which grew bottom-up from the smaller navies, as 
opposed to the more common top-down perspectives of other writers which 
concentrated almost entirely on the most powerful navies. 
 
However, concentrating on Booth’s diplomatic role it can be seen that in its simplest 
form the author considered naval diplomacy to have three elements.  The first, 
negotiation from strength, was, he wrote, the ‘political demonstration of naval force’ 
which required ‘presence’, including an ability to operate in the air and to project military 
power ashore, as well as mastering the traditional naval environment, the sea.140  
Booth’s negotiation from strength entailed a number of subsidiary objectives such as 
the reassurance of allies, the improvement of bargaining positions and the ability to 
affect the course of diplomatic negotiations.141 It fits neatly with Luttwak’s ‘supportive’ 
function which spanned both active and latent suasion and can also be considered an 
element in each of the three categories of the ‘classical’ model of naval diplomacy. 
 
Manipulation, the second of Booth’s diplomatic elements, may be considered a 
straightforward extension of the influence tactics of the first.  Booth himself 
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acknowledged the difficulties in making a ‘clear distinction between the exercise of 
naval power and the exercise of naval influence’ because of the ‘subtlety of the stages 
through which a warship can be transformed from a platform for a dance-band and 
cavorting local dignitaries, to a haven of refuge for nationals in distress, to a gun-
platform for shore bombardment.’142 However, this ‘subtlety’ can be navigated.  
Whereas Booth’s concept of power and negotiation from strength tends toward the 
‘status’ and ‘amity’ pillars of classical thought, this thesis contends that manipulation is 
more concerned with coercion; it is the demonstration of naval power, management of 
bargaining positions within an alliance and the gaining of access to new countries.143     
 
The third element of Booth’s diplomatic role is prestige.  Whilst prestige may initially be 
considered a concept less prominent in the modern era than it was in the days of 
imperialism, Booth is convincing of its relevance and devotes a whole chapter of Navies 
and Foreign Policy to its discussion, describing it crudely as ‘the sex appeal of 
politics’.144 In this approach he is clearly influenced by the classic work of international 
relations, Politics Among Nations, by Hans Morgenthau, who Booth quoted when 
offering a definition of prestige as ‘reputation for power’;145 it is interesting that 
Morgenthau similarly devotes a considerable portion of his most famous work to 
prestige, stating that ‘military strength is the obvious measure of a nation’s power’.146 
Importantly in the context of naval diplomacy, Booth considered prestige as a factor 
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both on the world stage, in common with the classical model derived from Mahan, 
Corbett and Richmond, and also domestically, as a means of garnering support from 
the general public and for ‘oiling the wheels of intra-governmental bargaining’.147  
However, the management of self-image can have ‘pitfalls’ as Booth is at pains to point 
out: sex appeal can create ‘false expectations,’148 and returning to the pejorative, ‘one 
man’s goodwill visit may well be another man’s gunboat diplomacy’.149  Nonetheless, 
Booth did identify a ‘prestige race’ as taking place during the Cold War and stated that 
‘prestige may be sufficient justification for expenditure of resources.’150 Effectively, he 
claimed that the seeking of prestige could be a rational strategy. 
 
Booth’s points were not lost on the architect of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei 
Gorshkov.  Before his classic book The Sea Power of the State was published, 
Gorshkov exposed his thoughts through a series of articles, originally released in the 
Soviet journal Morskoi Sbornik in 1972-3 and later translated and reproduced in the 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings magazine throughout 1974.  The 
Proceedings articles, running to eleven in total in consecutive issues from January to 
November of that year, were each accompanied by a commentary by a US Navy flag 
officer, including such luminaries as Arleigh Burke and Stansfield Turner.  The column 
inches that the American publication gave to the Russian’s thoughts over almost an 
entire year, and the degree of parallel analysis, is recognition of the importance of his 
writing to the geopolitical situation of the time.  As Rear Admiral Miller wrote following 
the first instalment: 
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His [Gorshkov’s] writings should be studied as assiduously as European statesmen 
studied Alfred Thayer Mahan’s works during the years preceding World War I.  They are 
of considerable importance in determining the nature and scope of the big-power 




The articles also formed the backdrop to a seminar on Soviet naval development in 
Canada in 1974, which left the participants (one of whom was Ken Booth) with the clear 
impression that Gorshkov was concerned ‘to demonstrate the continuing and increasing 
importance of navies as instruments of state policy in peace and war.’152 Gorshkov, 
obviously, was required reading in that particular period of the Cold War. 
 
Gorshkov suggested that Soviet naval growth after 1945 was managed in direct 
response to American naval advances and not simply designed for the furtherance of 
Soviet foreign policy.153  However, he did use his knowledge of western maritime 
strategy to introduce a forward presence mission to a fleet which had traditionally 
concentrated on coastal defensive tactics. He intuitively understood that the Navy could 
be extremely useful in operations other than war: 
 
                                               
 
151
 Miller, George, H.  ‘Commentary’ following Gorshkov, Sergei, G. ‘Navies in War and Peace.’ 
USNI Proceedings 100, no 1 (1974): p27.  
 
152
 MccGwire, Michael, Booth, Ken & McDonell, John (Eds).  Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and 
Constraints.  (New York: Praeger, 1975), pv. 
 
153
 Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State, pp178-212 
 99 
 
Demonstrative actions by the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve 
political ends without resorting to armed struggle….. The navy has always been an 




However, unlike Cable and Turner, Gorshkov’s notion of naval diplomacy was not 
entirely adversary-centred.  In addition to its coercive potential he saw a role of sea 
power as being a means of ‘holding in check’ allies in order to manage or maintain 
power relationships,155 a concept clearly reminiscent of Mahan’s work.  He was 
particularly intrigued by the UK-US relationship and thought it ‘interesting’ that the 
United States achieved its position of relative maritime pre-eminence in the twentieth 
century through close partnership with Britain, a position which Germany had failed to 
reach through confrontation.156   
 
Equally, he was interested in amity and robustly promoted an ‘ambassadorial’ role for 
the Soviet Navy,157 particularly for spreading influence in the Third World and amongst 
existing ‘client’ states and non-aligned countries.   
 
And, mirroring pre-Cold War naval thinkers, he associated maritime strength with 
national prestige: 
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The strength of the fleets was one of the factors helping states to move into the category 
of great powers. Moreover, history shows that states not possessing naval forces were 




What is clear from Gorshkov’s work is that it was written primarily for a domestic 
Russian audience.  Indeed, John Hibbits wrote in a critique that three major objectives 
were apparent: Gorshkov was attempting to justify the importance of a navy to great 
power status, he was enlisting Communist Party support for the Navy, and he was 
explaining his theory to Soviet sailors.159 However, what is also apparent is that his 
vision was largely reactive and followed developments in the West.  He saw NATO as 
‘an alliance of maritime states, with powerful naval forces occupying advantageous 
strategic positions in the World Ocean’,160 and he used strong rhetoric to illustrate the 
threat he perceived: 
 
For over a century, American imperialism used the navy as the main instrument of its 
aggressive foreign policy in line with prevailing tradition and was impressed by the 





The true intention of western sea power in peacetime, he wrote, was ‘gun diplomacy.’162  
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Gorshkov used the term ‘local wars of imperialism’ to describe his interpretations of 
western strategy and offered the opinion that naval forces were the most suitable 
instruments of state military power because of their mobility, persistence, independence 
ability to be deployed or withdrawn at will.163 The attributes are clearly recognizable and 
though Gorshkov used them in his analysis of NATO strategy they are universal and 
equally applicable to his own forces.  ‘Local wars of imperialism’ was obviously a 
politically charged term but the sense was familiar; the meaning can be directly equated 
to the ‘limited wars’ or ‘limited use of naval power’ of Gunboat Diplomacy. 
 
Emphasising the soft power potential of naval diplomacy, Gorshkov built up a fleet 
which not only comprised a credible fighting force, but one which deployed to non-
traditional operating areas with a forthright agenda to extend communist influence: 
 
The Soviet navy is also used in foreign policy measure by our state.  But the aims of this 
use radically differ from those of the imperialist powers.  The Soviet navy is an 
instrument for a peace-loving policy and friendship of the peoples, for a policy of cutting 
short the aggressive endeavours of imperialism, restraining military adventurism and 
decisively countering threats to the safety of the peoples from the imperialist powers. 
[…] Soviet naval seamen [.. ] feel themselves ambassadors for our country. […] Friendly 
visits by Soviet seamen offer the opportunity to the peoples of the countries visited to 
see for themselves the creativity of socialist principles in our country, the genuine parity 
of the peoples of the Soviet Union and their high cultural level.  In our ships they see the 
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Significantly, a contemporary US analysis of Gorshkov’s original Russian articles 
(perhaps not coincidentally published as an article in same issue of the US Naval War 
College Review as Stansfield Turner’s piece), concludes that Soviet naval strategy was 
defensive and deterrent, based on sea denial rather than control and reactive to the 
West. 165   That analysis may be correct, but it focuses on hard power to the detriment of 
the wider elements of sea power which Gorshkov espoused.  If the Soviet Admiral was 
indeed reacting to US and Western naval supremacy then his asymmetric approach 
involving non-naval means such as research ships, fishing vessels and the merchant 
marine,166  communicated a significant challenge to his adversaries, edging the ‘fight’ 
from an area of known weakness to one closer to parity. 
 
At the end of the 1970s Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell of the US Center for 
Naval Analyses published a study entitled Soviet Naval Diplomacy.  Though Gorshkov 
had clearly been influenced by NATO practices, there was predictably little open source 
material emanating from the East for western researchers to examine.  ‘While 
researchers have produced a number of papers and monographs on various aspects of 
the Soviet Union’s use of its navy in a political role,’ Dismukes and McConnell stated, 
‘no comprehensive discussion of Soviet naval diplomacy is available.’167 They 
attempted to remedy the situation, plotting trends in ‘showing the flag’, coercive 
diplomacy and superpower confrontation; on the whole, they asserted, the Soviet naval 
diplomacy of the period was successful and played a greater relative role in overall 
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strategy than did the American equivalent.168 Gorshkov had watched, learned and 
improved upon what he saw.  
 
The language used by the strategists chosen to represent the Cold War perspective 
may be very different, indeed at times may appear obscure, but when read together 
their treatises on ‘suasion’, ‘naval influence politics’ and ‘wars of imperialism’ tell a 
common story.  It should not be surprising that this is the case, for each was influenced 
by the work of the others and there is significant cross-referencing in their books.169  
The exception is The Sea Power of the State, the major work of Gorshkov, seemingly 
the latest chronologically and which is notable for its extensive discussion of Western 
naval history but with an almost complete lack of acknowledgement of Western naval 
theorists.170 However, on closer consideration, it is apparent that Gorshkov’s work, 
appearing in a Russian language publication in 1972-3 and USNI Proceedings in 1974 
before receiving its book-length treatment, actually pre-dated the key writings of both 
Luttwak and Booth, though it did follow Zumwalt’s and Turner’s Project 60 work, of 
which he would undoubtedly have been aware.  The Westerners’ views on the West, 
therefore, are in part shaped by an Eastern protagonist’s politically biased perspective 
on the subject. 
 
The most obvious thread common to each work is the signal importance of coercion.  It 
is explicit in Luttwak’s active suasion, can be seen clearly in Booth’s discussion on 
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naval power and is effectively at the root of Gorshkov’s wars of imperialism and 
Turner’s naval presence mission.  In any generic Cold War model of naval diplomacy, 
therefore, coercion must be evident.  Its counter, non-coercive influence, is also 
universally mentioned; this ‘softer’ form of power is described variously as reassurance, 
support to allies or ‘clients’ and an ambassadorial function of navies.  It should therefore 
form the second factor in the generic model.  The ability of navies to build and support 
strategic alliances, a concept familiar to the classical writers, was key to Gorshkov’s 
understanding of naval utility and is implicit in Luttwak and Booth.  Turner’s article is the 
lesser for not fully addressing it.  In the context of the times the two major alliance blocs 
were the mainstays of the bipolar world and the role of navies in supporting and 
maintaining grand strategy was self-evident.  
 
A simple construct for a Cold War model, therefore, might have three pillars of naval 
diplomacy: 
 
Figure 2.7: Naval Diplomacy in the Cold War: an initial model 
 
However, this model is perhaps too rudimentary to accurately reflect the complexities of 
the height of the Cold War, but it can be developed. If the three categories identified 
were assumed to be naval capabilities as opposed to specific naval missions, ie the 
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ability to coerce, to influence and to maintain alliances, and they were assumed to be 
inter-related, then the model could be displayed differently.  Arguably, in the context of 
the bipolar competition for dominance at the time, the central outcome of the combined 
capabilities could be judged to be prestige or status.  
 
Though few governments of the modern age would consciously admit to national 
greatness being a goal, it would perhaps be irrational to dismiss it outright.  Booth’s 
discourse on prestige is convincing because it is based in credible, accepted theory and 
deserves a place in the generic model.  With hindsight, a ‘prestige race’ between East 
and West in the Cold War is plain to see.171  An alternative model could then be as 
shown below: 
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Figure 3.8: Prestige-focused Naval Diplomacy in the Cold War 
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NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: 
THE ‘POST-MODERN’ MODEL 
 
The immediate post-Cold War period, from 1991 to 2010, was one of transformation 
and uncertainty in geopolitics, as the analysis in Chapter 4 expands upon.  The collapse 
of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union were arguably the catalysts for 
change but there were other key milestones in social, political, economic and cultural 
spheres.  The inexorable rise of China and India, the financial crisis in the West, the 
embracing of democratic peace theory172 and subsequent backlash of nationalist 
movements, insurgency and anti-western terrorism all played their part, as did the ever 
increasing commercial interactions, linkages and interdependencies known as 
globalisation.173 
 
In an era which has been characterised variously as The End of History and The Clash 
of Civilisations there has been no shortage of comment and conjecture.174   
 
If Cold War naval diplomacy was understood by practitioners and commentators as a 
means to maintain bi-polar balance through coercion, reassurance and image 
management, then its immediate post-Cold War expression was not quite so definitive.  
It was a period of change and for a time in the 1990s one of the major blocs, the former 
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Soviet Union, all but ceased naval activity on grounds of affordability, whilst the other 
sailed the world’s oceans unopposed.175  As the remaining established navies 
continued to conduct ‘business as usual’,176 their professional leadership and academia 
debated their place in the new world order.  In a reinvestigation of coercive diplomacy, 
Peter Viggo Jakobson applied the framework developed earlier by George and Simons 
to the conflicts in Kuwait and Yugoslavia as examples of immediate post-Cold War 
outcomes; he concluded that although in generic terms the model stood it needed 
refinement, particularly in acknowledging the use of ‘carrots’ as well as ‘sticks.’177  This 
sentiment can easily be transposed into the naval sphere: it was no longer about 
gunboat diplomacy, but also about promoting ties and cooperation between like-minded 
actors. 
 
However, some commentators were quick to go further.  Michael Pugh, for instance, 
stated that ‘navies are no longer accurate measures of national power,’ and that ‘power, 
even symbolically, can no longer be solely equated with the barrel of a gunboat.’178 In 
the United States the Naval War College published a series of papers looking 
specifically at US naval strategy through the transitional periods of the 1970s, ‘80s and 
‘90s.  The latter decade stands out because of the scale and pace of development in 
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strategic thought.179 Throughout, naval diplomacy was an acknowledged feature of 
American strategy and much discussed, though often under the banner of ‘forward 
presence’: 
 
Forward deployed naval forces help preserve US influence overseas, even in places 
where we have no bases or political access. They enhance our ability to deter 
aggression, promote regional stability, strengthen diplomatic relations abroad and 
respond quickly to crisis.  Naval forces provide policy-makers with unique flexibility.  We 
can quickly reposition a powerful fighting force off the coast of a country, out of sight to 




Similar reassessments took place elsewhere and in the United Kingdom the Royal Navy 
formally published its doctrine for the first time in the 1990s, including an 
acknowledgement of naval diplomacy.  Eric Grove, discussing his part in writing the first 
edition of British Maritime Doctrine stated, ‘We were not completely satisfied with Sir 
James Cable’s taxonomy of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ for the purposes of doctrine and 
instead adopted ‘presence’, ‘symbolic use’, ‘coercion’, and ‘preventive, precautionary 
and pre-emptive naval diplomacy’.’181 Indeed, language is key and Canada similarly 
attempted to distance its doctrine from ‘gunboat’ diplomacy, which it called a ‘pejorative’ 
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term, preferring instead ‘preventive deployments, coercion, presence and symbolic 
use.’182 
 
The argument for naval diplomacy and forward presence appeared compelling in the 
age of liberal intervention but it was limited by offerings which focused on the naval 
forces of the West.  Like other aspects of international relations thought, it suffered from 
the problem of Western or Euro-centricity.183  In the early days of the aftermath of the 
Cold War virtually no attention was given to the navies of the rising powers, a shortfall 
that has since begun to be, though not yet fully, addressed.  The navies and coast 
guards of small, not yet ascendant powers remain largely ignored. 
 
In 2007 the Indian navy deployed a squadron of warships to Singapore, Yokosuka, 
Qingdao, Vladivostok, Manila and Ho Chi Minh City.  The deployment was a departure 
from previous Indian operating norms which, Geoffrey Till stated, bore ‘more than a 
passing resemblance to the famous cruise of Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet 
before the First World War.’  The deployment delivered little in terms of specific 
exercises but was conducted ‘for general purposes of greatness’.  Specifically, there 
was undoubted rivalry between India and China in the region and the deployment was 
the clear staking of a claim of regional primacy by the Indians.184   
 
Whether the Indian deployment was in reality any different to the naval activity of the 
superpowers during the Cold War and a return to an older modus operandi is uncertain.  
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What is evident, however, is that naval diplomacy was alive and well at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, and not just by the global hegemon.  Malcolm Murfett, one of a 
generation of commentators beginning to question the significance of naval diplomacy 
came to the same conclusion: 
 
One of the reasons why it still has relevance in the modern world is because it can be used 




China achieved such a ‘tangible result’ in 2008 when it dispatched two destroyers and a 
support ship to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy operations.  The deployment, though 
small by Western standards, demonstrated China’s ability to operate credibly and self-
sustain over a prolonged period which had previously been assumed to be beyond its 
capability.   The People’s Liberation Army (Navy) ‘compelled Western observers to 
revise their once-mocking estimate of Chinese aptitude for naval expeditionary 
operations.’186  When Western analysts turned their attention to the East, particularly in 
the newly formed China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, they 
found that there had been a surge of maritime interest in China and in the theories of 
Mahan which, when viewed in concert with Indian and other Asian maritime expansion 
programmes, could result in a ‘reconfiguration of maritime power’ in the region and, by 
extension, globally.187   
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The period of globalisation and rapid geopolitical transformation from a bi-polar through 
uni-polar to multi-polar world saw a significant change in the number and type of 
maritime actors.  Roger Barnett, a proponent of naval power, noted the change at state 
level and reported an increase in the number of navies by ‘about two-thirds… in the 
past 50 years. The count is somewhat imprecise because many states maintain forces 
with maritime functions such as policing, customs enforcement, and a broad array of 
coast guard operations that are not organised as navies.’188  On their varying utility as 
instruments of power, he added that offshore presence may no longer be ‘visible’ but 
that it was certainly still ‘tangible’: 
 
A coastal state might not be able to see ships cruising off its coasts, but it will ‘feel’ 
them.  A widely dispersed presence mission by an ocean going navy can serve as a 
warning to adversaries, an indication of support to allies, and a demonstration of resolve 




Non-state actors engaging in communicative action at sea in order to elicit responses 
from other parties have already been mentioned.  Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley 
drew attention what they termed ‘the contested commons’ in a 2009 US Naval Institute 
Proceedings article, highlighting Hezbollah’s and Al Qaeda’s maritime tactics and 
stating that ‘there is a consensus that rising states and non-state powers, combined 
with continued globalization, will put great pressure on the international system as a 
whole.’190  The ‘international system’ that they discussed, it could be argued, is made up 
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of vested interests concerned with the maintenance of the status quo.  Another writer, 
Michael Quigley, turned attention back to those vested interests in the same issue of 
Proceedings:  
 
In May 2008 the Navy re-established the US Fourth Fleet which had been dormant for nearly 
sixty years, thereby raising the profile of naval operations in the Caribbean and Latin 
America.  [… This] high profile way to assert US naval authority and underscore the 
strategic, diplomatic and political importance of Latin America. […] The signal is being sent 





The reference to the ‘signal being sent’ reaffirms the role of naval diplomacy as a 
means of communication.   
 
An article in Diplomacy and Statecraft in 2011 by J.J. Widen attempted to reignite a 
debate about naval diplomacy by deconstructing the issues surrounding the non-
belligerent and political uses of naval forces a reframing them in theory.  ‘Naval 
Diplomacy – A Theoretical Approach’ considered the basic components of the theory to 
be political aim, naval means, diplomatic method and geopolitical context, with the 
strategic value of naval forces described in terms of defence, coercion, support and 
symbolism.192 Widen’s article was timely, coming as it did after a decade or more of 
liberal interventionism operating at the blurred edges between peace and war, and it 
challenged Cable’s dominance of the topic, describing his contribution as ‘over-rated’.193  
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However, despite early comments on twenty-first century naval conflict in between 
North and South Korea,194 and passing references to contemporary, generalist 
considerations of seapower,195 much of Widen’s analysis remains rooted in the pre- and 
Cold War concepts discussed earlier.   
 
The ‘post-modern’ world, according to Till, instead requires post-modern navies, which 
he defines as those belonging to states moulded for the information economy rather 
than the industrial and who embrace a cooperative world system of openness and 
mutual dependence.196 Till argues that in a world very different to the bi-polar system of 
the Cold War, post-modern navies would, by necessity, require different strategies and 
he presents them with four key missions: sea control, expeditionary operations, good 
order at sea and the maintenance of a maritime consensus. The first two, he claims, are 
adaptations of traditional roles, the latter two are new. 197  
 
It could be logically supposed from Till’s reinterpretation of the maritime military 
environment,198 that naval diplomacy would receive a similar re-evaluation.  Very much 
in keeping with Western strategic thought in the immediate post-Cold War period,199 
naval diplomacy to Till effectively required presence.  Presence, he stated, is more than 
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merely a navy in existence, or a fleet-in-being, it is a strategy of having vessels forward 
deployed ‘and handy for whatever may turn up in areas of concern.’200 This fundamental 
requirement in Till’s model, presence, may also be its main weakness.  If it is to be 
based on anything more than the pure luck of being in the right place at the right time, 
presence in the way that he defines it requires quantity and is therefore effectively 
limited to those larger post-modern navies able to field a quantity of platforms if it is to 
be exercised on a global, or even multi-regional, scale. 
 
From presence, with its implications for force composition, readiness and deployment 
routines, came three ‘components’ of naval diplomacy.  When Till published an early 
version of his seapower theory in the Journal of Strategic Studies in 1994, the 
components he identified were coercion, alliance or coalition building and international 
maritime assistance;201 collectively, they were not dissimilar to the ‘Cold War’ model. 
Interestingly, however, a decade later he had changed his position and the 
‘international maritime assistance’ component had been removed, its place being taken 
by ‘picture building’.202 
 
The original 1994 journal article discussed ‘assistance’ at some length, in particular 
describing the growing prevalence of ‘naval humanitarianism’ and issuing a warning 
that it was likely to be increasingly important in the future.203 Missions and tasks falling 
under the assistance component included peacekeeping, the enforcement of 
embargoes, humanitarian and disaster relief and the rescue of threatened citizens.  In 
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many respects Till’s view of international maritime assistance was similar to Richmond’s 
‘non-military roles’ set out over sixty years before. However, by 2004 when the first 
edition of Seapower was published, Till had moved the assistance component from 
naval diplomacy and had instead included it under the banner of ‘humanitarian 
operations’, where it sat as a postscript to ‘expeditionary operations’, a separate entity 
straddling the boundaries of war-fighting (the military role) and the maintenance of good 
order at sea (in essence, the policing role). By the time the second edition was 
published in 2009 it was an integral pillar of expeditionary operations.204  
 
Despite Cable’s judgements on ‘detection capabilities’ in his view of the ‘altered 
environment’, picture building is arguably not an instinctively recognizable role of naval 
diplomacy under the definition offered by this thesis.  Till justified its inclusion because 
he saw it as an essential activity in anticipating emerging risks and threats and by 
reminding the reader that it was something traditionally carried out by foreign service 
officers, ambassadors and the intelligence services.205 Indeed, intelligence collection 
does have a long pedigree in international diplomacy and features as one of the core 
roles of the profession in Hedley Bull’s The Functions of Diplomacy,206 and it does 
correspond to one of the ‘three main functions’ in general diplomacy described by 
Griffiths and O’Callaghan.207  However, this thesis argues that despite its usefulness in 
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crisis prevention and early response, information collection itself cannot have a direct 
cognitive effect on a potential adversary or ally until it is further exploited in some way.  
 
Till’s work has made him one of the key figures of early twenty-first century naval 
thought.  One writer remarked in 2008 that he was ‘prescient with regard to the USN’s 
new pre-occupation with building maritime security networks, leaving one to ponder the 
influence of Till’s work within the USN hierarchy.’208 That observation was penned as 
part of a critique of Admiral Mike Mullen’s concept, the ‘1000-ship navy’. 
 
Mullen, who went on to become the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was Chief of 
Naval Operations when he launched the idea of the 1000-ship navy in a speech at the 
US Naval War College in 2005.  In the speech Mullen told his audience that changes in 
the world meant that there was a need for ‘a new image of seapower’ for which he drew 
a picture of a partnership, not just between navies, but with ‘the DEA [Drug 
Enforcement Agency], or the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], or the Customs and 
Border Control agencies of any number of other nations, not just our own.’209 Mullen 
was effectively calling for collaboration amongst maritime stakeholders in order to better 
combat the uncertainties of the age. Chris Rahman, in his critique of the concept, stated 
that: 
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In some respects, it represents little more than a continuation of post-Cold War 
proposals by many policy makers, naval operators and commentators… [making it] … 




Indeed, the evolutionist basis of Mullen’s ideas was apparent in the words he used in 
his speech, when he drew on his own experience of Operation Active Endeavour in the 
Mediterranean and quoting the work of the exponent of fourth generation warfare, 
Thomas Hammes, adapting it to the maritime environment.211 However, Mullen’s 
speech may not have been an expression of pure conceptual thought; contemporary 
global, national and inter-service politics may well have had some role to play in both its 
drafting and timing.  Rahman again: 
 
A cynic might suggest that the 1000 ship navy concept and the new maritime strategy 
are ways to make the navy seem more relevant to the war on terrorism, thus 




The cynical view, of course, might also be a sensible view; a leading navy would 
undoubtedly be subject to harsh criticism if it did not consider the contemporary 
environment when setting out its stall.  The importance of the global war on terrorism in 
the forging of Mullen’s concept is plain to see in an article published just two months 
after his speech was delivered.  Writing in the USNI Proceedings John Morgan and 
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Charles Martoglio, two USN flag officers and Mullen acolytes, reminded readers of the 
challenges faced after the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 and called for a 
‘combination of national, international and private-industry cooperation’ at sea.213 The 
article is not coincidental: it applauds Mullen’s speech and clearly aims to take the 
debate to the next level.  Importantly for this research, in it can be found the roots of a 
‘Mullen model’ for naval diplomacy.  The authors identify two ‘objectives’ within the 
‘overarching goal of the 1000-ship navy’: ‘increasing maritime domain awareness’ and 
‘posturing assets to respond to crises or emergencies’.214  The first, which they describe 
as gaining the ‘knowledge of anything at sea that affects a nation’s security, safety, 
economics or its environment,’215 can be equated with Till’s ‘picture building’.  The 
second, posturing, may just as accurately be termed ‘naval presence’.   
 
The Mullen model, then, may use familiar concepts but it situates them in an unfamiliar 
configuration.  Where Till places ‘presence’ at the pinnacle of his hierarchy of naval 
diplomacy with coalition building as a supporting pillar, Morgan and Martoglio (for 
Mullen) reverse the arrangement.  The model also places greatest emphasis on the 
‘softer’ end of the power spectrum, perhaps in an attempt to attract support from less 
‘aggressive’ stakeholders, and ignores the harder effects of coercion and war fighting. 
Paradoxically, this was the obverse of the position of the US Navy thirty years earlier as 
articulated by Stansfield Turner. 
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The concepts of hard, soft and smart power devised by Joseph Nye in the aftermath of 
the Cold War have been subject to continued debate since.  Some commentators have 
equated ‘soft’ with non-military power and ‘hard’ with military alone, making the two 
effectively mutually exclusive.  Ogoura Kazuo has written that the original meaning of 
soft power, which Nye defined as ‘getting others to want the outcomes you want,’ 216 
has ‘been distorted, misused and – in extreme cases – abused.’217 Clearly, this was not 
Nye’s intent and since the initial publication of his ideas in 2004 he has unambiguously 
stated that not only can military resources contribute to soft power,218 they are most 
effective when used under a smart power construct. 219   
 
Nye portrayed power as the ability to realise ‘behavioural outcomes’ in others and 
identified three means by which any desired end could be reached: coercion, reward 
and attraction.220 From these three basic modes he derived a ‘spectrum of behaviours’ 
which stretched from the ‘tangibles’ of hard power, such as money and force, to the 
intangibles of ideas, values and culture which constitute soft power.   
 
 
Figure 2.9:  Nye’s Spectrum of Power Behaviours221 
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By examining Nye’s spectrum, the contribution of militaries can begin to be understood. 
They are obviously vital at the hard end of the spectrum where their war fighting 
capabilities are brought to bear, but they offer more.  Nye explained that even under an 
objectionable dictatorship military prowess and ‘myths of invincibility’ might ‘attract 
others to join the bandwagon.’222 In other words, hard power can be attractive.  Of note, 
Nye used a naval example to make his point that a single element of power need not be 
limited in application to a single point on the spectrum: 
 
Naval forces can be used to win battles (hard power) or win hearts and minds (soft 




Nye’s ideas have certainly resonated amongst the defence and security community and 
the role of the military in soft and smart power has received significant attention since 
the concepts were published, both amongst politicians and practitioners.   
 
When Nye turned his attention specifically to the military in The Future of Power he 
questioned whether the utility of force had declined since the collapse of the bipolar 
world.  He concluded that nuclear weapons have achieved a degree of deterrence, 
certainly against unlimited war, that conflict is increasingly costly, that growing 
interdependence and globalisation mean that issues are less likely to be resolved by 
force and, finally, that there has been an increasing sense of anti-militarism, particularly 
amongst the democracies.224 Extrapolating, it can be concluded that military forces, 
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therefore, are more likely to be used towards the middle and softer end of the spectrum 
than at the hard end, a philosophy shared with Robert Art and discussed more fully in 
Chapter 1.225   
 
Nye identified four ‘modalities’ of military power in The Future of Power but only one, 
fighting, fits into the realm of pure hard power.  The other three, coercive diplomacy, the 
protection afforded by alliances, and the assistance offered by aid and training,226 tend 
towards the ‘soft’.  Again, to illustrate his point, Nye used naval examples.  He 
described the deployment of ships as a ‘classic example of coercive diplomacy’,227 he 
highlights the dispatch of a US warship to the Baltic during a major Russian exercise in 
2009 as a case of support and assistance to a nervous ally (Latvia),228 and he 
applauded the publication of the US Co-operative Strategy for Twenty-first Century Sea 
Power for its forthright message of international partnering and mutual trust.229 In short, 
the smart power concept which Nye produced calls for substantial military and naval 
involvement.  
 
More recently Christian Le Mière took another step towards updating the concept of 
naval diplomacy with his book Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century.  In it he 
acknowledges the rather limited ‘gunboat’ or coercive methods beloved by previous 
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writers, and then introduces two additional classifications of his subject: co-operative 
and persuasive maritime diplomacy.230  The first, as the name suggests, requires willing 
participants on all sides and covers such missions and tasks as joint exercises and 
operations, goodwill visits and even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  The 
second, persuasive, is something rather more nebulous, covering presence and 
prestige but falling short of out-and-out threatening behaviour.  Together coercion, co-
operation and persuasion make the whole and the whole, Le Mière asserts, is the use 
of maritime assets in the management of international relations.231 
 
Maritime Diplomacy is an important contribution to the debate on sea power in 
operations other than war but it too perhaps relies on an assumption of state-centrism 
and two party ‘action-reaction’ relationships.  Indeed, Le Mière leans heavily on game 
theory to illustrate his points, where player A and player B do things to achieve the best 
outcome for themselves.  The reality, as the author tries to point out, is much more 
complex with a potential stakeholder mix of military, paramilitary, commercial and NGO 
actors on the stage.232   
 
Le Mière is undoubtedly correct in his assertion that the wielding of the diplomatic tool 
at and from the sea goes beyond formal ‘military’ navies, and he refers to the 
importance of actions by maritime constabulary and para-military actors. However, 
these grouping still tend to be representatives of state or de facto state organizations; 
he does not delve fully into the world of true non-state actors such as pressure groups, 
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multinational corporations or communities of local fishermen or others engage in sea-
based trade.   
 
In addition to his three category framework for maritime diplomacy, Le Mière identified a 
series of constituent properties which would allow for ‘clearer analysis of any particular 
event.’ These properties or characteristics, he stated, exist on a spectrum and relate to 
the dynamics of the powers involved and the level of tension driving the activity.  An 
event or incident could therefore be assessed according to its kinetic or non-kinetic 
effect, whether or not it was explicitly telegraphed, implied or simply unaccompanied by 
language, whether it was sustained or abbreviated, pre-emptive or reactive, and 
whether its execution was symmetrical or asymmetrical. 233  
 
Le Mière aids the reader by showing these properties as pentagons in a series of 
diagrams referring to specific incidents in his analysis.  The efficacy of the properties 
can be plotted against a subjective scale.  Figure 3.9 below shows a non-specific 
example of an event assessed as highly pre-emptive, broadly symmetrical, non-kinetic, 
and possibly vague but sustainable. 
                                               
233
























Figure 2.10:  Le Mière’s ‘Properties of Maritime Diplomacy Visualised’234 
 
The ‘properties’ diagram could be a valuable tool for post-event analysis. There are 
clearly subjective assessments to be made about Le Mière’s choice of property (he 
does not include context, legitimacy or cost, for example) but the diagram could be 
adapted for the particular requirements of the analyst or circumstances of the case and 
it would be particularly useful for comparative studies.  However, the principal 
shortcoming of the tool is its inability to display degrees of success or failure – highly 
kinetic, explicit, sustainable, pre-emptive, and symmetrical applications of maritime 
diplomacy are arguably no more likely to succeed in their instigator’s aim than those 
which display the opposite qualities. It is therefore of less use for planning or prediction 
of outcome. 
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When comparing the ‘post-modern’ naval literature, a question is raised of whether the 
Till model really applies to those states still reliant on industrial economies and not yet 
fully embracing of globalisation or whether Le Mière’s model would provide a better fit.  
The logical assumption would be that the post-Cold War world is undergoing a period of 
transition and that ‘modern’ (as opposed to ‘post-modern’) navies should adhere to the 
older, Cold War model as the best approximation of their circumstance.  The result 
could be a hybrid maritime military environment in which modern and post-modern 
navies co-exist and in which they, by necessity, operate in both contexts. The 
alternative would be to adopt, on a global scale, Mullen’s concept of the 1000-ship navy 
and thereby gain presence of numbers not as a single navy but as a networked 
partnership of likeminded states and non-state actors.  Till and Mullen, therefore, might 
offer mutually supportive world views. 
 
This thesis argues that a post-Cold War model of naval diplomacy can be determined 
by applying those post-modern interests of building maritime situational awareness, 
building coalitions and alliances and engendering attraction to the sliding scale of Nye’s 















Figure 2.11:  Post-modern Model of Naval Diplomacy 
  
                                                                                              





















THE CONTINUING FACE OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY 
 
Comparative analysis of the ‘models’ of naval diplomacy identifies a number of enduring 
themes which, for the purposes of this research, can be divided into two categories: 
construct, that is, how the model is framed within the context of international relations; 
and content, or the outcomes and effects desired by the proponent’s strategy.   
 
With the exception of those provided by Luttwak, Booth, Till, Nye and Le Mière,235 it 
must be pointed out that the various models of naval diplomacy described above were 
developed in the course of this research and, as such, are not the pure product of the 
writers or era to which they are accredited.  Any discussion of construct, therefore, is a 
secondary argument and must be considered with that in mind.  However, if that point is 
accepted then this thesis argues that each of the existing models is based on four 
underpinning principles. 
 
Firstly, each model is based in the realist theoretical tradition of international relations.  
Realism, widely regarded as the most influential school of IR thought attempts to 
explain the world ‘as it is’, rather than ‘how we might like it to be,’236 and focuses on 
power relationships.  Classical naval writers such as Mahan and Corbett would have 
seen their advocacy of seapower, including the use of force, in peacetime as a means 
to further the interests of the user at the expense of the recipient if necessary.  
Similarly, the Cold War protagonists, including Sir James Cable with his ‘strong and 
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weak’, ‘assailant and victim’ themes, speak directly to realism.  The exceptions are the 
post-Cold War, post-modern works of Geoffrey Till and Joseph Nye, which situate their 
ideas more broadly in the globalised era; the latter is most commonly associated with 
interdependence and the neo-liberal school.237  However, Nye has himself attempted to 
‘transcend the classical dialectic’ between the major IR traditions,238 and this thesis 
contends that the military dimension of his smart power still sits comfortably with realist 
thought.239  
 
Secondly, and closely linked to the realist tradition, each model is essentially state-
centric.  Baylis et al voice the widely held opinion that ‘strategists are so pre-occupied 
by threats to the interests of states that they ignore security issues within the state.’240 
Naval strategists are no different; each writer in the ‘classical’ and Cold War periods 
undoubtedly had his own state’s interests at heart.241  Though the later post-modern 
commentators certainly placed less overt emphasis on the state, couching their words 
in globalism and cooperative approaches to seapower, the state remained the basic 
unit of discourse.  Mike Mullen, for instance, did not propose the global maritime 
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partnership for altruistic reasons and ended his 2005 speech with a plea aimed directly 
at the United States: ‘we need to be a team player, a leader, for that 1000-ship navy.’242 
 
Thirdly, each model is based on a mechanistic methodology in which one ‘side’ does 
something and the ‘other side’ reacts.  That the models rely on this action-reaction 
process between the (primarily) state actors involved means that they are in essence 
binary in nature.  Fundamentally, the current understanding of naval diplomacy is that it 
is an action requiring a response (even if that response is a conscious decision to do 
nothing), whereas this thesis contends that it is a means of communication. 
 
Fourthly, and following on from the previous three principles, the realist, state-centric, 
binary models of naval diplomacy are all outcome based and thus demand that 
decisions be made.  In Political Psychology David Houghton likens decision making in 
international relations to a Russian doll,  
 
… in which opening one structure gives rise to a smaller one.  When we open up the 
international system, we find states.  When we open up the state, we find bureaucracies.  
Opening up bureaucracies, we find groups, another situational level.  It is only when we 




The decision, therefore, must ultimately be taken by an individual or a group of 
individuals.  In Cable’s terminology the decisions are those, conscious or subconscious, 
of the ‘assailant’ and of the ‘victim’. In Schelling’s theory of arms and influence, success 
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depends on the individual’s assumption of rationality and on the individual’s accuracy of 
prediction of outcomes.244 In other words, the models are based on attempts to 
manipulate the cognitive process: ‘actions are chosen for both their immediate effect 
and for the effect they have on the other player’s choice.’245  Luttwak’s term ‘suasion’ 
may be vague but, in this context at least, it is insightful.  
 
This thesis contends that these four principles form the bedrock of the existing models 
of naval diplomacy, but that they are not discrete.  Shown diagrammatically, they would 
not constitute four equally sized pillars on which outcome-based naval diplomacy sits.  
Rather, they are best viewed as inter-related and hierarchical and, perhaps, as akin to 





















Figure 2.12:  The Basic Principles Underpinning Existing Models of Naval Diplomacy  
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If a common construct of naval diplomacy can be determined, then so too can a shared 
set of content, which shifts in emphasis from era to era.  Though the words and 
terminology used differ from writer to writer, a careful interpretation of their works can 
find threads of similar meaning throughout the body of naval and strategic thought over 
the past century and a half.  As might be expected, the development of ideas has been 
iterative and evolutionary.    
 
Through the use of the models, seven major traits of naval diplomacy can be identified: 
coercion, deterrence, picture building, prestige, co-operation, reassurance, attraction 
and assistance.  Taking the writers and models in broadly chronological order, it can be 
demonstrated that the traits most indicative of hard power, such as coercion and 
deterrence, are commonly cited, whereas it is the later writers who place the greatest 
emphasis on the soft power effects of assistance and attraction. 
 
The literature also shows that naval diplomacy has been used since man first put to sea 
in ships and that its history can be traced through the centuries.  However, until the 
middle of the twentieth century naval writing tended to focus on military capability at sea 
but the political benefits of the threat of force, the use of limited force and ‘showing the 
flag’ were known and understood.  Naval diplomacy before the Second World War was 
largely the bailiwick of those maritime states with global ambitions and used to coerce, 
to reassure and to promote the image of its practitioners.  The bipolarity of the Cold War 
did little to change the purpose and tactics of naval diplomacy but its use became 
largely restricted to the major seafaring states in both the Western and Eastern blocs.  
Strategic thought developed from superpower confrontation and the interest in naval 
diplomacy as a separate topic, particularly in the 1970s, grew within that context.  The 
aftermath of the Cold War saw a transformation in world politics and a reassessment of 
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the utility of force in general, but naval diplomacy continued; indeed, its use expanded 
with the increase in maritime stakeholders. The future may start to see new aspects of 
an old role; ballistic missile defence at sea, theatre security co-operation, humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, the enforcement of no-fly zones, forward presence and 
global fleet stations are all forms of post-modern naval diplomacy.   In sum, the differing 
approaches to naval diplomacy does not necessarily present competing narratives.  
Instead, they build progressively and reflect the period in which they were written.  
 
The contemporary applicability of the various models of naval diplomacy is discussed 
further in Chapter 5 after consideration of a series of post-Cold War case studies.  
However, it is worth highlighting some of the characteristics of the twenty-first century 
global order which may affect their relevance.  This is done by returning to the ‘Russian 
doll’ construct of the underlying principles of the existing models provided earlier. 
 
Realist theory has been increasingly criticised since the end of the Cold War, 
particularly given the seemingly greater occurrence of intra- compared to inter-state 
conflict.246 Though realism has generally maintained its dominant position in IR, 
competing theories, such as liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, post-structuralism and 
post-colonialism, have gained traction at its expense and become influential alternative 
world views.247  A challenge to the existing models of naval diplomacy, therefore, would 
be to test their validity in scenarios which do not fit the accepted realist framework.  
Baylis et al identify a range of such issues in modern world politics, including human 
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security, human rights and nationalism,248 as opposed to ‘state-ism’, which transcend 
the realist perspective and perhaps confront commonly held notions about what 
militaries, and hence navies, can do in the pursuit of international influence.  This will be 
returned to in Chapter 5 when testing the proposed new foundational model of naval 
diplomacy. 
 
The complex multitude of stakeholders may mean that event or outcome based models 
which assume a binary, action-reaction relationship are no longer appropriate.  In a 
discussion of the interconnected world Anthony McGrew characterised globalization by 
not only the scale and number of actors involved, but also by the pace and intensity, or 
‘depth of enmeshment’, of interactions.249 The challenge to politicians, diplomats and 
military practitioners may be to establish second, third and fourth order consequences 
to the decisions they choose to take. 
 
Finally, in such a world, can a truly rational actor exist or does an alternative model 
need to be adopted?  The next two chapters will explore this question by quantitatively 
and qualitatively investigating a range of examples of post-Cold War incidents of naval 
diplomacy.  Collectively, they will seek to determine whether reality corresponds to 
theory and whether there are types or variations of and within incidents of naval 
diplomacy which are not adequately reflected in existing literature. 
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The aim of this Chapter is to present and provide insight into an empirical survey of 
naval diplomacy between 1991 and 2010.  It is not intended to be a comprehensive 
compendium (arguably, such a complete history would be impossible to compile) but it 
does capture in a single place over 500 examples of the use of seapower for political 
purposes over that particular twenty year period.  It is, in part, an extension of the 
chronological survey published in the three editions of Gunboat Diplomacy.  However, 
by contrast, Sir James Cable’s seminal work catalogued barely half that number in an 
analysis which covered seven decades.1  That is not to claim that this research is more 
thorough than Cable’s, merely that Cable was, perhaps, more discriminating in his 
choice of incidents and quicker to dismiss potential case studies when forming his 
opinions and arguments.  Importantly, he concentrated on the coercive element of naval 
diplomacy and largely ignored the day-to-day, year-to-year ambassadorial roles which 
this survey does include. 
 
The criteria used for inclusion in the survey are straightforward yet inherently subjective.  
At the outset, a definition of naval diplomacy was required.  The suggestion put forward 
in Chapter  1, that naval diplomacy is a niche communications process seeking to 
further the interests of an international actor, was adopted and applied as the litmus test 
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against reported maritime activity; put simply, if an example qualified under that 
definition it was included, if it did not then it was discarded.  Like Cable, this survey 
does not include naval action during war (except that which involved neutral or third 
parties) but it does include that which may have taken place between belligerents prior 
to the start or after the end of a major conflict.  For example, the coercive coalition 
posturing before the Gulf War of 1991 and the long period of containment of Iraq from 
1991 until 2003 are included, but the use of force by navies during the actual liberation 
of Kuwait is not.   
 
Similarly, examples of multi-national acquisition which could potentially reflect a political 
discourse between the actors involved are generally not included, though this does 
represent a topic worthy of further research – much can be read into the 
interdependence of relationships in the global economy.  Conversely, examples of 
‘gifting’ of naval assets, such as Australia’s award of patrol vessels to Fiji in July 1992 
following the normalisation of relations after the latter’s coup of 1987, are included.  
These represent clear attempts to build amity between actors rather than to seek 
immediate commercial profit.  In addition, some examples of significant changes to the 
global naval picture are listed, such as the launch of the first vessel of the newly formed 
fleet of an independent Croatia in May 1992 and China’s purchase of a second-hand 
aircraft carrier in 1998; arguably, these moments in time were matters of great prestige 
for the actors involved and thus means of communicating their ‘message’ to the 
international community in a way that the ‘routine’ procurement activities of established, 
leading navies are not. 
 
When constructing the survey primary sources were used wherever possible; examples 
of naval activity fitting the thesis definition were taken from the official publications of 
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eight major maritime states – the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
Russia, China, India and Japan. These navies would be classified as major or medium 
global and medium regional force projection navies under Eric Grove’s typology.2  If 
those countries deemed an example of their navy’s employment worthy of mention in 
operations databases, White Papers and reports to their respective legislatures then 
they are included here. These states were chosen because their records are openly 
published and accessible, they are geographically dispersed and they field naval forces 
at differing scales.  It is entirely probable that by extending the review to include other 
states’ official publications more examples would be uncovered; this is another area for 
potential research in future, particularly the activities of the smaller coastal navies and 
coast guards which Grove classifies as purely adjacent force projection, offshore and 
inshore territorial defence, constabulary and ‘token’.3 Finally, secondary sources 
including books, academic journal articles, specialist and generalist open media 
reporting and online resources were used to corroborate the ‘official’ version of an 
incident and to provide additional examples not revealed elsewhere.  Jane’s Defence 
Weekly and Jane’s Navy International were particularly rich resources.  The thesis does 
not aim to be the definitive word on every example of naval diplomacy cited.  Instead, it 
seeks patterns and it is assesses that patterns are discernible in the incidents included. 
 
It is worth highlighting that even these broad selection criteria may have resulted in 
many otherwise pertinent examples of naval diplomacy being overlooked.  For example, 
the ‘routine’ day-to-day business of the major global navies such as port visits and low-
level bilateral exercises may not be deemed worthy of reporting even by the navy 
                                               
2
 Grove, The Future of Sea Power, pp236-40. 
 
3




involved, whereas any departure from the norm by a small, traditionally coastal navy, 
such as a long, out of area ‘blue-water’ deployment, is. Similarly, picture building, that 
constituent part of any diplomatic activity, would more often than not be conducted 
clandestinely and may only be reported when discovered.  Therefore, whilst an initial 
glance at the survey may elicit the conclusion that it is skewed in favour of the activity of 
the major, established navies, under-reporting may mean that in reality the reverse is 
the case. 
 
In common with Cable’s analysis and many of the sources cited, the dates used in the 
survey are accurate to the month.  When describing an example which spanned a 
longer period of time, the start and end months are given.  It must also be borne in mind 
that, in common with other forms of international diplomacy and communication, much 
naval diplomacy is enduring, such as the Royal Navy’s persistent presence mission in 
the Persian Gulf from 1979 onwards or the US Navy’s basing of forces in Japan, whilst 
other occurrences are contingent.  It is perhaps inevitable in a work of this kind to find a 
structural bias toward reporting the contingent at the expense of the enduring.    
 
The description given for each example is a very short summary which aims to distil at 
times complex scenarios into a sentence or two. To aid brevity, it has been assumed 
that the reader will have some general knowledge of world events, such as the 
fragmentation of the Soviet ‘empire’, the rise of the BRICS and the first and second Gulf 
Wars.  The description of the incident used in the survey is, in the majority of cases, a 
précis of the source material and therefore does not redress any potential 
misrepresentation or bias in the original account; it is for the reader to determine 
whether the report is entirely accurate.  However, each incident is accompanied by a 
reference which, generally, will give a fuller account; many are cross-referenced and 
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contrasting interpretations seen. Importantly, for the purposes of this research, the fact 
that an incident did occur, that at least some of the participants can be identified and 
that it can be classified according to previously determined criteria is sufficient 
justification for inclusion and a basis for analysis.  Some of the examples which 
represent the key events and themes of the period are expanded upon greater detail as 
case studies in Chapter 4. 
 
The actors named in each example tend to be the principal active participant(s) and 
principal target audiences. They are not listed in any order of importance and they are 
not classified as ‘assailant’ or ‘victim’ as they are in Cable’s work.  Often, the term 
‘Int[ernational] Community’ is used to highlight occasions when an incident of naval 
diplomacy is judged to have been conscious and obvious messaging to the world at 
large, rather than to just a single polity.  An example is that of France in February 2003, 
when the FS Charles de Gaulle carrier task group sailed for the eastern Mediterranean 
after the French government had declared its opposition to military intervention in Iraq; 
the move signalled to both sides of the conflict that France could mobilise if necessary, 
and to the world in general that France was an independent player on the stage.4 
Occasionally the terms Dom[estic] or Regional Community are used when the 
messaging is deemed to be more geographically focussed and less ‘scatter gun’; 
examples of this type include the Royal Australian Navy’s outreach to its country’s 
remote aboriginal communities in March 1993,5 or French peace support exercises with 
eastern and southern African countries in February 2002.6  
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The column entitled ‘Cable classification’ is an attempt to categorise the examples 
according to the criteria which James Cable used in Gunboat Diplomacy.  The letter 
used indicates whether an incident would have been deemed definitive, purposeful, 
catalytic or expressive.  Cable’s third volume, which took his survey to the end of 1991, 
included only two entries for that year – a US non-combatant evacuation operation from 
Somalia in January and a British ‘reassurance’ mission to Grenada in July; both are 
included in this summary and both show the same classification that Cable gave.  The 
‘Cable classifications’ of the remaining incidents are supposition but they are consistent 
with his approach; for instance, non-combatant evacuation operations are judged to be 
purposeful and major representational deployments and visits are expressive.   
 
A few other examples, such as those in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil 
Tigers) / Sri Lankan government conflict which ran throughout much of the period, or 
naval agreements or public announcements on maritime matters, such the signing of a 
Maritime Consultative Agreement by the United States and China in January 1998, are 
marked ‘-’.  This indicates that they do not sit naturally into any of Cable’s categories; 
they are included in this survey because they fit the definition of naval diplomacy used 
here.  In the case of the Tamil Tigers’ use of maritime demonstration and force at sea, 
further justification for inclusion rests in their examination in other works on the topic, 
such as Christian Le Miere’s Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century.7   
 
In the final column, ‘Composite classification’, the incidents are categorised according 
to those major traits of naval diplomacy identified in Chapter 2: coercion, deterrence, 
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co-operation, prestige, reassurance, picture building, attraction and assistance.  These 
are a construct determined from the writings of Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Gorshkov, 
Turner, Luttwak, Booth, Till, Mullen, Nye and Le Miere.  As has previously been stated, 
the words and terminology used differ from writer to writer and from era to era, but a 
careful interpretation of their works can find threads of similar meaning throughout the 
body of naval and strategic thought over the past century and a half.  In common with 
‘Cable classification’, their application is subjective and based on analysis of the source 
material.  In contrast to Cable, however, they are rarely exclusive; that is, the majority of 
incidents have a ‘composite classification’ of two or more traits.  Categorising naval 
diplomacy according to a single effect or outcome is evidently easier said than done. 
 
Finally, to determine whether the immediate post-Cold War era really was different to 
the Cold War itself, two ‘control’ periods have been included to provide a suitable 
benchmark.  Therefore, whilst the second part of this Chapter provides a survey of the 
years from 1991 to 2010, the third part contains incidents of naval diplomacy from 1960 
to 1964, and from 1980 to 1984.  Though the thesis accepts the systemic definition of 
the Cold War discussed in Chapter 1, these control years were selected because they 
represent, respectively, the culmination of the first Cold War around the time of the 
Cuban missile crisis, and the period of heightened tensions during the Reagan-
Brezhnev second Cold War following the end of detente.8 They are also separated by 
time and, when set against the main survey, offer periods for analysis at twenty year 
intervals. The criteria used for the inclusion of incidents in Parts 2 and 3 are identical. 
 
                                               








The survey shows that incidents of naval diplomacy are seldom limited to just two 
parties.  In a significant number of cases three or more actors are involved and, often, 
there is also a plain intent to send a message to the domestic, regional or international 
community.  A case in point is the November 1994 interaction between the United 
States, Thailand, North Korea and China.  The US wished to pre-position its ships in 
Thai territorial waters as a deterrent to North Korean posturing against South Korea, but 
Thailand refused permission for the move because it did not want to offend North 
Korea’s only ally, China.9 The example shows the complexity of international relations 
and the corresponding intricacy of naval diplomacy.  Any attempt to describe the 
incident in bilateral terms between the US and North Korea, the US and Thailand, the 
US and China or even China and North Korea would be unsophisticated and erroneous. 
 
Chapter 2 explained that during the Cold War approximately 40 per cent of reported 
naval diplomatic incidents involved the major players of either the Eastern or Western 
blocs interacting with third parties10 - an analysis supported by the 1960-64 and 1980-
84 surveys in Part 3 of this Chapter.  It might be reasonably surmised that with the end 
of the bipolar order other actors would be less constrained and therefore increase their 
influence activity at and from the sea. Indeed, this was one of the hypotheses proposed 
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in Chapter 1. However, the survey shows that in the immediate post-Cold War era the 
reverse was true; the overwhelming majority of incidents involved NATO members.  In 
effect, the early 1990s saw a Western dominated naval scene with the US and her 
allies sailing unchallenged in the Mediterranean and Middle East, attempting to forge 
new relationships with former adversaries and exercising with previously non-aligned 
states.  Interestingly, NATO members’ dominance of naval diplomatic action did not 
diminish as the Cold War receded into ‘history’; by 2009/2010 they were still players in 
approximately 40 per cent of reported incidents. 
 
In contrast, the former Warsaw Pact countries disappeared from the seas virtually 
overnight.  Russia alone, with the dominant Warsaw Pact navy during the Cold War, 
attempted several times to reassert her position as a major maritime power including 
submarine forays into Swedish waters in June 1992 and a surface ship deployment to 
the Mediterranean, UK and US in May and June 1993, but these were isolated 
occasions, at least until the late 2000s.  Interestingly, however, the former Soviet Union 
did make use of its Navy in August 1991 during the attempted coup to oust President 
Gorbachev; ships blockaded the port of Tallinn,11 and part of the Pacific Fleet poised in 
port in Vietnam.12 Navies, evidently, can play a part in influencing internal affairs as well 
as international crises.   
 
The first Gulf War of 1991 was an important milestone for naval diplomacy. Not only did 
it see the first major post-Cold War use of military force, it also afforded an opportunity 
for previously undemonstrative actors to begin to make their mark.  Germany and 
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Japan both deployed vessels in the aftermath and the Middle East became a focal point 
for naval grandstanding; states with a maritime agenda wanted to be there and be seen 
to be there.  Kuwait, a country not normally considered a leading naval actor, took 
centre stage for a number of years after its conflict with Iraq.  The US and UK exercised 
independently with Kuwait in early 1992 and even Russia, a state whose prestige (as 
the USSR) had suffered in the Arab world as a result of its occupation of Afghanistan in 
the 1980s,13 conducted a naval exercise with Kuwait in December 1993.14   
 
If Kuwait was a participant in naval diplomacy by virtue of its unwanted circumstances, 
other states were participants through calculation. Libya, for instance, may be judged to 
have been ‘rewarded’ with naval visits for its less confrontational posture as the new 
century grew; Indian warships visited Libyan ports in June 2006 and were followed by a 
visit by a US Coast Guard vessel in June 2009.  It was the first American military visit to 
the country since President Ghadaffi seized power in a coup in 1969.   
 
After the initial domination of the West in the early 1990s, the new rising powers did 
begin to increase their presence at sea.  India, for example, announced plans for more 
exercises with the established blue water navies in March 1992 and by August 2008 
was showing signs of considerable maritime maturity by contributing to the multi-
national counter-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa.  Similar development can be 
tracked throughout the survey by China and, to a lesser extent, by Brazil and South 
Africa.   This will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
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Though state actors dominate the survey, it is clear that not all participants are states.  
Insurgent or terrorist organisations and pressure groups all appear; examples include 
Hezbollah’s use of force against Israel in July 2006, Israel’s use of force against the 
Gaza Freedom Flotilla in May 2010, Greenpeace’s campaigning in the North Sea in 
mid-1996 and the complex situation developing between various parties in the Niger 
Delta region from the mid-2000s onwards.  It is apparent that naval diplomacy remains 
an activity primarily but not exclusively carried out by states.  Further analysis of the 
role of non-state actors in naval or, rather, ‘at sea’ diplomacy is warranted. 
 
History and Geography  
 
Historical legacy clearly plays a part in determining the dynamics of many incidents. 
Portugal’s interaction with Guinea-Bissau in July 1998 and the UK’s involvement in 
Sierra Leone in 2000 may be seen as manifestations of former colonial ‘responsibility.’  
More often, though, geography is the driver.  There are more regional than global 
navies and the survey clearly shows that the majority of interactions are by 
neighbouring actors in their adjacent seas.  The many entries throughout the period of 
Asian states in and around the South China Sea are perhaps the most apparent 
examples of the point but others, such as Argentinean / Chilean engagement from 1998 
until 2007, are similarly identifiable.  Interestingly, this contrasts sharply with the 
reported activity during the Cold War shown in Part 3; then, the major Western and 
Eastern navies tended to interact with third parties at range.  Of the 105 incidents 
described in Part 3, some 58 (55%) could be described as extra-regional; there is no 





Enmity or Amity? 
 
Naval diplomacy is not synonymous with gunboat diplomacy, as even a cursory review 
of the type of platform used will show.  Chapter 2, which provided a review of the 
literature relating to the use of sea power for political ends, showed that writers and 
theorists tended to focus their work on the use of naval and military forces to influence 
adversaries, either through coercion or deterrence or both.  Historically, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the soft power of navies, particularly their utility in forging 
friendships. Quantitatively, the survey shows that only a quarter of the catalogued 
incidents in the post-Cold War period could be described as indicative of enmity 
between the parties involved.  Conversely, some 90 per cent have some degree of 
amity in their purpose.15  (The sum is more than 100 per cent because the two are not 
mutually exclusive and purposes are rarely binary.)  Activities which may be deemed to 
be aimed at an actual or potential adversary can also involve an element of 
reassurance or support to allies or own populations.  It is striking that in the ‘composite 
classification’ column the ‘negative’ effect of deterrence is invariably paired with the 
‘positive’ effect of reassurance. In complex relationships signals of enmity and amity 
can be, and are, made concurrently.  For example, Australian port visits to Indonesia in 
1991 were in part aimed to balance contemporary actions being taken by the RAN to 
limit illegal fishing by Indonesian vessels.16 Overlapping or multiple outcomes from 
naval diplomacy are not exceptional, they are the norm.   
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Figure 4.1: The ‘Negative’ / ‘Positive’ Balance in Naval Diplomacy 
 
However, when the Cold War ‘control’ periods are analysed a very different picture 
emerges.  The incidents catalogued in Part 3 are almost evenly split between amity and 
enmity.  This could, of course, be attributed to the existence of established blocs and 
proxies during the Cold War or to any one of a number of other factors, not least the 
tendency to under report ‘good news’.17 
 
Degrees of Engagement 
 
As actors seek to extend their influence they do so by a variety of means.  The survey 
provides evidence to support the view that there are degrees of engagement within 
naval diplomacy and that the state of a relationship can often be assessed by the type 
of engagement practised. In short, engagement can be weighted.  At the lowest end of 
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 Of the 105 incidents in Part 3, 60 can be deemed to have some degree of enmity and 57 




the scale are goodwill visits which can be means of ongoing ‘relationship maintenance’ 
for established allies, symbolic first forays into amity for those with a more adversarial 
association, or even rewards for ‘good behaviour’.  When navies begin to exercise 
together they usually engage in non-war-fighting training such as search and rescue. 
Complexity and interoperability in exercises progressively increase until the very closest 
of allies are capable of fully integrated operations in difficult and dangerous scenarios.  
Clearly, the former are more commonly found than the latter.  Figure 4.2 shows a 
diagrammatic representation of various levels of engagement identified in the survey 




Figure 4.2:  Degrees of Engagement in ‘Soft’ Naval Diplomacy18 
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One aspect of naval diplomacy which does not directly fit either the Cable or composite 
classifications but is readily apparent from the survey is the communicative impact of 
not doing something.  Cancelled port visits, such as Australia’s suspension of its Navy’s 
visits to French Pacific territories in January 1995 in protest at France’s nuclear testing 
programme, can send as powerful a diplomatic message as an inaugural visit after a 
long period of animosity.  Likewise, the cancellation of planned exercises such as the 
annual US-South Korean Team Spirit, deferred for several years in a row in the 1990s 
as an incentive to North Korea to halt its nuclear development, can be used to make or 
reinforce a position.  Disengagement, then, can be a potent communicative tool.   
 
However, disengagement can also result in unintended consequences.  In December 
1992, for example, the United States redeployed an aircraft carrier from the Persian 
Gulf to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope, and Iraq exploited its absence to escalate 
pressure on visiting UN weapons inspectors and to violate the southern no-fly-zone 
which the carrier had helped to enforce.19  A similar exploitation of a gap was seen in 
October 1994 when, during another USN aircraft carrier absence, Iraq moved 80,000 
troops towards to its border with Kuwait.  The situation was only reversed when a 
substantial Western coalition naval presence was resumed.20 
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Symbolism and Tokenism 
 
As might be expected from historic precedent, the post-Cold War world saw a continued 
symbolic role for naval forces.  Warships were used as backdrops for political 
announcements and as independent sovereign territory when the situation dictated.  
For example, Romania’s declaration of its intention to join the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) was made during USS Tortuga’s visit to the country in August 1994,21  and 
HMNZS Te Kaha was employed as a venue for inter-party peace talks in the Solomon 
Islands in August 2000.22  However, some states resorted to deploying naval forces in a 
manner more akin to campaigning pressure groups than to military forces.  One such 
case was New Zealand’s dispatch of HMNZS Tui to the Mururoa Atoll in September 
1995, where it demonstrated against French nuclear testing alongside a civilian ‘protest 
flotilla.’23  This is perhaps an example of the blurring of lines between traditional state 
and non-state roles in global politics. 
 
Symbolism can take other forms and Iran’s contribution to counter-piracy operations off 
the Horn of Africa in 2009 was, arguably, an attempt by that country to present itself as 
a responsible member of the international community;24 the stakes were low and the 
message simple.  The Seychelles’ contribution to the same task at the same time was 
similarly a matter of prestige for a small state acting on the issue of the day, not a 
military or economic necessity. 25 
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There have been occasions in naval diplomacy which can best be described as 
examples of tokenism.  When Russia decided not to join the PfP in February 1994 it 
softened its position by immediately sending a warship to conduct a search and rescue 
exercise,26 that most basic of building blocks, with NATO forces. As has been 
previously argued, the ease and rapidity with which naval forces can be visibly (or 
invisibly) put to work to give demonstrable support to their government’s position is a 
particular strength in international relations.  
 
Continuity or Change? Cable in the Twenty-First Century 
 
It has already been stated that this survey includes more examples than Cable chose to 
catalogue in his work.  It must be assumed, therefore, that if he had lived to produce a 
fourth volume of his Gunboat Diplomacy then many, perhaps the majority, of the 
examples cited here would not have been used. Nonetheless, the bulk do fit into one or 
more of his categories and a very significant proportion are deemed expressive, the 
‘last and least’ mode of limited naval force which Cable so readily dismissed. 27 Given 
the numerical differences and the non-availability of equivalent source material from 
each period, therefore, a direct comparative analysis is not possible.  
 
However, an indirect approach can be adopted.  If expressive examples of naval 
diplomacy are omitted from both this survey and Cable’s chronological index, a 
remarkable truth can be observed.  Whilst acknowledging Cable’s warning about the 
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use of his data for numerical purposes, a simple statistical review shows that there is 
little discernible difference in the relative ratios of definitive, purposeful and catalytic 
incidents in the pre-Cold War, Cold War and post-Cold War eras.  In each period just 
over half of non-expressive incidents are deemed purposeful, approximately a quarter 
are definitive and less than a fifth are catalytic.  In Cable’s terms, it can be argued that 
the desired outcomes of naval diplomacy do not change significantly over time.  The 
diagrams below show the approximate ratios (pre-Cold War incidents are taken from 
Cable’s work; Cold War incidents are Cable’s plus the thesis survey; post-Cold War 





Figure 4.3: Ratios of Types of Gunboat Diplomacy according to Cable’s Classification 
(Expressive removed). 
 
However, in non-Cable terms a different trend can be seen.  It has already been stated 
that the engagements involving ‘amity’ became more prevalent than those involving 
‘enmity’ after the Cold War as Figure 4.4 shows.  By comparing ‘composite 
classifications’ between the primary survey (ie 1991-2010) and the control periods 
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(1960-64 and 1980-84), the relative incidence of each form of engagement can be 
seen.   
 
The occurrence of assistance operations, be they navies providing disaster relief after 
the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, gifting patrol vessels or providing 
hydrographic surveys in areas beyond the capabilities of the sovereign state, has 
increased over time.  The ability to ‘lend a hand’ in times of need has perhaps become 
a matter of importance on the world stage, and altruism a sign of international 
responsibility, to an extent not seen during the Cold War.  Similarly, co-operation in the 
form of bilateral or multi-lateral exercising has quantitatively increased.  Interestingly, as 
coercion and deterrence have reduced in relative terms, reassurance (often the other 
side of the same coin), has not; again, it is perhaps an indication of the increasing 

















CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
 
The survey provides a useful but inevitably incomplete overview of naval diplomacy 
since the end of the Cold War.  The themes which can be drawn from it suggest both 
continuity and change and are certainly worthy of further qualitative analysis.  It shows 
that naval diplomacy is primarily but not exclusively carried out by states and that the 
appetite of non-state actors to become involved in international communication on the 
global seas might be increasing.  It shows that seapower is numerically used more for 
purposes of amity than for enmity, though at the ‘harder’ end of the spectrum of 
operations there is little difference in the desired outcomes either before, during or after 
the Cold War.  Cable’s model, seen as seminal at the height of the superpower stand-
off, was incomplete when he devised it and requires significant refinement if it is to be 
relevant to the contemporary environment.  At the ‘softer’ end of the scale there are 
degrees of engagement which, when considered objectively, can be used to judge the 
health of any particular international relationship.  However, the impact of 
disengagement, or actively not doing something, should not be underestimated.  Navies 
are, and have always been, used for symbolic purposes and that symbolism perhaps 
approached a new zenith in the post-Cold War era with an international doctrine of 
humanitarianism and friendly co-operation. 
 
The next Chapter will build on these themes and example to investigate further the 
macro-trends and micro-actions of naval diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. 
  154 
 






D: Definitive:  the act or threat of force which possessed a definitive purpose apparent to both sides 
P: Purposeful:  less direct; limited naval force applied in order to change the policy or character of a foreign government 
C: Catalytic:  ‘lends a hand’ to act as a catalyst in a situation the direction of which has yet to be determined 
E: Expressive:  where warships are employed to emphasize attitudes or to make a point 





The major outcomes specified by existing models of naval diplomacy, shown in Chapter 2: 
 
Coercion, Deterrence, Co-operation, Prestige, Reassurance, Picture Building, Attraction, Assistance. 
 












USS Guam and Trenton conduct Non-Combatant 
Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Somalia, taking 281 






Britain deploys HMS Ark Royal to the Mediterranean to 






US CVN conducts air strikes against Iraqi forces, as 
part of the commencement of Desert Storm hostilities 








The Australian Defence Force contribution to Op 
Desert Storm includes incorporating HMAS Brisbane 
and Sydney into a USN battle group.  A medical team 
also serve in the US Hospital Ship Comfort4 
E Co-operation 
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February US 
Iraq 
Following Desert Storm the US poises amphibious 





Italy stations its corvette Danaide off Libya during 






Iraqi naval threat to Western and regional interests 




RAN deploys HMAS Perth to the Mediterranean in 
support of the 50th anniversary of the WWII campaigns 




Soviet forces continue to withdraw from Eastern 
Europe and streamline structures, but Soviet Navy 






Ships and aircraft from USN carriers begin to enforce 




RAN conducts its largest ever fisheries surveillance 
operation in its northern waters and apprehends 35 
P Deterrence 
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Indonesian vessels fishing illegally11 
April Germany 
Iraq 
Germany commits 5 MCMVs and 2 support ships to 




HMAS Launceston and Wollongong pay good will visit 





Japanese Security Council and Cabinet make decision 
to send minesweepers to Gulf; six depart at the end of 







An Australian vessel visits Honiara to host a sea day 
for local VIPs and media from the Solomon Islands 
and Tonga.  Separately, a ship visits the Philippines for 






RFA Fort George and Royal Marine units conduct Op 





Two Iranian speed boats exercising in central Gulf fire 
on USS La Salle17 
P Coercion  
July UK HMS Ambuscade is diverted to Grenada to reassure P Reassurance 
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The Soviet Union withdraws its final warships from 
former East German bases19 
C/E - 
August USSR Warships blockade Tallinn in Estonia during a coup 
attempt to overthrow President Gorbachev20 
C Coercion 
August  USSR 
Vietnam 
Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean temporarily relocate 




Following volcanic eruptions in the Philippines, HMAS 




An unidentified submarine violates Finnish territorial 
waters23 
E Picture Building 
September NATO 
USSR 
NATO conducts a series of naval exercises in the 




The UK and France look to collaborate on a new 
nuclear submarine project25 
- Cooperation 
September NATO NATO considers establishment of standing naval force 
in the Mediterranean26 
C/E Attraction/Prestige /Co-
operation 
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October USSR 
Int Community 
Soviet Union announces that half of its Pacific Fleet 
submarines will be scrapped, then redeploys 2 SSGNs 
from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific27 
E - 
October France  
China 
Taiwan 
China protests after France sells 6 frigates to Taiwan28 - Deterrence/Co-operation 
October UK 
Egypt 
UK and Egypt conduct a week-long bilateral naval 
exercise and port visit; only the third such exercise 







HMS Amazon stands ready off Haiti to conduct NEO 
after military coup30 
P Assistance 
November South Korea 
North Korea 
Int Community 
The first global deployment of the Republic of Korea 




The UK stations a warship in the Adriatic to assist with 





The Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov passes through 
the Turkish Straits for trials in the Mediterranean33 
E Prestige 
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The US and South Korea announce the cancellation of 
Exercise Team Spirit 92 on condition that North Korea 
honours its pledge to allow inspection of nuclear 






An amphibious exercise, Eager Mace 92, is held in 
Kuwait, timed to coincide with the deployment and 
unloading of strategic pre-positioning ships (Active 
Fury 92) based in Diego Garcia.  The exercises 




CIS Black Sea Fleet deploys to the Mediterranean for 






India announces its plans for more naval exercises 
with the established blue water navies of US, UK and 
France37 
- Co-operation/Prestige 
April NATO STANAVFORMED officially formed, providing a 
permanent NATO naval presence in the 
Mediterranean38 
E Picture Building /Co-
operation/Prestige 
May UK UK amphibious exercises involving HMS Beaver and E Reassurance/Deterrence 
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Kuwait 40 Cdo RM in Kuwait; the first UK/Kuwait exercise 
since the Gulf War39 
May Croatia 
Int Community 
The first independent Croatian warship is launched40 - Prestige 
May CIS 
NATO 
The CIS intelligence gathering ship, Ekvator, shadows 
STANAVFORMED; the first CIS AGI activity since the 
end of the USSR41 





The RN deploys the Orient 92 task group, led by HMS 
Invincible.  It visits numerous European, Middle and 
Far East ports and exercises with other navies in an 
attempt to demonstrate Britain’s ability to operate at 





Three Taiwanese ships (2 destroyers and a tanker) 




Sweden complains that 2 CIS submarines have 
violated its territorial waters; the USSR had a long 
history of incursions into Swedish waters which they 
claimed were US and UK submarines conducting 
‘tests’44 
E Picture building/Coercion 
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The WEU and NATO commence operations in the 
Adriatic to monitor the movement of shipping in the 





The fishery protection vessel HMS Brecon is 
dispatched to protect British fishing vessels off the 




Franco-German ties ‘deepen’ following bilateral naval 




USN ships and aircraft from US carriers begin to 




July South Africa 
Kenya 
Int Community 
Two South African Navy fast attack craft visit 
Mombasa; it is a rare example of a apartheid era SAN 
visit to a ‘black African’ country and follows the visit of 




Australia gifts 2 patrol boats to Fiji following the 
normalisation of relations, which were severed after 




Georgian President Edvard Shevadnadza calls for 
‘limit and quota’ to the number of warships in the Black 
- - 
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Sea; the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet had been 
divided between Russia and Ukraine51 
July South Africa 
Angola 
Int Community 
South Africa deploys its support ship Tafelberg to 




The Indian Navy conducts its ‘biggest ever’ exercise in 




Russian and Ukrainian Presidents agree to joint 
control of the former Black Sea Fleet54 
E Co-operation 
August  UK 
West Indies 
HMS Cardiff and Campbeltown conduct relief 





Western naval forces start to concentrate in the 




Taiwanese trawlers report a number of boardings by 
unmarked patrol craft of Chinese design.  One trawler 
is fired upon.  Taiwan denounced the patrol craft as 
‘pirates’ and China denied responsibility57 
P Coercion 
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September Sweden 
Russia 
Sweden attacks an unidentified submarine contact in 
its territorial waters during a naval exercise; the 






Three Russian Kilo Class submarines leave Latvia for 
Iran.  The sale resulted in protests from the US, UK 




A Russian Helix helicopter lands on a US warship in 




In an attempt to ‘calm nerves’ over its regional 
expansion, India invites ASEAN countries to join a 
naval exercise for the first time. ASEAN had 
traditionally been an economic not a security 






The US sends the submarine Topeka to Bahrain, for 
the first routine maintenance in the Gulf.  Understood 
to be messaging to Russia and Iran following the sale 





The US threatens not to renew leases on 8 frigates 





The US redeploys its Gulf carrier to Somalia for 
Operation RESTORE HOPE.  In its absence Iraq 
- - 
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escalates pressure on UN weapons inspectors and 








The RAN provide strategic sea lift, logistic, 
communication, intelligence and air support in Somalia 
as part of the US-led Op RESTORE HOPE65 
C Co-operation/Picture 
building 
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January Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE – ‘Tamil 
Tigers’) claim to have built ‘suicide submarines’ for 













Australia invites ASEAN countries to join the naval 
exercise Kakadu; Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 






HMAS Geelong pays a series of visits to Aboriginal 
communities in the Tiwi Islands and Arnhem Land as 
part of a Customs and Navy awareness campaign69 
- Reassurance  
March UK 
France 
During a dispute over fishing rights off Guernsey a 
French vessel is arrested.  Later, HMS Blazer, a 
university RN unit, is boarded by French fishermen in 




HMAS Derwent becomes first RAN ship to visit Fiji since 
coup of 198771 
- Attraction  
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May Iran 
Int Community 
Iran conducts a naval exercise involving more than 100 
vessels including, for the first time, a Kilo class 
submarine72 








Russia deploys numerous vessels in a ‘show of 
presence’.  Three Krivak class to the Mediterranean; 
one Krivak to Norway; one Sovremenny to New York; 
one Sovremenny to the UK73 
E Prestige  
June US 
Iraq 
The USN fires Tomahawk missiles at Iraqi intelligence 
service HQ from its ships in the Gulf and Red Sea.  The 
use of force is in retaliation for a plot to assassinate 




Russia deploys a flotilla from its Pacific Fleet to the East 
China Sea following PLAN arrests and harassment of 






Plans are announced for a joint Polish, Danish and 
German naval exercise in the Baltic.  Poland wishes to 







UN maritime interdiction operations commence off Haiti 
following the removal of President Aristide in 199177 
D/P Coercion 
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The US announces its decision to send the aircraft 




Following unrest, the US President orders USN to 
enforce a blockade of Haiti.  By the following April 712 




Russia and Kuwait hold their first joint naval exercise; up 
until this point Russia had only exercised with Western 





HMAS Canberra and Perth visit Langkawi island in 
Malaysia for an international maritime and space 
exhibition; defence and trade ministers attend.  Diving 
teams then assist Royal Malaysian Police in search and 
recovery of body of missing crewman who had fallen 
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Australia hands a patrol boat to Kiribati as part of an 
ongoing co-operation programme with small Pacific 
Ocean island states. No weapons are included but the 




Poland and the Netherlands sign an agreement for 
joint exercises, personnel and technology exchanges 




Russia decides not to join the PfP but allocates the 





The US and South Korea agree to suspend the Team 
Spirit 94 exercise after North Korea agrees to IAEA 






Around 100 NATO vessels take part in Exercise 
Resolute Response to practice defence of sea lines of 





Yugoslav Navy ships interfere with an action by 
NATO/WEU warships conducting Operation Sharp 
Guard in the Adriatic; the NATO/WEU ships were 
D/P Coercion 
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The US announces that its aircraft carrier 
Independence will be kept within one week’s sailing 










The South African warship Drakensburg joins the Joint 
Maritime Course off Scotland.  It is the first time the RN 











Exercise Baltops 94 takes place involving 35 ships 




The Russian cruiser Kerch becomes the first to pass 
through the Turkish Straits into the Mediterranean 
since 199193 
E Prestige  
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The Russian and US navies conduct a joint exercise 




HMAS Swan and Torrens visit Indonesia for Australia 




The USN deploys two mine countermeasures vessels 
to the Western Pacific to enhance its capabilities 




The USS Inchon amphibious ready group deploys to 





Colombia and Venezuela agree to co-ordinate naval 





The Australian and Indonesian navies jointly exercise 





The Romanian Defence Minister announces his 
country’s intention to join the PfP during USS Tortuga’s 
visit100  
E Attraction/Co-operation 
August UK The Argentinean sail training ship Libertad visits E Reassurance/Co-
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Argentina Dartmouth at the UK’s invitation101 operation 
September Japan 
Russia 
Negotiations take place for the first ever 





The US and South Korea declare that in the event of a 
crisis on the Korean peninsula the headquarters of the 
USN 7th Fleet will move from Hawaii to South Korea103 
- Reassurance/Deterrence 
September Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Tamil Tigers destroy the Sri Lankan navy’s largest 
ship, Sagarawardene, by ramming it with small boats 





RAN provides a secure environment for the conduct of 
the Bougainville Peace Conference105 
C Reassurance 
October Germany The German Navy transfers its fast attack craft flotilla 





In the absence of a USN aircraft carrier in the Gulf, 
Iraq moves 80,000 troops towards Kuwait.  A sizeable 
US naval force including the aircraft carrier George 
Washington, the amphibious ship Tripoli and the 18th 
MEU, then reposition into the Gulf and poise off Iraq.  
The RN stations its Armilla Patrol in the Northern Gulf.  
Iraq backs down107 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
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The PLAN rehearse an amphibious assault off Taiwan 






Thailand turns down a US request to pre-position ships 
in Thai territorial waters; the pre-positioning was aimed 





USS Gettysburg and USS Halyburton become the first 
USN ships to visit South Africa since 1967111 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
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Canadian Navy commences Operation 
Ocean Vigilance, monitoring fishing activity 
off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.  The 
operation would last for 2 years during the 





China seizes the disputed Mischief Reef 130 






Norway donates three Storm class fast patrol 




Australia suspends RAN visits to French 





HMS Marlborough stands by off Sierra Leone 





An international naval force of 26 ships from 6 
countries poises off Mogadishu during 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
                                               
112
 Canada.  Royal Canadian Navy. Background Summaries: Recent Operations Overview.  http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-
a_eng.asp?id=460 (accessed 3 June 2013). 
113
 Lanteigne, Marc.  Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction.  2
nd
 Edition. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p136. 
114
 JDW 23, No 2 (1995): p9. 
115
 Australia, RAN Operations Database. 
116
 UK, RN Operations 1970-2013. 
  176 




The first US-Albanian exercise takes place, a 







A naval exercise, Kakadu II, takes place in 
the Timor and Arafura Seas as part of 






HMAS Flinders conducts survey of Rabaul 
Harbour to determine impact of volcanic 
eruptions and establish safe navigation 
routes120 












A ground-breaking Israeli-Arab naval exercise 
planned to take place off Tunisia as part of 
the Middle East peace process.  It involves 
SAR and ‘incidents at sea’ exercises121 
E Co-operation 
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USS Bunker Hill visits China.  It is the first 
USN visit to the country since the 
suppression of the pro-democracy movement 
in 1989122 
E Attraction 
April Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Tamil Tigers sink two warships, SLNS 
Sooraya and Ranasura, at the Trimcomalee 






HMS Monmouth patrols near the Turks and 
Caicos to intercept and deter illegal Haitian 
immigration124 
P Deterrence/Picture building 
May Russia 
Australia 
HMAS Sydney visits Vladivostok; the first 





NATO’s STANAVFORMED conducts a SAR 
exercise with Bulgarian and Romanian 




Exercise Malabar II takes place in an attempt 






The RNLN promotes Dutch industry during its 
Fairwind 95 deployment, visiting Egypt, the 
- Prestige 
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The USN reactivates its 5th Fleet in Bahrain to 
command naval operations in the Gulf region; 
it had been disbanded in 1947129 
- Prestige/Reassurance 











The Southern Africa Development 
Community form a Maritime Standing 
Committee under South African 
Chairmanship, with the aim of increasing 
naval and maritime co-operation in the region.  
















A flotilla of six Australian warships visits 





HMS Southampton stands by and then 
provides assistance to Montserrat during and 




China conducts air and maritime exercises in 
the East China Sea following a heightening of 
P/E Coercion 
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tensions with Taiwan133 
September New Zealand 
France 
Int Community 
HMNZS Tui is deployed to the Mururoa Atoll 
to demonstrate against French nuclear testing 
in the Pacific and to support the ‘Protest 




The US trains Thai Navy pilots in preparation 





Iran conducts an amphibious exercise, Great 






China conducts further air and maritime 
exercises in the East China Sea, signalling its 
displeasure at Taiwanese posturing.  In 
addition, an amphibious landing exercise is 
conducted on Dungshan Island, south of the 





The French Navy make a goodwill visit to 




The Indian Navy and UAE conduct a naval 
exercise in the Gulf; the Indian ships then visit 
the UAE139 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
                                               
133
 Porch, Douglas.  “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the US Navy.”  US Naval War College Review 52, no 3 (1999): p18. 
134
 JDW 24, No 9 (1995): p4. 
135
 JDW 24, No 14 (1995): p18. 
136
 JDW 24, No 14 (1995): p22. 
137
 Porch, The Taiwan Strait Crisis, p18. 
138
 JDW 24, No 22 (1995): p18. 




The USS Nimitz carrier battle group makes 
passage through the Taiwan Strait, the first to 






A Russian Akula class nuclear submarine 
operates off the north-western US, tracking 
Trident class submarines.  The US 
assessment is that the Russian Navy is 
reasserting its capabilities after a lengthy 
period of budget constraints141 
E Prestige/Picture building  
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The Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov and its battle 
group enters the Mediterranean in the first major out-




A naval and marine exercise, Iron Magic Iron Siren 96, 





HMS Northumberland conducts presence and 
deterrence operations against illegal fishing by 





The Dutch and Belgian fleets join under a single 





Greek Navy commandos raise a flag on an uninhabited 
island 4 nm from the Turkish coast (in Greek: Imia; in 
Turkish: Kardak).  Turkey responds by deploying three 
frigates, one destroyer and three attack craft.  Greece 
then counters with two frigates, one destroyer and 
three attack craft.  Both sides raise their alert states on 
the island of Cyprus.  The three day confrontation ends 
following US diplomatic pressure – Greece removes its 
flag and Turkish forces withdraw146 
D Coercion 
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February Sweden  
Singapore 
Sweden enters an agreement to train Singapore 
submariners147 




The US and South Korea cancel their annual Team 
Spirit exercise for the third consecutive year, but they 











US warships and UK auxiliary poise off Liberia to 





The RN hosts Russo-UK-US naval exercises which 





The US and Philippines hold a naval exercise.  It had 
been postponed from 1995 because of tensions 




Turkey and Israel announce plans for naval 
exercises153 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
June to UK RN warships monitor confrontation between Danish - Picture 
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July Denmark 
Greenpeace 
fishing vessels and Greenpeace in the North Sea154 building/Deterrence 
July Greece 
Israel 
Greece and Israel announce plans for naval exercises; 
Greece also aims to ‘dampen’ its criticism of Israeli co-




The first visit by Japanese Maritime Self Defense 
Force ships to Russia, to celebrate the 300th 




The Japanese training ships Kashima and Sawayuki 
visit South Korea. It is the first visit by the JMSDF to 




The Egyptian and Saudi navies exercise together in 
the Red Sea.  Tensions between the two countries had 
been high but recently improved158 
E Co-
operation/Reassurance 
September North Korea 
South Korea 
A North Korean mini-submarine runs aground off South 
Korea during a suspected attempt to infiltrate a 
reconnaissance team; the crew are all found dead with 
shots to the head159 
P Picture building 
September China 
Japan 
Hong Kong protest vessels invade seas near 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands after the Japanese 
proclamation of an EEZ.  Several protesters are 
P Coercion 
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blocked by Japanese patrol vessels and jump into the 
sea; one is drowned160 
October Taiwan 
China 
Taiwan conducts a one day amphibious landing 
exercise involving 80 ships and 13,000 personnel161 




HMS Nottingham patrols the coast of Croatia in 
support of the NATO operation162 
P Picture 
building/Deterrence  
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US cruisers position in the Mediterranean to 





RN commences Ocean Wave deployment, 
sending 17 ships and submarines to Middle 
East and Asia-Pacific in support of UK political 
interests by demonstrating continuing ability to 
deploy an effective force for a significant 
period164 
E Prestige/Attraction 
January  Australia 
Japan 
Australia announces that the RAN would seize 
Japanese vessels caught fishing in Australian 
EEZ after failure to reach agreement on 
quotas165 





India, the Maldives and Saudi Arabia are 




HMS Birmingham and Exeter stand by off 
Albanian port of Durres to conduct NEO during 
internal unrest167 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
March to South Africa South Africa hosts Atlasur naval exercises with E Co-operation/Attraction 
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South American countries168 
April Russia 
Ukraine 
Russia and Ukraine hold their first exercises 







Three Chinese navy ships deploy across the 
Pacific and visit various ports in North and 




HMCS Huron becomes the first Canadian ship 





During the Five Power Defence Agreement 
(FPDA) Exercise Flying Fish in the South 
China Sea, Capt Bopal of the Royal Malaysian 
Navy embarks in HMS Illustrious and assumes 
command of the maritime forces.  It is the first 
time that a foreign maritime component 




Indonesia and Singapore conduct co-ordinated 
anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits173 
P/E Co-operation 
May France Fish poaching becomes a problem and France P/E Co-operation/Attraction 
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  187 
South Africa offers to help to patrol the waters around 
Prince Edward Islands, beyond the endurance 
of South African patrol boats174 
June Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Sri Lankan navy attacks and sinks a 




UK auxiliary poises off Sierra Leone during 





HM Yacht Britannia, patrol vessels and frigate 
in Hong Kong for handover to China.  Ocean 
Wave task group poises over the horizon177 
E Prestige/Reassurance 
August Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
Sri Lanka sinks two and damages twelve Tamil 




The British Ocean Wave deployment and 
returns to the UK after eight months away and 
visits to 20 countries179 
E Prestige 
September South Africa 
Namibia 
Two South African warships operate from 
Namibia as part of a memorandum of 
understanding on maritime co-operation in the 
region180 
- Co-operation 
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  188 
September Australia 
China 
HMAS Perth and Newcastle visit China in order 





Iran conducts a ten day naval exercise in the 
Gulf in response to the announcement of USS 
Nimitz deployment to the region (the 
deployment was, in turn, a response to an 




The Greek minesweeper Avra steams over the 
‘narrowly submerged’ Turkish submarine, 
Yildiray, in international waters in the Aegean 
Sea.  The submarine was visible with masts 
protruding the surface.  Turkey calls the 




A South African task group in the Indian Ocean 
conducts a SAR exercise with French forces 





HMS Campbeltown acts as host ship in 
Odessa for UK Secretary of State for Defence 
to conduct trilateral defence talks with Ukraine 
and Poland185 
E Prestige/Attraction 
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  189 
October UK 
Congo 
HMS Monmouth and RFA Orangeleaf stand by 
off Congo during deteriorating political situation 





Naval exercise takes place between 
Indonesian, Australian and German warships 
in the Java Sea.  The German ships then pay a 




Malaysia and the Philippines conduct a nine 
day long anti-piracy exercise called Sea 
Malphi188 
E Co-operation 
November New Zealand 
Papua New 
Guinea 
The RNZN leads a Truce Monitoring Group in 
Bougainville.  It is the largest multi-national 




Six Singapore sailors take part in a Swedish 
mine countermeasures exercise190 
- Co-operation  
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China and the US sign a Maritime 
Consultative Agreement aimed at preventing 





US amphibious forces complete a month 





Israel, Turkey and the US hold a one day 
exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean called 
Reliant Mermaid.  The exercise is SAR 
based and is viewed as an attempt to 
deepen the relationship between the 
region’s two non-Arab states.  The Egyptian 
Foreign Minister warned of a ‘counter-




Greece transfers a coast guard vessel to 
Georgia after a co-operation agreement.  It 
is followed by a visit by the Georgian 
Foreign Minister to Greece; Georgia’s first 




The US deploys USS Independence and the 
UK deploys HMS Invincible, both aircraft 
P Coercion/Reassurance 
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  191 
Iraq carriers, to the Gulf because of the growing 
Iraq crisis195 
February Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Tamil Tigers sink two Sri Lankan naval 
vessels off the Jaffna peninsula 
- Coercion 
March Sierra Leone 
UK 
HMS Monmouth, followed by HMS Cornwall, 
visit Sierra Leone in a show of support for 
the restored democratic government196 




France and Australia help Fiji to monitor its 
EEZ after spending cuts forced  its Navy to 
end patrols for the rest of the year197 





The uncompleted aircraft carrier Varyag is 
bought from Ukraine by an unknown 
company based in Macau; it is suspected 








A four country, four day MCM exercise takes 
place off Qatar, simulating the clearance of 





An anti-submarine warfare exercise, 
USWEX 98, is conducted in the Gulf by four 
E Co-
operation/Deterrence/Reassurance 
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Western powers; aimed at demonstrating 
capability to Iran200 
April Russia 
Ukraine 
Russia and Ukraine hold joint exercises in 





Iran holds its first exercises with its new Kilo 
Class submarines.  Ex Ettihad (Unity) takes 
place from Bander Abbas and through the 
Strait of Hormuz to Chah Bahar.  It aims to 
demonstrate Iranian maritime power to 
neighbouring countries202 
E Prestige  
May Argentina 
Chile 
Argentina and Chile announce naval 
exercises to be conducted later in the year.  
It is a significant development in military ties 







Ex Madat 98 (meaning ‘Help’), a five day 




France joins the annual Baltops 
exercise/deployment to the Baltic Sea for 
the first time in its 26 year history205 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
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Australia announces suspension of RAN 
visits to, and exercises with, India and 






China deploys its first ‘air capable’ ship 
(Shichang) to Australia, New Zealand and 
the Philippines. 207 




HMS Cornwall is withdrawn from an 
exercise with the South African Navy to 
stand by for a NEO off Guinea Bissau if 







Ex Co-Operative Partner 98, a PfP exercise, 




Joint US-Croatian exercises take place 








India attempts to counter Pakistani and 
American influence in the Gulf by holding its 
first exercises with Iran and Kuwait and a 
one day exercise with Saudi Arabia and 
Oman.  It is seen as an assertion of Indian 
C/E Prestige/Attraction/Co-operation 
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  194 
Pakistan 
US 
foreign policy independence after US 
attempts to isolate Tehran211 
June Australia 
Indonesia 
RAN deliver food and medical supplies to 
drought affected areas of Irian Jaya212 
- Assistance 
June North Korea 
South Korea 
A North Korean submarine violates South 
Korean waters and is arrested213 




The Portuguese ship Vasco da Gama 







The foreign ministers of Portugal and Angola 
meet Guinea Bissau rebels on board Vasco 
da Gama; government officials are invited 
but fail to turn up215 
C/E Prestige/Reassurance  
July Russia 
Japan 
Russia and Japan hold their first joint naval 
exercise (SAR).  The Japanese destroyers 





HMS Marlborough and RFA Fort Victoria 
visit the Syrian port of Latakia; it is the first 
contact between the armed forces of the two 
countries since 1986217 
E Attraction/Co-operation 
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  195 
August Argentina 
Chile 
Argentina and Chile conduct a joint naval 





US warships John S McCain and Blue Ridge 






Al Qaida  
USN warships launch cruise missile attacks 
against Khost in Afghanistan and Al Shifa in 
Sudan; the former was believed to be the 
hiding place of Osama bin Laden, the latter 
was a pharmaceutical factory allegedly 
being used to manufacture chemical 
weapons.  Both bombings were in response 
to the AQ attacks on the American 








Various RAN units support UN sanctioned 
peace enforcement operation in East Timor, 




The UK stations a warship off Albania for 
NEO if required222 
P Assistance/Reassurance 
September China Chinese protesters land on the disputed P Coercion 
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Japan island of Senkaku/Diaoyu and clash with 
Japanese Coast Guard223 
September UK 
West Indies 
RN conducts disaster relief in St Kitts and 





Greece and Turkey exercise together as 
part of the NATO exercise Dynamic Mix, the 





NATO’s STANAVFORMED conducts 
presence operations in the Adriatic as 
demonstration of resolve against Serbian 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.  The force is 
stood down after diplomatic protests226 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
October South Korea 
Russia 
South Korean ships Seoul and Taejon visit 







UK mine hunter conducts clearance of WWI 




France proposes co-operation over aircraft 
carrier development plans229 
- Co-operation 
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November US 
Iraq 
The US stations two carrier battle groups 
and two amphibious ready groups in the 










Major multi-national relief operations in and 





Omani officers accept an invitation to watch 
Iranian naval exercises.  Iran had been 
trying to conduct joint exercises with US-







Operation Desert Fox takes place.  It 
includes the most punishing air strikes 
against Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War.  There 
are significant diplomatic protests 
worldwide233 
D Coercion 
December North Korea 
South Korea 
A North Korean submarine violates South 
Korean waters and is sunk by the ROK 
Navy234 
D Picture building/Deterrence 
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UK stations warship off Sierra Leone to support 







HMS Invincible deploys to the Gulf following 
‘diplomatic difficulties’ with Iraq.  It conducts 
maritime interdiction, air surveillance and 
enforcement of the no-fly zone.  On returning to 
the UK it is diverted to the Ionian Sea to participate 
in Operation Allied Force against Serbia236 
D Coercion 
February Sri Lanka 
LTTE 





The US donates 5 patrol vessels to the Albanian 





France assists Fiji by conducting maritime 
surveillance flights over its EEZ, using its naval 




India deploys the aircraft carrier Viraat to the Gulf 
for the first time as part of its diplomatic plan to 
increase its influence in the region240 
E Prestige/Attraction 
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In an ambitious series of exercises (Milan), India 
strives for ‘professional interaction’ with 
neighbouring states.  The Western Fleet exercises 
off the Kochi coast with the Maldives, Mauritius, Sri 
Lanka, the UAE and Oman, whilst the Eastern 
Fleet operates in the Bay of Bengal with Sri Lana, 






The Indian Navy and Coast Guard intercept an 





The Gulf Co-operation Council states voice 
concern over Iranian naval exercises; they stage 
their own week-long naval exercise in response243 
- Co-operation/Deterrence 
March North Korea 
South Korea 
South Korea recovers a North Korean infiltration 






Operation Allied Force is launched, consisting of 
air and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) 
strikes on Serbia245 
D Coercion 
March Japan Discovery of a ‘spy ship’ off the Noto Peninsula246 E Picture building 
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The Indian Navy participates in Blue Crane, a 
peace-keeping exercise for the South African 
Development Community (no other non-SADC 




HMAS Perth and Arunta become the first 
Australian ships to visit Vietnam since the end of 
the Vietnam war, becoming a symbol of improving 





NATO’s STANAVFORLANT prepares to deploy for 
embargo operations in the Adriatic, similar to 
Sharp Guard from 1993 to 1996.  The force poises 
off Gibraltar249 
P Deterrence 
May New Zealand 
South Korea 







In the wake of the Kargil crisis, when Pakistani 
forces crossed the Line of Control in the disputed 
territory, India put its Navy on alert and altered the 
operations deployment plans for its Eastern and 
Western Fleets.  This sent a signal that any 
‘misadventure’ would be firmly dealt with.  India 
claimed that its naval response had a definitive 
effect on the outcome of the crisis251 
D Deterrence 
                                               
247
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HMAS Tobruk contributes to the evacuation of 




China bans USN ships from Hong Kong as part of 
a suspension of military contact following the 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade253 
- - 
Coercion 
June North Korea 
South Korea 
Shots are exchanged between North and South 
Korean Coast Guard ships  after North Korean 
vessel crosses the Northern Limit Line; in 






The US deploys the USS Constellation carrier 
battle group and the USS Peleliu amphibious 
ready group to the Western Pacific in response to 




The Philippine Navy sink a Chinese fishing boat off 







The Indian fleet poises off Karachi and India claims 
its presence hastens the end of the recent Kashmir 
border dispute257 
P Deterrence 
                                               
252
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253
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August South Korea 
North Korea 
Japan 
Pyongyang protests when South Korea and Japan 






The US sends two missile tracking ships to Japan 





Georgian and US Coast Guard vessels hold a joint 




China allows the first visit by USN ships to Hong 







The US deploys USS Belleau Wood and Canada 
deploys HMCS Proteceur to East Timor to help 
restore peace after much infrastructure is 







The Indian Navy conducts high profile anti-
poaching and anti-illegal immigration operations in 
and near the Nicobar Islands263 
- Deterrence 
November South Korea 
Vietnam 
Three South Korean warships visit Vietnam for the 
first time264 
E Attraction 
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HMS Ocean provides assistance to Turkey 




The Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, 
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The first French/Argentinean naval exercise 
takes place between the Mar Del Plata and 
Cape Horn.  It involves the French helicopter 
carrier Jeanne d’Arc, the destroyer Georges 
Leygues and the Argentinean submarine 




A French/Indian naval exercise in the Arabian 
Sea is the first Indian military exercise with a 





USS John C Stennis carrier battle group visits 
Hong Kong.  It is seen as a sign of improving 




HMS Victorious becomes the first UK ballistic 
nuclear deterrent submarine to visit France; it 




French naval, air and ground forces conduct 
Ex Pearl Of The West 2000, the largest 
exercise for France in the Gulf since the 1991 
war271 
E Co-operation/Attraction/Prestige 
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Iran conducts Ex Vahdat 78 (Unity 78), a 
naval exercise in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman and 




The UK deploys an auxiliary vessel and Royal 
Marines to Mozambique to conduct 
humanitarian assistance following floods, 




Chinese naval vessels train in the vicinity of 







Following a military co-operation agreement 
earlier in the month, France rapidly plans and 











Six  states conduct naval exercises together 






Singapore conducts its first round the world 
deployment to showcase its new LST, RSS 
Endurance. Port visits include New York, 
E Prestige 
                                               
272
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Hawaii, Mexico, Panama, Canada, the UK, 
France, Egypt and Saudi Arabia277 
April India 
Thailand 
Two Indian warships visit Bangkok and 
exercise with the Thai Navy; it is part of the 





Pakistan and Saudi Arabia conduct Ex 
Naseem Al-Bahr (Wind of the Sea) in the 
Arabian Sea.  It is aimed at improving co-
operation.  Pakistani ships then visit Saudi 





India and Sri Lanka conduct a joint naval 
exercise in the Bay of Bengal. There is 
speculation that there could be joint patrols 
and Indian assistance to prevent the Tamil 
Tigers trafficking arms by sea280 
E Co-operation 
May  India  
Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Indian Navy’s Eastern Command is put 
on a war footing under Op Jalinkas as a 
signal of deterrence after the Tamil Tigers 




The USN deploys a patrol craft to Sierra 
Leone to conduct a NEO if required282 
P Reassurance 
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Op Palliser, a UK operation in support of the 
government of Sierra Leone when the capital, 
Freetown, was under attack from rebels.  
HMS Illustrious, Ocean, supporting frigates 






Australia and New Zealand dispatch ships to 
conduct a NEO following a coup in the 
Solomon Islands284 
P Assistance/Reassurance 
June Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
Tamil Tigers sink two Sri Lankan fast attack 







The Russian submarine Kursk sinks with the 
loss of all lives.  The UK and Norway each 




USS Chancellorville pays a port visit to 
Quingdao as part of a resumption of US-




The Chinese warship Shenzen and its 
auxiliary Nancang visit Simons Town288 
E Attraction 
August New Zealand New Zealand deploys HMNZS Te Kaha to the C Attraction/Prestige 
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Solomon 
Islands 
Solomon Islands after a request for a ‘secure, 
neutral venue for peace talks’289 
September US 
South Africa 
USS George Washington visits Cape Town.  
It is the first visit by a USN carrier to South 
Africa since the 1960s; a possible response 







A joint submarine rescue exercise involving 
Turkey, Italy and the US takes place off 
Mersin Bay in Turkey; it follows the Russian 
submarine Kursk disaster in August291 
E Co-operation 
September Australia 
Fed States of 
Micronesia 
Various RAN units provide surveillance 







USS Cole suffers a terrorist attack in Yemeni 




HMS Cardiff is dispatched to Belize to provide 




An Indian naval task group pay good will 
visits to China, Vietnam and Indonesia295 
E Prestige/Attraction 
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In Operation Silkman, an RN amphibious task 
group conducts a show of strength and beach 
landing near Freetown; the timing coincided 
with the end of a 30 day cease fire and was 




                                               
296
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The US, Israel and Turkey conduct a joint SAR 




Russia announces one of its navy’s longest 
deployments since Soviet break-up.  The warship 
Vinogradov and support vessel Panteleyev will spend 




USS Mitscher participates in an anti-submarine 







The US vetoes a visit by the Taiwanese ‘friendship 
fleet’ to the Marshall Islands under the Compact of 
Free Association.  The Marshall Islands had 
established diplomatic relations with the Republic of 




The Indian and Singaporean navies conduct a bilateral 
anti-submarine exercise301 
E Co-operation 
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An agreement is signed to establish BLACKSEAFOR, 
a naval force of the Black Sea countries to be used for 
SAR, environmental protection, mine countermeasures 
and good will visits302 
- Co-operation/Attraction 
April North Korea 
South Korea 
A North Korean patrol boat violates South Korean 
territorial waters.  South Korean ships intercept the 
vessel and escort it out.  North Korea does not 







PLAN vessels challenge Australian warships transiting 






In a ‘new chapter of cooperation’ the Indian Navy 






HMAS Kanimbla conducts disaster relief operations in 





The Taiwanese ‘friendship fleet’ returns to Taiwan after 
a 95 day deployment, visiting eight countries in the 
E Prestige/Attraction 
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Int Community Pacific, Central and South America, all of which 




Singapore hosts a mine countermeasures exercise, 
reinforcing its leading role in promoting multi-lateral 
military activity in the Asia-Pacific region.  Participants 
include Australia, China, France, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South 





HMAS Hawkesbury and Huon becomes first RAN 
ships to visit major Indonesian port since operations in 





Largest RN task group since Falklands conflict in 1982 
sails for Ex Saif Sareea II 
E Attraction  
August China 
India 
Reciprocating the Indian visit of the previous year, two 








On the day of the terrorist attacks (9/11) in New York, 
the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise deploys to the 
Northern Arabian Gulf as a contingency force312   
C/P Deterrence/Reassurance 
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Community 
September South Africa 
US 
South Africa refuses permission for the visit of a 





China increases its patrols of the South China Sea and 
Spratley Islands with three new patrol boats.  The 
vessels belong to the PLAN but are marked as 
‘customs’ to downplay their role314 




Ex Saif Sareea II becomes a symbol of the global war 
on terror.  An Omani Navy Commodore becomes the 
Maritime Component Commander in a UK Type 22 
frigate315 
E Attraction/Co-operation  
October Australia 
Int Community 
HMAS Warramunga turns back illegal immigrants at 
Ashmore Reef.  HMAS Adelaide fires warning shots 
across the bow of another vessel carrying illegal 
immigrants316 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
October South Korea 
China 
North Korea 
South Korea pays its first naval good will visit to 
mainland China, led by the destroyer Euljimundok; 





The US and UK lead a coalition assault into 
Afghanistan from ships in the Indian Ocean318 
D Coercion/Co-
operation/Reassurance 
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A Japanese warship is deployed to the Indian Ocean 
for ‘data gathering’; other destroyers and mine 
countermeasures support vessels deploy for ‘co-





Nigeria and South Africa conduct joint anti-piracy 
patrols off the west coast of Africa320 
P/E Co-operation 
 
                                               
319
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320
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France and Tanzania co-host a peace support exercise in 
Tanzania’s Tanga Bay.  France provides its amphibious 
ship Sirocco.  Other states participating are Kenya, South 
Africa, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Botswana, 







Under the banner Op Sagittarius, the Indian Navy escort 
High Value Vessels through the Strait of Malacca choke 
point as part of the US-led Op Enduring Freedom (the war 





Germany assumes command of the international naval 
Task Force 150, operating around the Horn of Africa as 





At Mexican request, the Indian Navy escorts a sail training 





Taiwan tests its first anti-ship missile, the Hsiung-Feng 2, 
with a reported range of 150 km326 
- Deterrence 
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May India 
France 
A joint Indian/French naval exercise is conducted in the 
Arabian Sea.  The Indian Defence Minister visits the 
French flag ship, Charles de Gaulle327 
E Co-
operation/Attraction 
June North Korea 
South Korea 
Shots exchanged as North Korean patrol boats cross the 
Northern Limit Line and are intercepted by the South 
Korean Navy328 
D Coercion/Deterrence 
July New Zealand 
Vietnam 
RNZN ships Te Mana and Endeavour pay a good will visit 









Russia conducts the largest naval exercise in the Caspian 
Sea since the end of the Soviet Union; it involves 60 ships 




Russia is forced to cancel a Black Sea Fleet exercise, 
reportedly because of fuel shortages.  It was due to 





India and Indonesia commence joint patrols of the Malacca 
Strait333 
P/E Co-operation 
October Japan Japan’s first post-WWII international fleet review is held in E Attraction/Prestige 
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China commences building a major naval signals 
intelligence facility on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island, near 
India’s strategically important Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands336 





A Spanish warship, acting as part of Task Force 150, 
intercepts a ship carrying Scud missiles from North Korea 
to Yemen.  However, after protests from Yemen the ship is 
allowed to proceed.  The US Secretary of State then 
announces that Yemen had agreed not to pass the 
missiles to a third party337  
P - 
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336
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The Indian government announces that its 
Navy will provide logistical support to Sri 







US and UK naval assets begin to mass in 
the Arabian Gulf following Iraqi refusal to 





The French carrier Charles de Gaulle and 
its task group of three frigates, one nuclear 
submarine and replenishment vessel sail for 
the eastern Mediterranean.  The French 
political leadership had formally declared 
their opposition to military intervention in 
Iraq but the deployment is viewed as a 





Iran and India conduct joint naval exercises 
off Mumbai in an attempt to increase 
bilateral cooperation341 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
March US The invasion of Iraq begins with an assault D Coercion 
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from the sea342 
March UK 
Sierra Leone 
The UK deploys HMS Iron Duke plus an 
auxiliary with Royal Marines embarked to 
Sierra Leone in support of the government 




Russia commences a long-planned naval 
deployment to the Indian Ocean.  The 
Defence Ministry claim that it is not 
connected with the US-led invasion of Iraq.  





Brunei and the Philippines hold their first 





Russia and Ukraine conduct joint naval 
exercises, Peace Fairway, in the Black Sea.  
This follows a NATO announcement of a 
PfP exercise with Ukraine and involvement 
of STANAVFORMED planned for later in 
the year346 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
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Indian and Russian navies conduct the first 
bilateral exercise between the two countries 




Canada reduces its naval footprint in the 
Persian Gulf, withdrawing one of its frigates 





The Indian Navy considers a request to 
provide maritime security for the African 







Ex Teamwork South 2003 takes place off 
the coast of Northern Chile.  It aims to 
improve interoperability between the 
participating forces, particularly when 
working under a UN mandate352 
E Co-operation 
                                               
347
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A series of joint US-ASEAN naval 







The US and India conduct a SAR exercise 
off Chennai; there are observers from 





The Greek and Tunisian navies conduct 




USS O’Kane becomes the first USN 
warship to visit Fiji in 3 years following the 







INS Ranjit and Suvarna deploy to 
Mozambique to provide maritime security 





Japanese and Russian warships conduct 
bilateral anti-terrorism exercises in the 
Okhotsk Sea; the exercises are a departure 
from the normal SAR and are an attempt to 
strengthen ties358 
E Co-operation  
                                               
353
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354
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August US 
Liberia 
In response to deteriorating conditions in 
Liberia, the US President authorises 
deployment into the country’s territorial 
waters to support UN and West African 





Taiwan conducts large live-fire exercise 
involving ships, aircraft, troops and vehicles 
in an anti-amphibious scenario.  However, 
the exercise suffered a series of mishaps 
including missed targets; Taiwan publicly 
blamed the presence of an unspecified third 
party ‘spy ship’ and a Chinese electronic 




The Indian and Iranian navies conduct a 




Greece withdraws the Hellenic Navy from 
participation in Op Enduring Freedom, citing 





The USN deploys its experimental 
catamaran HSV-2 Swift to South Africa; 




USS Vandergrift becomes the first USN 
warship to visit Vietnam since the fall of 
Saigon in 1975; the visit follows a visit to 
Washington the previous week by the 
E Attraction 
                                               
359
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Vietnamese Deputy Defence Minister for 




Following a port visit to Shanghai, the 








An Indian Navy survey vessel, INS 
Nirdeshak, conducts survey operations 




The Chinese and Pakistani navies conduct 
their first ever bilateral exercise366 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
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Japanese patrol vessels allegedly attack 







The US announces that it will deploy an Aegis-
equipped destroyer to the Sea of Japan to 
bolster ballistic missile defences368 
P/E Deterrence/Reassurance 
May to July India 
Mozambique 
Int Community 
INS Savitri and Sujata deploy to Mozambique to 
provide maritime security (Op Farishta 04) during 
a World Economic Forum meeting and a Afro-
Pacific-Caribbean Heads of State meeting at 
Maputo. Simultaneously, medical treatment is 
given to 450 patients and naval training is given 





During its commissioning voyage from Norfolk, 
Va to San Diego, Ca, USS Ronald Reagan 
conducts exercises with South American navies.  
Of note, it includes ‘touch and go’ exercises with 
Argentinean Super Etendard aircraft, which have 
not been to sea since the scrapping of the 
Argentinean aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo 
in 1997370  
E Prestige/Co-operation 
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The US, Brunei and Singapore conduct a 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 




Iranian Navy seizes British sailors and marines in 
Royal Navy rigid inflatable boats in the Shatt al-
Arab waterway, claiming they had entered 






Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia commence 









A Chinese naval survey vessel and marine 
research ship operate within the Japanese EEZ 








Georgia leads the BLACKSEAFOR for the first 
time, during a month long cruise around the 
Black Sea376 
- Co-operation 
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HMS Richmond and RFA Wave Ruler divert to 
Grenada and Grand Cayman to provide disaster 




Brazil gifts patrol vessel to Namibia378 - Assistance/Attraction 
October Australia 
Russia 
HMAS Arunta visits Vladivostok to support navy-
to-navy talks and further diplomatic relations 





Russia and the US conduct a bilateral naval 
exercise off the Norwegian coast and pay port 
visit to Stavanger380 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
October South Korea 
US 
North Korea 
The US alerts South Korea to the presence of 
two suspected North Korean submarines in its 
waters.  Later, in an incident reported to be 
unrelated, a South Korean naval vessel sinks in 
bad weather381 






Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, the US and Spain 
participate in the Unitas naval exercise in 
Uruguayan waters; SAR based382 
E Co-operation 
November Australia RAN conducts mission to destroy or remove - Assistance/Attraction 
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Kiribati thousands of pieces of WWII ordnance from 
island of Tarawa in Kiribati383 
November China 
Japan 
A submerged Chinese nuclear powered 
submarine violates Japanese territorial waters.  





Numerous navies engage in disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance in response to 
earthquake and tsunami on Sumatra385 
- Assistance 
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385
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RN deploys HMS Invincible and her task group on a 
three month Marstrike 05 deployment to the 
Mediterranean and Gulf; the aim is to demonstrate the 





In a dispute over economic rights in the South China 
Sea, the PLAN seizes Vietnamese fishing vessels and 
detains their crews.  This tactic continues for at least 




INS Sukanya pays a good will visit to Rangoon388 E Attraction 
February India 
Seychelles 




US provides $100 million for the Caspian Guard 
initiative, helping the Caspian Sea littoral states to 
improve maritime surveillance and security in a 
strategically important region; it gives US business a 
foothold390   
- Attraction 
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July Russia 
NATO 
Russian ships Moskva and Rytliviy make port call to 
Naples whilst the commander of the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet meets with NATO commanders to discuss 
potential Russian co-operation with Op Active 










Following the Disengagement Plan, the Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza, the Israeli Navy deploy patrol 
vessels off the Gaza coastline to provide maritime 




China and Russia hold a joint tri-Service exercise, 
Peace Mission 2005, near Vladivostok in the Russian 




Speculation mounts about China’s aircraft carrier 
ambitions.  The ex-Russian carrier Varyag is under 





A JMSDF vessel is deployed to assist following an 
accident involving a Russian submarine off the 
Kamchatka peninsula395 
- Assistance  
September China 
Japan 
Chinese naval vessels operate near the Kashi oil fields 
in order to demonstrate capability and protect maritime 
rights and interests in the disputed East China Sea 396 
P/E - 
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September Canada 
US 
HMCS Athabaskan, Ville de Quebec and Toronto 
deploy to the Gulf coast of the US to help relief efforts 





The first Indian-Sri Lankan naval special forces 




The Indian and Indonesian navies conduct Op Indindo 
Corpat, a co-ordinated patrol of the international 




The Indian and Russian navies conduct a joint 
exercise which includes anti-submarine warfare, 




Singapore and Malaysia embark on their first joint 
military endeavour outside the FPDA (consists of 
Singapore and Malaysia, plus the UK, Australia and 





After a decade of relationship building (see Feb 96 
onwards), Singapore decides to buy Swedish 
submarines402 
- Attraction 
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Following a rise in piracy in the Strait of Malacca, 
Malaysia establishes the Maritime Enforcement 
Agency as a symbol of its determination to focus on 
providing safe sea routes to international shipping403 
- Deterrence/Reassurance 
 
                                               
403
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India conducts surveys of Seychelles waters.  
The completed charts are presented to the 







Israel declares exclusion zone around the 
Tetis natural gas installation, 13 miles from its 
coast, and steps up naval patrols; the 
installation is critical to the Israeli economy 




The USN’s Pacific Command proposes a 
series of officer exchanges between itself and 
the PLAN.  If approved, it will be the first 
bilateral military contact between the two 
countries since a mid-air collision soured 






Nigeria announces that it is developing an 
unmanned coastal surveillance capability; the 
move follows a series of attacks on Niger 
delta oil installations in the preceding 
months407 
- Deterrence/Picture building 
May India 
Indonesia 
The Indian warship Rajput becomes the first 
foreign warship on the scene after an 
- Assistance 
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India demonstrates its Navy’s global reach by 
deploying a four ship task group to the 
Mediterranean.  It visits Israel, Egypt, Greece, 





NATO conducts Exercise Steadfast Jaguar in 
Cape Verde.  The exercise, which includes an 
amphibious assault and numerous aircraft 
carriers and other ships from member states 
is set to test NATO’s Response Force in 
Africa.  Cape Verde was keen to host the 






On its return from the Mediterranean the 
Indian naval task group is diverted to Lebanon 
and conducts a NEO from Beirut; 2280 Indian, 





The PLAN accepts an invitation to observe a 
major US exercise, Valiant Shield, in seas off 
Guam.  It is the largest US exercise in the 
Western Pacific since the Vietnam War412 
- Co-operation 
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July Russia 
Japan 
A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese 
fishing vessel, killing one crew member.  
Japan protests413 
P Deterrence 




Ex Sea Breeze 06, an attempt to improve 
NATO’s relationship with Ukraine and 
encourage her to join the Alliance is a 
diplomatic failure; Russia objects, the local 
population protest against the US-led force 
and the exercise does not take place as 
planned.  Ultimately, Ukraine announces its 
decision not to rush into NATO membership414  





Israeli warship Hanit is sunk by an anti-ship 
missile fired by Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The 
ship had been enforcing a blockade during 








North Korea conducts ballistic missile firing 
into Sea of Japan.  US responds by deploying 






UK conducts Op Highbrow, a NEO from 
Beirut, evacuating some 4,500 civilians 
including 1,300 in a single journey in HMS 
Bulwark417 
D Assistance 
                                               
413
 Japan, Defense White Paper 2011. 
414
 Sanders, Deborah.  “US Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages.” US Naval War College Review 60, No 3 (2007): pp61-72. 
415
 Cordesman, Anthony, Sullivan, George & Sullivan, William.  Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War.  Significant Issues Series Vol 29, No 4.  
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2007), p131; JDW 43, No 30 (2006): p18. 
416
 Japan, Defense White Paper 2011; JDW 43, No 28 (2006): p5. 
417
 UK, RN Operations 1970-2013;  Benbow, British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships, p55. 
  236 
August Taiwan 
China 
Taiwan completes the development of a 
supersonic anti-ship missile and overtly 
displays it on a Cheng Kung class frigate; 
local media reports that its purpose may be to 







The Russian-led BLACKSEAFOR conducts 
Ex Black Sea Harmony, just weeks after the 
failed US-led Sea Breeze exercise led by the 




China and the US conduct joint SAR exercise 







The UK deploys an amphibious task group to 
West Africa in a show of support to the Sierra 
Leone government and to conduct capacity 
building and goodwill visits421 
E Reassurance/Attraction 
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419
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The Nigerian Navy exercises its Eastern and Western 
Fleets, a total of four ships, in the strategically 
important Bight of Bonny; the exercise is believed to 
be a stepping stone to securing sea lines of 





Iran’s Revolutionary Guard detain 15 UK naval 
personnel from HMS Cornwall in the Arabian Gulf; Iran 
claims that the boat carrying the British servicemen 
and women was in its territorial waters.  The personnel 






INS Sarvekshak conducts surveys of Mauritius and 











China publicly seeks a joint naval exercise with 
ASEAN.  Previously, interaction between ASEAN 
states and China had been limited to bilateral naval 
- Attraction 
                                               
422
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exercises and port visits.  The initiative is intended to 
help expand political and economic ties426 
April India 
China 
The Indian and Chinese navies exercise together427 E Co-operation 
April India 
Russia 















The US pilots its first Global Fleet Station deployment, 
using the high speed vessel Swift.  It visits 7 
Caribbean and Central American states and conducts 






A 17 ship exercise takes place in the Singapore Strait 
and the disputed South China Sea, with participants 
from India, the US, France, Japan, Malaysia, New 






India test fires cruise missile from a Kilo-class 
submarine.  It is deemed to be a ‘watershed’ moment 
in Indian military development, allowing the country to 
join an exclusive club of states with that capability432 
E Prestige 
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June US 
Int Community 
The USN announces plans to send an amphibious 
ship to the Gulf of Guinea to act as a ‘school house’ for 
regional navies and to provide a persistent presence in 







Syria and Iran equip their fast attack craft with anti-ship 
missiles of the type used by Hezbollah to attack INS 
Hanit in 2006.  The countries are believed to be 
demonstrating their ability to disrupt maritime 





USS Peleliu of the Pacific Partnership Station visits 
Danang, making a ‘watershed’ in post-war US-




The USMC embarks its largest ever detachment of 
AV8B Harriers on to HMS Illustrious. It demonstrates 




Canada deploys HMCS Fredericton (frigate), 
Summerside (patrol vessel) and Corner Brook 
(submarine) to the high north to exercise sovereignty 
of part of the Arctic Ocean (Operation Nanook 07) as 






India conducts a month long series of bilateral 
exercises with Asian and Western navies in the Bay of 
Bengal and Gulf of Aden.  They are aimed at 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
                                               
433
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‘constructive engagement’ and increased ‘domain 
awareness’; however, Chinese officials visit New Delhi 
to discuss the exercises which they believe may be 
aimed at ‘containment’ of China438 
September Argentina 
Chile 
Argentina pulls its Navy out of annual bilateral 
exercises with Chile due to financial constraints and 
the poor operational condition of its units.  It brings into 
question the importance given to the Argentina-Chile 
relationship. The exercises had been held annually 
since 1998439 
- - 
October Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
The Sri Lankan Navy claims success over the Tamil 
Tigers after destroying the ‘final’ rebel vessel being 





USN and RN conduct Ex Sandstone, a joint anti-
submarine exercise in the Northern Arabian Sea; the 
exercise is designed to send a signal to Iran that its 
submarine force should not attempt to interfere with 




RN and Yemeni Navy and Coast Guard conduct joint 
operations in the Gulf of Aden as a deterrent to human 





Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia conduct joint naval 
patrols of the Strait of Malacca to help contain piracy in 
the region443 
P/E Co-operation/Deterrence 
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November China 
Japan 
The first post-WWII visit by a Chinese warship to 
Japan takes place444 






Op Wasp sees the UK and Republic of Ireland conduct 




HMS Campbeltown and USS Gunston Hall conduct 




India attempts to strengthen its relations with Vietnam 





Russia seizes six Japanese vessels found to be fishing 







Russia publicly announces plans to revive its global 
maritime capability after years of atrophy.  It deploys its 
aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and escorts to the 
Mediterranean449 
- Prestige 
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RN, USN, Yemeni Navy and Yemeni 
Coast Guard conduct human 
trafficking deterrence patrols off the 





France plans to establish a naval 
base in the UAE by 2009 in an 
attempt to reassure Gulf allies of its 
commitment following growing threat 




The Indian Landing Ship Gharial 
deploys to Bangladesh for relief 






Japan takes the political decision to 
revive its refuelling mission in the 
Indian Ocean, in support of US 
warships in the war on terror453 
P/E Co-operation  
February India 
Pakistan 
India tests its first nuclear-capable 
submarine launched missile; Pakistan 
warns that a new nuclear arms race 
may result454 
E Deterrence 
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USN demonstrates its ability to shoot 
down a satellite for the first time.  
USS Lake Erie engaged the ‘out-of-
control’ satellite at an altitude of 153 





USN deploys the USS Nassau 
expeditionary strike group to the 
eastern Mediterranean in the wake of 
increasing political tensions between 
Lebanon and Syria456 
P/C Coercion 
March Sri Lanka 
LTTE 
Sri Lankan Navy fast attack craft is 
sunk by Tamil Tigers following an 
engagement at sea457 
- Coercion  
March North Korea 
South Korea 
Tensions rise between the two 
Koreas after the North carries out a 
test firing of an anti-ship cruise 







RFA Lyme Bay deploys to Tristan de 
Cunha to repair harbour wall at 
Calshot Harbour; without repairs the 





Taiwan conducts an amphibious 
exercises but decides not to sail its 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
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ships through the Taiwan Strait in 




RN and RFA help to form ‘ring of 









RFA Mounts Bay joins Spanish 
amphibious task group, Esparabas, 





USN establishes the Africa 
Partnership Station and deploys it for 








HMS Westminster and Edinburgh 
deploy to Burma to offer assistance 
following cyclone Nargis; Burmese 
military government decline support 
and ships depart. However, two 
Indian warships provide relief464 




HMS Echo conducts collaborative 
surveying operations in Bangladeshi 
territorial waters465 
- Co-operation/Assistance/Picture building 
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RN conducts an overt anti-submarine 
warfare exercise in the Indian Ocean 
(Ex Phoenix) to prove the capabilities 
of its helicopter-borne sonar, 2087; it 
demonstrates the UK’s ability to 
counter submarines in demanding 





In a sign that the relationship among 
some of the emerging powers is not 
confined to the economic, a tri-lateral 
Indian/Brazilian/South African naval 






In BMD tests USS Lake Erie 
successfully performs a terminal 
phase intercept of a ballistic target; it 




JMSDF destroyer Sazanami becomes 
the first Japanese warship to visit a 
Chinese port since the end of the 






The Russian Federation deploys 
Northern Fleet warships into the 
Arctic for the first time since the end 
of the Cold War.  They operate in the 
vicinity of Svalbard; Russia states that 
C/E Coercion/Prestige 
                                               
466
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it does not recognise Norway’s claim 




The USN re-establishes its Fourth 
Fleet in order to operate in the 
Caribbean and the waters off Central 
and South America and build ‘multi-
national coalitions’471 





UK, Dutch and French ships conduct 
joint counter-narcotics operations in 
the Caribbean as part of Op Carib 
Venture472 




Three Indian warships join the 
international counter-piracy effort off 







Russian ships of the Black Sea Fleet 
are involved in a ‘skirmish’ with 
Georgian vessels.  Russia claims that 
the Georgian ships had violated their 
declared ‘safety zone’ off the coast of 
Abkhazia.  One Georgian vessel is 




The Ukraine President issues a 
decree that Moscow must give three 
days warning if it wishes to sail the 
- Coercion 
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Black Sea Fleet from Sebastopol 




Malaysia deploys ships to join the 







Russia deploys ships from the Baltic 
to the Gulf of Aden to join the 
international anti-piracy effort off the 






Indian, Indonesian and Thai warships 






There are local protests in the port of 
Yokosuka after the arrival of the 
nuclear powered carrier USS George 
Washington; the ship replaced the 






NATO provides naval escort for World 
Food Programme ships delivering aid 
to Somalia480 
D/E Deterrence/Reassurance  
November India A terrorist attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba C/E Coercion 
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Pakistan 
LeT 
(LeT), launched from the sea, kills 
140 people and injures over 300 
others in Mumbai481 
November Russia 
Venezuela 
Russian Navy warships Pyotr and 
Admiral Chabanenko visit Venezuela, 
coincident with a visit to the country 
by President Medvedev; it is the first 
Russian Navy visit to the Caribbean 
since the end of the Cold War.  The 
visit is also rumoured to be linked to a 






Iran projects its naval power in the 
Gulf, establishing an ‘impenetrable 
defence line’, with the launch of new 





Two Chinese oceanographic research 
ships enter Japanese territorial 
waters off Senkaku islands484 




China commences its counter-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden485 
E Co-
operation/Deterrence/Reassurance/Prestige 
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The Israeli Navy conducts Operation 
Cast Lead, a campaign against 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip, including  
support to ground troops and anti-
smuggling patrols486  
- Deterrence/Reassurance 
 
                                               
486
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Japan considers sending a 
destroyer to join the international 








The Georgian breakaway region of 
Abkhazia announces a plan to allow 
Russia to establish a naval base 
and an airfield on its territory; this 
would provide Moscow with access 
to the Black Sea other than from its 
disputed Crimea base488 
- Attraction/Reassurance Coercion 
February North Korea 
South Korea 
US 
USN increases its number of sorties 
of intelligence gathering Aegis ships 
after satellite imagery shows North 
Korean missile sites preparing to 
launch missiles489 





RN deploys its largest deployment  
to the Far East in a decade.  During 
Taurus 09 the ships exercise with 






Japan deploys its Aegis destroyers 
Kongou and Chokai to the Sea of 
Japan in readiness for a North 
P Deterrence/Reassurance 
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Korean missile launch.  North 
Korea threatens war if its missiles 
are shot down.  The missile launch 




USNS Impeccable is challenged by 
PLAN warships and civilian vessels 
when operating in China’s EEZ 
south of Hainan Island; Impeccable 
leaves the scene but returns within 
days in the company of USS Chung 
Hoon491 





The Nigerian Navy is attacked by 
armed militants from the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND); two sailors are killed 
and at least one gunboat seized.  





China holds an International Fleet 
Review at Qingdao and displays its 





The Seychelles becomes the first 
East African state to contribute to 
the Horn of Africa counter-piracy 
P Co-operation/Deterrence/ 
Prestige 
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effort; the Coast Guard assist in two 
operations with a patrol aircraft and 
patrol vessel, PW Andromache. 
The President applauds his 





MEND warns oil companies to 
withdraw workers from the region or 






Iran deploys two naval ships, the 
frigate Alborz and the auxiliary 
Bushehr, to conduct anti-piracy 






NATO provides naval escort for 
World Food Programme ships 




A US Coast Guard vessel, 
Boutwell, becomes the first 
American ‘military’ ship to visit 
Libya since President Ghadaffi 




An Indonesian patrol vessel ‘almost’ 
fires on a Malaysian patrol vessel 
which violated Indonesian territorial 
D Deterrence/Coercion 
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waters in a disputed maritime zone 





The Gulf Co-operation Council 
demand that the Red Sea be 
excluded from international 
arrangements on counter-piracy, 
stating instead that security there 
was ‘the responsibility of the Arab 
countries overlooking it.’  They 








Israel deploys an attack submarine, 
Leviathan, and an accompanying 
corvette, Hanit, through the Suez 
Canal and into the Red Sea for the 
first time.  It is believed to be a 






During Op Patch HMS Cornwall 
facilitates engagement between 






The Indian Navy strengthens its ties 
with the Maldives, augmenting its 
co-operation and security initiatives.  
The move is believed to be a 
- Assistance/Attraction/Co-
operation/Deterrence 
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counter to growing Chinese 
influence in the Indian Ocean503 
August China 
US 
China asks the US to end its 
maritime surveillance activities 
within the Chinese-claimed EEZ; 
the request was ostensibly to 
reduce the risk of naval 
confrontation504 
- Coercion/Picture building 
October Georgia 
Russia 
Georgia deploys a coast guard 
vessel in territorial waters off the 
break-away region of Abkhazia in 
an attempt at a ‘naval blockade’.  
Russia responds by stating that its 
Black Sea Fleet will ensure lines of 






HMS Iron Duke provides maritime 
security for Commonwealth Heads 
of Government meeting in Trinidad 
and Tobago506 
E Assistance/Reassurance 
November North Korea 
South Korea 
North and South Korean ships 
engage in ‘firefight’ in Yellow Sea 
off Daechung Island following the 
North’s incursion into disputed 
waters507 
D Coercion/Deterrence 
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January North Korea 
South Korea 
In a supposed bid to strengthen its position 
ahead of talks with the South, North Korea 
fires artillery shells into its own territorial 
waters in the Yellow Sea near the disputed 
maritime Northern Limit Line.  South Korea 
returned fire with 100 warning shots.  The 
North then declared the area a ‘no sail 
zone’508 
C Coercion 
February Canada  
Haiti  
Int Community 
Canada deploys HMCS Halifax and 
Athabaskan to provide support to Haiti 




India increases its naval presence and 
surveillance activities around the Andaman 
and Nicobar islands in a counter to growing 
Chinese presence in the region510 






RFA Largs Bay deploys to Haiti as part of Op 
Panlake relief effort511 
- Assistance 
March North Korea 
South Korea 
North Korea attacked and sank the South 
Korean warship Cheonan; 46 lives are lost.  
North Korea denies responsibility512 
D Coercion 
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April China 
Japan 
Ten Chinese warships pass between 
Okinawa’s main island and Miyako island 




Ukraine agrees to extend the lease allowing 
the Russian Navy to operate from 
Sevastopol; the announcement is met with 






Iran conducts a series of naval exercises 
around the Strait of Hormuz.  The exercises 
were stated to be aimed at securing Iranian 
shipping routes, but have alienated many 
GCC countries who see them as a challenge 







MV Mari Marmara, operated by a Turkey 
based pressure group, attempts to break the 
Israeli blockade of Gaza. The Israeli Navy 
intercept and board the vessel and violence 
ensues.  Nine people are killed and there is 
worldwide condemnation of the Israeli heavy-
handed tactics516 
D/C Coercion  
June Turkey 
Israel 
Turkey cancels a planned naval exercise with 
Israel following the Mari Marmara incident517 
- - 
July China China conducts an unprecedented military E Deterrence  
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US 
ASEAN 
exercise in the South China Sea, involving 
ships and aircraft from all three of its fleets. 
This came after the US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stated earlier that month at the 
ASEAN Regional Forum that “the US has a 
national interest in freedom of navigation, 
open access to Asia’s maritime commons, 
and respect for international law in the South 
China Sea.” 518 
July North Korea 
South Korea 
US 
North Korea denounces a combined US-
South Korean naval exercise, stating that it is 





Iran publicly unveils four new mini-
submarines at Bandar Abbas520 
- Prestige/Coercion 
August South Africa 
Mozambique 
South African Navy ships exercise with 
Mozambique and conduct joint security 








Whilst the runway in the Falkland Islands is 
being resurfaced, HMS Ocean deploys to the 
South Atlantic and pays a visit to Brazil and 
West Africa.  Though she does not physically 
reach the Falklands, she demonstrates 
British capability and commitment to 
Argentina  
P Deterrence/Attraction/Reassurance 
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September China 
Japan 
A Chinese trawler is detained after it rammed 
into two Japanese coast guard vessels in a 







Malaysia conducts a two week long ‘maritime 
domain awareness’ exercise in the Strait of 
Malacca and then declares the security of the 
South China Sea a ‘top priority’523 
E Deterrence/Picture building 
November UK 
West Indies 
HMS Manchester conducts disaster relief 
and humanitarian assistance in St Lucia and 
Turks and Caicos in wake of Hurricane 
Tomas524 
- Assistance 
November North Korea 
South Korea 
US 
North Korea fires 170 artillery shells at the 
island of Yeonpyeong killing four people; the 
firing is believed to be in response to a South 
Korean navy live firing exercise in the nearby 
disputed region of the Yellow Sea; the USN 
deploys the aircraft carrier USS George 








RN nuclear submarine HMS Tireless deploys 
to Indian Ocean with French carrier battle 
group (Op Agapanthe)526 
E Co-operation 
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The US bathyscope Trieste reaches a record breaking 







To deter attacks by Indonesia on New Guinea, the 
Netherlands government announce despatch of carrier 
Karel Doorman and two destroyers.  No attacks are 
made, but reactions from Indonesia are damaging and 




A Cuban cutter fires on the US submarine Sea 




The nuclear powered US submarine Triton completes 
the first submerged circumnavigation of the globe; it 






USN carrier Wasp arrives off coast to evacuate US 





US submarine George Washington conducts the first 
test firing of Polaris ballistic missiles from a submerged 
boat.  It demonstrates American capability.532 
E Prestige/Deterrence 
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August US  
USSR  
Int Community 
US submarine Seadragon is the first ever to surface at 






After armed uprisings allegedly inspired by Cuba 
against the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, 
the carrier USS Shangri-La and US destroyers 
patrolled the Caribbean coasts of these countries until 






US submarine George Washington, which had test 
fired Polaris missiles earlier in the year, sails for the 
first nuclear deterrent patrol.535 
P Deterrence 
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Visible presence offshore of US fleet encourages a 
group of Cuban exiles organised by the CIA to 
attempts the overthrow of Castro.  Receiving no actual 








After Iraq claims sovereignty over Kuwait on 25 June 
and make menacing troop movements, Britain 
responds to Kuwaiti appeal for help by landing marines 
from HMS Bulwark.  These are reinforced by tanks, 
troops and, ultimately, 45 warships (including two 
aircraft  carriers).  Ground forces replaced by Arab 
League troops in October and Iraq recognises Kuwaiti 
independence in October 1963.  Iraqi aggression 




After initial bombardment by aircraft from the carrier 
Arromanches, the cruiser Colbert, Bouvet and 
Chevalier-Paul force the entrance to the Lake of 
Bizerta and, with the help of French troops, break the 
Tunisian blockade of the Bizerta naval base complex 





Visible presence offshore of US fleet (including 
carriers Franklin D Roosevelt and Valley Forge with 
1800 marines on board) enable President Kennedy’s 
representative to secure the expulsion of the Trujillos 
P Coercion 
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(the family of the late dictator) and the establishment 
of a government acceptable to the US.539 
November UK 
Kenya 
HMS Victorious (later Centaur) and helicopters, plus 
amphibious ship Striker with Royal Marines embarked 
provide humanitarian assistance after severe flooding 
in Kenya.540 
- Assistance 





 Benbow, British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships, p10. 











Indonesian motor torpedo boats try to land infiltrators 
into New Guinea but are caught by the Netherlands 





HMS Centaur is deployed to Kuwait to act as a 






Carrier covers landing of US marines in Thailand, an 
operation intended to demonstrate US readiness to 
intervene if communists push their military success in 




US aircraft carrier Wasp leads a force of 8 ships into 
the Baltic.  It is the largest American deployment into 






US, UK and SEATO naval forces exercise together and 






Pakistan operates nine vessels as part of the UN 
Temporary Executive Authority, one of the ‘first 
- Deterrence/Reassurance 
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Indonesia generation’ peacekeeping missions, following the 




The US imposes an air and naval blockade on Cuba 
following the discovery of the construction of ‘offensive 
military’ facilities by the Soviet Union.  The ensuing 
Cuban missile crisis becomes a defining moment of the 
Cold War.547  
D Coercion 
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 Gavin, Francis J (Ed).  The New York Times Twentieth Century in Review: The Cold War.  (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), pp388-399. 
 











French destroyer Tartu sent to fishing grounds off 
north-east coast of Brazil after three French lobster 
boats had been seized by Brazilian warships 60 miles 
off the coast.  Brazil countered with a cruiser, five 
destroyers and two corvettes, Tartu was soon 






US aircraft carrier Boxer anchors off Santo Domingo 
ready to send helicopters to rescue Vice President 






US task force cruises off Haiti to protect US nationals 
in case of conflict between Haiti and Dominican 
Republic, perhaps also to intervene if government of 
Haiti is overthrown, but crisis blows over.  A British 
destroyer and frigate also stand by US, but not British, 




Two Cuban warships land a party on a British island in 
the Bahamas to seize 19 Cuban refugees and two 
fishing boats.  Investigation by HMS Londonderry 
reveals that the normally uninhabited island had been 
used by Cuban exiles based in the US as a launching 
pad for their attacks on Cuba. Steps were taken to 
D/P - 
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USS Lake Champlain, Liddle and Muliphen undertake 
disaster relief operations in Haiti following Hurricane 






Following a deterioration in relations, Albania ejects 
Soviet Navy from its base in the country.  Over the 
subsequent years the USSR then attempts to find a 
suitable alternative in the Mediterranean.553 
- - 
December US  
Iran 
The US destroyer Strong and Iranian ship Babr, with 
medical teams embarked, conduct a joint 17 day 
mission at three Iranian ports to provide medical 
support to local people.554 
- Co-operation/Assistance 
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After the Zanzibar government is overthrown by coup 
d’etat, USS Manley, HMS Owen and Rhyl and RFA 
Hebe with one company of infantry evacuate US and 






During mutinies in three former colonies in East Africa, 
the governments’ request British help and three 
carriers (Albion, Centaur and Victorious) are deployed 
with other warships and RFAs as well as two Marine 
Commandos and army units.  The incident ends swiftly 








To reinforce their threat of armed intervention, failing 
the adoption of satisfactory measures for the 
protection of Turkish minority in Cyprus, the Turkish 




Four Cuban fishing vessels are seized off the coast of 
Florida by the US.  In response, Cuba cuts off the 




A USN task force prepares to deploy to Rio de Janeiro 
to offer support to the rebels during the Brazilian 
‘general’s coup’ against the President.  It was not 
needed and stood down.559  
C Coercion/Assistance 
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April US 
USSR 
The Soviet oceanographic research ship Sergei 
Vavilov visits Boston.  It is the first Soviet ship to visit 








USN deploys the ‘Concord Squadron’ to the Indian 
Ocean to conduct a six week goodwill tour of Africa 




US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin are 




Indonesian threats result in a British naval task group 
exercising freedom of the seas in the Lombok Strait.563 
E Deterrence/Reassurance 
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HMS Rhyl stands by the island of St Kitts, to be on 




Helicopters from USS Nimitz in Arabian Sea attempt to 
rescue US hostages from the Embassy in Tehran. 






The Bahamian Defence Force Ship Flamingo is sunk 
by Cuban aircraft whilst taking a Cuban fishing vessel 
into custody for illegal fishing.  HMS Eskimo and 





A Libyan submarine and frigate drive the Italian floating 







HMS Glasgow administers disaster relief in St Lucia 






British warships are diverted to the Gulf to start the 
Armilla Patrol for the protection of merchant shipping 
during war between Iran and Iraq.569 
P Reassurance/Deterrence 
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HMS Active remains in the vicinity of the Turks and 
Caicos Islands following civil unrest.570 
C/E Reassurance/Deterrence 
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HMS Cardiff stands by to assist in Bermuda following 




A squadron of five Soviet ships pays an official good 




A merchant tanker (Shell) is stopped and diverted by 
Algerian gunboats; HMS Dido is sent to assist but the 




Aircraft from carrier USS Nimitz shoot down two 
oncoming Libyan aircraft while task force is in Gulf of 
Sirte to emphasise US rejection of Libyan claim that 




The Iranian Navy seize Danish ship carrying 
explosives to Iraq.  The start of a long campaign 




The new Soviet aircraft carrier, Kiev, makes its maiden 




USN leads Exercise Ocean Venture in the Atlantic.  It 
involves 250 ships from the US, UK, Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Netherlands, 
Canada, West Germany, Portugal, France, Denmark 
- Co-operation/Deterrence 





 RUSI News Sheet 3 (1981), p6. 
 
573
 UK, RN Operations 1970-2013. 
 
574
 Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 3
rd
 Ed., p206; Benbow, British Uses of Aircraft Carriers and Amphibious Ships, p17. 
 
575
 Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 3
rd
 Ed., p207. 
 
576
 Jane’s Defence Review 2, No 6 (1981), p499. 
  274 
and Spain.  Norway refuses to join the exercise 
because it involves so many non-NATO members.  




During a period of political disaffection in Poland, the 
Soviet naval exercise Zapad culminates in the landing 
of 6000 troops and marines on the Baltic coast close to 
the Polish border.578 
E Coercion 
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After an initial foray into South Georgia by an 
Argentinean scrap merchant, an Argentine 
naval task force lands troops to seize Port 
Stanley in the Falkland Islands.  Initially 






Italian warships patrol the Strait of Tiran as 
part of the Multinational Force and Observers 





The Italian submarine Leonardo da Vinci 
detects a Soviet Victor I Class submarine in 
Italian waters off the naval base at Taranto.  
The submarine was tracked for 18 hours 
before it left Italian territorial waters.581 
- Picture building 
May US 
Cuba 
In Exercise Ocean Ventura, US Navy lands 
400 marines at their enclave in Guantanamo 
Bay and evacuates 300 Americans.  Cubans 
call it an ‘intimidating show of strength.’582 





Soviet Backfire bomber aircraft are detected 
over the Sea of Japan and Soviet air and 
naval forces surge in the area when aircraft 
carrier USS Enterprise transits North Pacific.  
The action is seen to be a sign of Soviet 
C/E Deterrence/Reassurance 
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concern over US carrier-based air power in 






Fourteen US warships are deployed off the 
Lebanese coast and carry out exercises to 
demonstrate US resolve.584 
E Coercion 
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Argentine patrol boat turns back a Brazilian naval 
survey vessel from the Beagle Channel in assertion of 






Following a request by the Egyptian presence for a 
show of force, the USN aircraft carrier Nimitz poises 
just outside Libyan waters.  Egypt accuses Libya of 







The Caribtrain 83 deployment led by HMS Invincible 
visits and conducts exercises with Portugal, the US, 
Bahamas and Belize, including exercises designed to 




Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk visits India to reinforce the 




An unknown submarine, believed to be Soviet, is 
detected in Hardanger fjord in Norway.  The 
Norwegian Navy fires on the submarine and the 
Defence Minister states that it will be destroyed if it 
fails to surface.589 
- Picture 
building/Deterrence 
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April Spain 
UK 
Three Spanish warships arrive in Algeciras Bay to 
express indignation of visit of HMS Invincible (with 
HRH the Duke of York on board) to Gibraltar.590 
E - 
August South Korea 
North Korea 
South Korean warships sink a North Korean ship 





One British and one New Zealand frigate with 
supporting auxiliary are diverted to the British Indian 






A US destroyer stops a Soviet flagged freighter in 
international waters; the vessel was bound for 
Nicaragua.  The action was an attempt to demonstrate 
US intent to prevent the shipment of arms to the 





The US State Department accuse Libya of ‘blatant 
intervention’ in the civil war/insurgency in Chad.  USS 
Eisenhower is dispatched and anchors close to Libyan 








In Operation Urgent Fury a US naval task force lands 
troops, in spite of indignant protest by the British Prime 
Minister, to occupy the island of Grenada and replace 
a left wing government by one more acceptable to the 
US.595 
D Coercion 
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November UK 
Egypt 
HMS Hermes, with 40 Cdo embarked, pays a good will 






Syrian forces in Lebanon fire on US aircraft, provoking 
an air strike on Syrian positions near Beirut from the 
carriers USS Independence and John F Kennedy.  
Two US aircraft are lost in the operation.  In turn, 
Lebanese Druze and Shia militias attack US Marine 
positions in the city.597 
P Deterrence 
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HMS Invincible is refused permission to visit 
Sydney after the British government refused 
to comment on whether or not she was 





Soviet warships visit Havana.599 E Attraction/Reassurance 
February NATO 
USSR 
NATO conducts its largest amphibious 
exercise in the Norwegian Arctic, involving 






Soviet submarine activity is detected 
operating close to the Swedish naval base at 
Karlskrona.601  
- Picture building 
February UK 
Lebanon 
During unrest and civil war 5000 civilians are 






US and Italian ground forces are evacuated 
from Lebanon.  Seven warships led by the 
Italian Vittorio Veneto escort the withdrawing 
D Reassurance/Deterrence 
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forces.  USN warships provide naval gunfire 
support to the Army in southern Beirut.603 
March USSR 
US 
The USSR deploys an additional aircraft 
carrier, Novorossiyk, to its Pacific Fleet in 
response to the USN’s deployment of 




USN and JMSDF conduct their first joint mine 
counter measures exercise in 13 years.  The 






The annual US-South Korean Team Spirit 





The Soviet Navy operates a sizeable force of 
20 surface ships and 4 submarines from Cam 
Ramh Bay.  It is judged to be an attempt to 
gain influence in the region to the detriment of 
the US.607 
C/E Attraction  
March France 
Spain 
French patrol boats attack and capture two 






The US conducts covert mining of Nicaraguan 
harbours during the peak coffee exporting 
season.609 
- Coercion 
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April USSR 
US 
Soviet carrier Minsk fires flares at the US 
destroyer (Harold Holt) trailing her in the 




The USSR stages a major naval exercise in 








Japan joins the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 





Iran attacks Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti oil 
tankers in the Gulf in order to force GCC 
states to pressure Iraq into ending its attacks 










Combined east-west naval powers manifest 
their concern at the maritime repercussions of 
the Iran-Iraq war by keeping warships in the 
Persian Gulf.614 
C Deterrence/Coercion/Reassurance 
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Australia sends destroyer Brisbane to work 
with USN in the North West Indian Ocean; it 
is seen as a response to the Iran-Iraq war 
spilling over into the maritime domain.615 
E Co-operation 




The East German training ship Wilhelm Pieck 
makes goodwill visits to Romanian, Bulgarian 




The Egyptian destroyer El Fateh pays a four 
day goodwill visit to the Soviet Black Sea 
Fleet.  There were Egyptian, Iraqi and UAE 






PLAN reinforces Paracel Island garrison and 
conducts naval exercises in the area. The 
sovereignty of the South China Sea islands 




The US 6th Fleet enters the Gulf of Sirte in 
order to exercise freedom of navigation; 
Libya, which claims the Gulf to be part of its 





Four Kuwaiti gunboats visit Egypt.  It is the 
first military contact between the two 
countries since, like most Arab states, Kuwait 
E Attraction 
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broke diplomatic relations with Egypt after the 





An international effort commences to clear the 
Gulf of Suez and southern Red Sea of mines 
from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.  Egypt had 
asked the UK, US and France for assistance 











The US conducts naval training with South 
American counterparts in the latest in the 




The UK releases three Iranian auxiliary ships 





Following discovery of sea bed tracks, Japan 
claims that USSR has been operating mini-
submarines in its territorial waters.  The area 
is in one of the Straits through which the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet must pass to reach open 
ocean.624 
- Picture building 
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September US 
Libya 
Libyan armed forces are placed on alert as 





Canadian warships visit Bangkok in an 
attempt to strengthen ties between the two 
countries.626 
E Attraction 
November Sri Lanka 
India 
LTTE 
Sir Lanka increases naval patrols of the strait 
between India and Sri Lanka in order to 






USN deploys three ships to West Africa to 




Australia and Indonesia conduct a joint naval 




USS Dwight D Eisenhower leads US and 
Israeli naval exercises; they are a sign of 
relaxation in the strained relations between 
the two countries following the 1982 Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon.630 
E Co-operation/Attraction 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
QUALITITIVE ANALYSIS: SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
  
Situating naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War era is a complex business.  As has 
already been discussed, the fall of communism and the end of a half century of 
superpower stand-off left the world an uncertain place, and one that has been the 
subject of much deliberation: 
 
The legacy of colonialism, resurgent nationalism and now non-state actors has given 
rise to a period of complexity and rapid change in international relations. The academic 





The views at the extremes of this debate could not be more stark.  On the one hand, as 
Richard Crockatt has written, ‘the end of the Cold War removed more or less at a stroke 
the structural and ideological conditions which underlay superpower conflict over the 
previous forty years.’2  On the other hand, John Ikenberry spoke for many when he 
stated the contrary position, that ‘a great deal of ink has been shed in recent years 
describing the various versions of the post-Cold War world order. These attempts have 
                                               
1 Mazzucelli, Colette.  ‘International Relations in the Post Cold War Era.’ 
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war-era-professor-colette-mazzucelli 
(accessed 19 September 2012). 
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failed, because there is no such creature.  The world order created in the 1940s is still 
with us, and in many ways stronger than ever.’3 
 
These differences of opinion are an interesting distraction, but each represents an 
avenue of research which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  For the purposes of this 
research, and as reasoned in Chapter 1, the majority view will be taken; the Cold War 
will be assumed to have ended in or around 1991 and Ikenberry’s ‘myth of chaos’ 
argument,4 therefore, will not be followed.  Instead, this thesis contends that with the 
end of the Cold War there was indeed a sea change in societal, economic, political and 
military norms, readily identifiable from those which went immediately before and which 
had the potential to influence the theory and practice of naval diplomacy.   
 
Chapter 2 described various models of naval diplomacy, deriving them from, and 
categorising them by, the period in which their underpinning rationale was shaped.  The 
classical naval scholars wrote around themes of deterrence, national status and amity; 
later commentators wrote of coercive and non-coercive influence and alliance building.  
Post-modernists centred their arguments on the gathering of information and 
understanding in the maritime domain, the soft power of attraction and the need for 
bespoke coalitions.  Enduring themes were identified, common to all periods, which led 
to the conclusion that up until the end of the Cold War naval diplomacy was a state-
centric, realist endeavour and that it assumed binary relationships between the two 
principal actors involved.  It also concluded that the practice of naval diplomacy relied 
on the assumption of rational, cognitive decision making on the part of the target or 
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‘victim’ government.  The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether those 
conclusions still apply in the new global order, especially in light of the incidents 
catalogued in Chapter 3. 
 
To make sense of the new global order it would be judicious to attempt to identify the 
macro trends which characterise it.  Many commentators have tried to describe post-
1991 global trends and a short examination of a representative section of this body of 
work uncovers a significant degree of concurrence.  Michael Cox, for instance, pointed 
to an era defined by the globalisation of capitalism, US hegemony, Russian reform, the 
rise of China, European integration and the rise of radical Islam.5 John Young and John 
Kent identified a very similar set of trends, albeit by other names: German reunification, 
the break-up of the USSR and the subsequent ‘wars of succession’, the Yugoslav 
break-up, US predominance, a willingness to engage in humanitarian intervention and a 
changing balance in the developing world. 6 As examples of the latter Young and Kent 
cite the ending of apartheid in South Africa, progress toward a peaceful settlement in 
Palestine, central African conflict in Rwanda and Zaire, and the economic rise of the 
east Asian ‘Tigers’.7  The themes are, simultaneously and intuitively, recognisable and 
right. 
 
                                               
5
 Cox, Michael.  ‘From the Cold War to the War on Terror.’ In Baylis, John, Smith, Steve (Eds). 
Globalization of World Politics, 3
rd
 Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp139-153. 
 
6 Young and Kent describe how the ‘wars of succession’ took various forms from ethnic tensions 
and border disputes to ideological conflict.  They cite as examples the attempts to establish the 
Transdniester Republic in Moldova (1990-94), the civil war in Tajikstan (1992-97) and the 
ongoing troubles in the Caucasus: Ngorno Karabakh (1992-93, 1999), Abkhazi revolt against 
Georgia (1992-93) and Chechnya from 1994 onwards.  See Young, John W. & Kent, John.  
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The themes may be recognisable and right, but in list form they can appear disparate 
and unrelated. Some commentators have sought to find an even broader overview by 
which to simplify the period.  Amund Lundesgaard, for instance, divided the post-Cold 
War era into three ‘distinct periods’: the rapidly changing and unpredictable security 
environment of the 1990s; the global war on terror after the al Qaeda attack on the 
United States on 11 September 2001; and the re-emergence of great power rivalry.8  
Though precisely where and when the last ‘period’ began is unclear. The renowned 
Cold War historian John Gaddis simplified matters further, seeing just two stimuli at 
work after 1991, the dual forces of ‘integration and fragmentation’,9 but that argument 
was, perhaps, made a little prematurely.   
 
Some have described the post-Cold War world not as a series of geopolitical 
‘happenings’ but in terms of societal or conceptual changes.  For instance, when 
debating the assertion that ‘the post-Cold War era is over’ Stephanie Hoffman and 
Kenneth Weisbrode discussed a number of post-1991 trends, including the emergence 
of the ‘comprehensive’ or ‘whole of government’ approach to foreign and defence 
policies which call for closer and better aligned civil-military partnerships.10 The 
approach is perhaps reminiscent of Joseph Nye’s ‘smart power’ thesis described in 
Chapter 2 and may explain a commonly held perception that there was an increased 
acceptance of the use of militaries in operations other than war from the 1990s 
onwards. 
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The change in emphasis in military employment may be more than a subtle 
improvement in joined-up government; it could be symptomatic of a re-evaluation of the 
whole role of military forces.  Rob de Wijk, writing about coercion, captured the post-
Cold War concept: ‘Traditionally, states use force to protect territory and to conquer 
land.  Today, liberal democracies use force mainly as a foreign policy instrument to 
influence the strategic choices of their opponent or target.’11 Whether this view is 
applicable after the liberal democracy led regime-changing campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is questionable.  Christopher Coker went straight to the core of the issue; 
the West, he argued, had changed from being a ‘threat community’ to being a ‘risk 
community’ in its attitude to security.12 Military forces, it would follow, would necessarily 
change from countering the threat posed by a potential ‘enemy’ to assisting in the 
management of generic ‘risks’ to national interests – not necessarily the same things. 
 
All of these themes offer potential frameworks for this Chapter.  In order to shape the 
thesis an amalgam is used through which to view naval diplomacy, describing a 
simplified geopolitical post-Cold War structure.  It begins with fragmentation and the 
uncertain security situation after the collapse of communism, looks in turn at the 
resultant nationalism and opportunism which followed, the assumption of, and then 
challenge to, US hegemony and finishes with the supposed return to great power 
rivalry. Throughout, the role of non-state actors, the diffusion of influence to regional 
powers and, arguably, increasing constraints on the use of force by and between 
states, are considered.  Though the themes chosen may logically appear to be 
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chronological and exhibit a causal relationship, in reality that is not always the case.  It 
quickly becomes apparent that throughout much of the twenty years after 1991, the 
trends and themes identified co-existed. 
 
To explore these issues further this Chapter will look at a selection of examples of naval 
diplomacy drawn from the period 1991 to 2010.  They are chosen from those identified 
in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 and are illustrative, not exhaustive; however, 
they do represent a range of actors and methods which are, perhaps, characteristic of 
the period and macro-trend which they represent. The majority of the examples, 
particularly those used to highlight fragmentation, nationalism and American hegemony 
may be considered discrete and many others could have been selected in their place.  
Those used toward the end of the Chapter to help describe the naval diplomacy wielded 
to support the rise of the emerging Asia-Pacific powers are more thematic in nature.  
Nonetheless, the whole picture is one of a twenty year period in which naval diplomacy 
has been far from absent in global affairs. 
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CASE STUDIES IN NAVAL DIPLOMACY 
 
Fragmentation and the Uncertain Security Situation  
 
The decline of communism and the rapidly changing map of central and eastern Europe 
led to a particularly uncertain security situation in the early 1990s.  The victors were 
quick to reap the supposed ‘peace dividend,’ the savings to be made against military 
expenditures which had become almost prohibitively expensive in the final years of the 
Cold War.  As one commentator later put it, ‘the reduction in East-West tension also 
resulted in a great decrease in inter-state conflicts…. Defence budgets in many parts of 
the world radically decreased.’13  However, as the same commentator went on to say, it 
would be ‘unwise’ to argue that the world was at peace, as it began to see the 
emergence, or re-emergence, of many serious armed conflicts in areas that had been 
‘relatively quiescent’ during the Cold War.14  From a Western perspective, and 
consistent with Coker’s ‘risk’ hypothesis,  a great number of dangers such as ‘regional 
rivalry, terrorism, transnational crime, nationalism, and ethnic and religious conflicts’ 
rose to prominence in the 1990s, ‘replacing the Soviet Union as the main concern.’15   
 
Two examples of naval diplomacy have been selected which typify this bout of 
fragmentation and the subsequent vying for influence in the former eastern bloc. 
Though the examples are a decade apart in time, both involved the West, both involved 
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former communist states and both were closely scrutinised by a non-independent third 
party, namely Russia.  Arguably, they represent prima facie attempts to exercise hard 
and soft power respectively. 
 
The first example, the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia, was not an obvious 
candidate for the application of seapower.  In fact, Tim Benbow stated that, ‘there was 
little apparent role for maritime forces in an intra-state campaign taking place on land, in 
which neither side has a significant navy or a grave vulnerability to the interdiction of its 
maritime trade.  In practice, however, the naval contribution was both substantial and 
significant.’16 What became apparent in the crowded waters of the Adriatic in the 1990s 
was an age-old truth: the purpose of a navy is not only to fight an opposing navy.17 
  
Though the conflict in Yugoslavia and subsequently in the newly independent states of 
Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo ultimately saw the employment of 
ground troops and a substantial application of air power, both from land and sea, in the 
maritime environment a steady trickle soon became of flood of actors appearing on the 
Balkan stage. The central issue in this example is perhaps the number, range and 
differing objectives of those actors.   
 
As the situation deteriorated in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security 
Council passed a series of increasingly aggressive Resolutions to quell the turmoil,18 
including UNSCR 787 in November 1992 which authorised the enforcement of 
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sanctions.19 This Resolution had the effect of giving Western action ‘some degree of 
bite’ but the sanctions were ‘inevitably slow to have an effect, and that effect was 
modest.’20 However modest that effect might be, the Western powers were keen to act 
and be seen to do so.  Early in 1993 the North Atlantic Council offered to police the 
Adriatic using its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).  It was, 
Fabian Hiscock asserted in The Naval Review, the first live operation ever conducted 
by NATO,21 and, as Eric Grove added, a ‘notable first in international naval co-operation 
– support of UN resolutions.’ 22 These claims, though appealing, are not strictly 
accurate.  M.D. Fink, in a 2013 analysis of naval support of UN resolutions identifies 
seven to date, including two (Southern Rhodesia in 1965 (UNSCR 217) and Iraq in 
1990 (UNSCR 665)) which pre-date Yugoslavia.23  Nonetheless, after the quarter 
century hiatus between the naval enforcement of sanctions of Southern Rhodesia and 
those authorising action against Iraq, there was a flood of UN mandated maritime 
activity in Haiti (1993), Sierra Leone (1997), Lebanon (2006) and Libya (2011).24 
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However, according to NATO, in the three years that the naval operations took place in 
the Adriatic, fourteen countries contributed forces.25 France, outside the NATO military 
structure at the time, felt able to become involved through the auspices of the Western 
European Union (WEU), which also committed forces. 26 The British formed a national 
task group in January 1993 based around the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal under the 
command of Jeremy Blackham, and a Dutch frigate joined it in February.27  
 
Notwithstanding the practical issue of sanction enforcement, it is clear that the Adriatic 
of the early to mid-1990s provided an opportunity for states to publically demonstrate 
their willingness to participate in coalition and alliance action in order to help shape the 
changing world order. There was, in effect, a scramble for a piece of the Adriatic.  
Additionally, the multi-national response to support UN Resolutions was arguably a 
strengthening, if not practical legitimising, of the role of international organisations in the 
post-Cold War world.  In International Relations terms, it spoke to the liberal agenda. 
 
Blackham stated that his immediate priority was to ‘familiarise ourselves with the 
geography, oceanography and pattern of activity in the Adriatic’ and that his mission 
was to ‘poise.’  The same mission, he stated, ‘similarly drove the thinking of the US and 
French commanders’ and are ‘the most classic, most ancient, and in the future, 
probably most likely form of naval operations.’28 However, that assessment is perhaps 
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an oversimplification, as each of the contributing parties had their own objectives.  From 
the start of the conflict until 1995 American policy had been based around its refusal to 
deploy ground troops,29 and thus it relied heavily on its aircraft carrier contribution to 
Operation Deny Flight against the Serbian air force to communicate intent.  Meanwhile, 
French warships were primarily supporting troops ashore, whilst standing NATO naval 
forces, from both the Mediterranean and later from the Atlantic, and the WEU, were 
conducting embargo operations.30  By the time operations completed in 1996 over 
74,000 ships had been challenged by navies maintaining a continuous vigil at sea and 
although the Yugoslav Navy attempted to interfere and assist an oil tanker to break the 
embargo in 1994, the enforcement was deemed completely successful.31  Ships were 
also used as neutral meeting grounds for negotiations between the Yugoslav 
constituent states and parties. Dr David Owen, the Co-Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 
was aware of the symbolism of holding a peace conference on board a third party 
warship and acknowledged that the ‘union of the three republics’ plan was ‘finalised on 
HMS Invincible’ in 1993.32   
 
In his analysis of the Adriatic operations from a British perspective, Eric Grove 
highlighted the complexities of integrating into an ‘environment with two other national 
carrier groups, American and French, two multi-national forces, NATO and WEU, not to 
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mention Italian and NATO command structures.’33  Richard Sargent similarly 
commented on the challenges of having ‘as many as four aircraft carriers in the Adriatic 
at any one time.’34  
 
The achievement of the 1990s naval diplomacy in the Adriatic was not just its obvious 
impact on its ‘victim’, the disintegrating Yugoslavia, but its realization of coalition 
building, its visible signals to the international community, and its reassurance to a 
myriad of domestic audiences that action was being taken in support of a popular 
humanitarian cause.  According to the US special envoy Richard Holbrooke it gave the 
US Navy a platform of success from which to lobby Congress,35 and it also sent a 
message to Russia that the West was still a force to be reckoned with at sea, despite 
the cuts made to defence spending since the end of the Cold War. That message, 
however, did have an adverse impact on relations between the two former 
superpowers.36  
 
The second example of naval diplomacy from the fragmented, former eastern bloc is 
perhaps an example of when naval diplomacy fails.  In the Adriatic the contributing 
states may have had dissimilar aims, but they were at least aware of the environment in 
which they operated.  In the summer of 2006 the United States led an initiative aimed at 
enhancing the interoperability and maritime capabilities of the Black Sea states and 
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supporting its own foreign policy objectives of securing the region from terrorism, 
promoting democracy and ensuring the free flow of goods. The US was absolutely clear 
in its aim but, arguably, it was not cognisant of the context. Since 1992 Russia, still the 
dominant power in the region, had viewed Yugoslavia as a distraction to its main naval 
aim, resolution of the ‘problem’ of Ukraine and the future of its Black Sea Fleet.37 
 
The US-led Sea Breeze series of exercises had begun in 1997 and were seen as an 
important vehicle for coalition building.38 The 2006 exercise was to be held off the 
Crimean peninsula, co-hosted by Ukraine, and involved participating forces from 
seventeen countries, all belonging to either NATO or the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
For its part Ukraine saw Sea Breeze as an aid to its own longer term objectives of 
NATO membership, progressing military modernization and increasing interoperability 
with other countries’ forces.39 
 
Though the exercise was actually a US-Ukrainian bilateral enterprise with a number of 
other invited states, it was seen by many, and particularly by Russia, as a de facto 
NATO endeavour and part of its attempt to expand to the east. At the end of May 2006 
the US-flagged merchant ship Advantage arrived as planned at the Ukrainian port of 
Feodosiya with a number of military reservists and five hundred tonnes of construction 
material for use in Sea Breeze. The Russian Duma, sending a clear warning to its 
neighbour, voted on 6 June by 435 to 0 for a resolution expressing ‘serious concern’ 
over Ukrainian plans to join the NATO Alliance. Pro-Russian demonstrators then began 
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to ‘picket’ the American ‘warship.’40 The Russian vote had been timed to pre-empt a 
Ukrainian parliamentary motion to allow foreign troops into the country for the 
exercise.41  Since an earlier Ukrainian election there had been a political impasse, with 
no party enjoying a clear majority, which made it difficult to achieve ‘the constitutionally 
required parliamentary authorisation of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil.’42 However, it 
was subsequently and successfully argued within Ukraine that since Advantage was not 
a ‘warship’ and that since its cargo was not ammunition, the port had every right to 
admit it without reference to parliament.43  That point notwithstanding, the political 
turmoil and anti-NATO sentiment in the predominantly ethnically Russian Crimea was 
such that it could be exploited for political gain.44  The definitive article on the incident, 
written by Deborah Sanders in 2007, stated that: 
 
The offloading of Advantage became a lightning rod for a widespread campaign against 
the government’s proposed foreign policy in general.  Residents of Feodosiya blockaded 
the city’s port, protesting what they saw as an attempt by NATO to establish a presence 
in the Black Sea..... The day after the arrival of Advantage the Feodosiya town council 
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declared the town a ‘NATO-free area’; a week later the Crimean parliament declared the 
peninsula a ‘NATO-free territory’.
45
   
 
Within two weeks the ship would be forced out of port, its equipment and cargo 





By early August when the Ukrainian parliament did vote to allow the foreign troops into 
the country to exercise, it was too late. 47 The external pressure from Moscow and the 
internal demands within the Crimea were so great that the Ukrainian government was 
forced to alter course.  In a visit to Brussels in September 2006 Viktor Yanukovych, the 
Prime Minister, stated that Ukraine was ‘not ready’ to join NATO.48 
 
Sanders used the Sea Breeze incident as a case study through which to question the 
‘generally accepted’ view of the diplomatic utility of naval power.  Naval diplomacy, 
which she defined as the use of naval power in peacetime to secure influence,49 could 
be counterproductive.  In this case of an American attempt to influence Ukraine through 
simple naval exercising, it failed to produce the desired effects for either side and could, 
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she argued, have caused unforeseen damage.50  Sanders combined elements of the 
works of Ken Booth and Edward Luttwak when reaching her conclusion: 
 
The relationship between naval diplomacy and domestic factors is complex. It has been 
argued that success is in the eyes of the ‘locals’, that the psychological environment of a 
‘target’ state affects its decision makers and ‘internal opinion forming groups.’ Naval 
diplomacy, then, must take account of a state’s political, historical, economic and military 
worldview; domestic politics – the policy environment, the decision-making arena, and 




Military personnel engaged in planning for and participating in future coalition building 
exercises will clearly need to understand the culture, history and sensitivities of host 




The success of this example of naval (and wider) diplomacy, if there was any, belonged 
to Russia, a state which had been neither a direct participant nor a deliberate ‘target’ of 
the planners.  Moscow’s own counter to American and NATO naval presence in the 
region was its encouragement for and joining of the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) 
in 2001.  In common with the aims of Sea Breeze, BLACKSEAFOR was established to 
enhance peace and stability among the region’s six littoral states, which it did through 
biannual naval exercises under the banner of Operation Black Sea Harmony.53 As Sea 
Breeze 2006 was unravelling a Black Sea Harmony exercise was underway.54   
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Nationalism and Opportunism  
 
Though the island of Taiwan is ethnically Chinese, it has had an ambiguous relationship 
with the mainland for centuries.  Incorporated into the Qing Dynasty in the seventeenth 
century, it had subsequently been ruled in part or whole by the Dutch, Spanish and 
French.  From 1895 until 1945 it was a Japanese colony and legally recognised as such 
by all of the major powers.  Only at the end of the Second World War did the Nationalist 
government in Nanking gain sovereignty. 55 Within four years, however, the Chinese 
communists under Mao had wrested control of the mainland in a civil war and the 
Nationalist Kuomintang, under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to the island and 
established the Republic of China (RoC) there. The RoC was not generally recognised 
by the international community and Taiwan remained officially at war with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) until 1991. ‘Terminating that “war” at the same time as the 
Cold War ended should have given Taiwan greater security.  It did just the opposite.’56 
 
Trade grew rapidly between China and Taiwan after 1987, when the Taiwanese 
authorised travel to the mainland,57 but a sense of economic optimism on the island 
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gave sustenance to a growing movement for true Taiwanese independence.58 To the 
PRC the developments on the island were unwelcome: 
 
From Beijing’s perspective, Taiwan has developed into a hotbed of secessionist 
sentiment, guided by a confederacy of island born leaders determined to evolve a 
political culture, economic infrastructure, and foreign policy that defines a destiny for 
their island distinct from that of the mainland..... The Republic of China quickly shed its 
image as a reliquary of Nationalist ‘bitter-enders’ dedicated to a reconquista of the 
mainland.... PRC leaders became incensed as Taipei picked apart the Beijing-
constructed arms embargo to purchase modern frigates and aircraft from France and 




Taiwan had fewer than thirty diplomatic allies in the world at the end of the Cold War 
and it thus developed a ‘calculated strategy’ to keep itself at ‘the forefront of 
international attention’ and remind the world of its plight.60  China-watchers believe that 
threatening gestures against Taiwan can be traced to the emergence of a new 
leadership in China as early as 1992,61 but it was not until 1995-6 that tensions came to 
a head.  Taiwan embarked on its own naval diplomacy aimed at building prestige and 
amity; in 1995 the Taiwanese President launched his country’s fifth Oliver Hazard Perry 
class guided missile frigate and ‘dispatched a “friendship fleet” to Singapore, to the 
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delight of the Chinese community there.’62 At around the same time there were moves 
in Taipai to achieve another diplomatic coup and get the President, Lee Teng-huito, to 
visit America.   
 
Since 1949 the United States had followed a ‘one-China’ policy, recognising only the 
Beijing government as the legitimate representatives of the whole Chinese people, and 
no Taiwanese leader had been granted permission to travel to the United States.  The 
long-established political stance was subtly changed by President Clinton in 1995 when 
he decided to grant a visa to Lee, not in an official capacity but as a private citizen.  The 
decision to grant the visa was greatly influenced by the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives, which was susceptible to the Taiwan lobby.63  After repeatedly 
declining his previous requests, the US allowed President Lee to make an unofficial visit 
to his alma mater (Cornell University) in 1995, to which the PRC objected.64 The 
subsequent crisis could, therefore, be said to have been precipitated by Lee’s political 
and diplomatic posturing.65 
 
Interestingly, Beijing’s decision to respond to the Taiwan issue through military 
demonstration could have been as a result of its assessment of Western military-
diplomatic methodology.  Douglas Porch, writing about the Taiwan Strait Crisis three 
years after the event, judged that ‘on the basis of Chinese analysis of the Gulf War, 
advocates […] preached that a display of the PLA’s capabilities during a crisis would 
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deter an enemy.’66 The ‘enemy’ to whom he is referring was both the RoC and the 
United States. Chinese missile ‘tests’ were consequently conducted from July 1995 until 
March 1996.  In August and October 1995 air and maritime exercises were held in the 
East China Sea involving the firing of anti-ship missiles,67 and in November an 
amphibious exercise took place around Dungshan Island, south of the Strait and similar 
to Taiwan in geography, terrain and weather; it made a ‘good rehearsal ground.’68  The 
PRC’s message to intimidate, coerce and deter was clear.  The November exercises 
were well timed to coincide with approaching Taiwanese parliamentary elections; the 
tactics seemed to bear fruit as candidates favourable to reconciliation with China were 
returned.69 ‘For China, then, coercion and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are as much 
a matter of communication and diplomatic signalling as of putting to sea potent ships, 
aircraft and missiles.’70 Deterring the US from intervening in some future ‘showdown’ in 
the Strait assumed top priority for Beijing.71 
 
The United States, however, was not deterred, and thus China’s attempt at naval 
diplomacy did not succeed.  On 19 December 1995 following continuing tensions, the 
United States responded by sending the USS Nimitz battle group through the Taiwan 
Strait, the first carrier to make that passage since 1979.72  The mission for the carrier 
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group was not to fight, but to be a highly visible and symbolic demonstration of interest.  
James Holmes, writing in 2009, saw the US action as entirely consistent with the 
Schelling’s conceptual theory of coercive diplomacy discussed earlier.  Carriers were 
sent, he reasoned, to ‘protect and deter.’ 73  
 
Taiwanese presidential elections were scheduled to take place in March 1996 and 
Beijing, mindful of its earlier successes in the 1995 vote, employed a similar strategy of 
military coercion in order to ‘intimidate’ Taiwan and influence the results.74  The PRC 
announced that it would hold further live firing exercises in the Taiwan Strait.  The 
United States responded in kind and directed the USS Independence battle group 
toward Taiwan, shifted the USS George Washington from the Adriatic to the Persian 
Gulf  and ordered the USS Nimitz battle group from the Gulf to Taiwan. 75  
 
There is some speculation over the true target audience for the US action.  It has been 
suggested that President Clinton dispatched the two carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait 
to constrain Beijing and demonstrate US naval power, but also to circumvent intense 
pressure from the US Congress if he failed to act. 76  The deployment became the most 
significant naval display in the East China Sea since the 1950s.77 
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Douglas Porch argued that the ‘conventional wisdom, especially in US government and 
naval circles, may be wrong.  It holds that the arrival of two carriers effectively deterred 
Beijing’s intimidation of Taiwan.  Unfortunately, a close analysis of the crisis yields little 
evidence to support this thesis.’78  Porch’s point is that although the deployment of the 
American ships may have given the Chinese leadership ‘pause’, it did not alter their 
plans at all.  The missile firings continued.79  However, President Lee turned the missile 
firings to his own advantage in his political campaign and denied Beijing the successes 
they had enjoyed in 1995.  In the March 1996 election he won handsomely with a 
popular vote of 54 per cent. 80 A reassessment of Porch’s assertion may in fact result in 
a different conclusion; the conventional wisdom may be partly right.  Beijing may not 
have been deterred but US action did reassure nationalist Taiwanese and give them the 
courage to side with Lee in the knowledge that they were being backed by the world’s 
superpower. 
 
The Taiwan Strait Crisis is interesting because it shows naval diplomacy being used to 
counter naval diplomacy, with interlocking activities by three parties and multiple 
audiences.  Who the ultimate victor was, however, is not clear.  Sheng Lijun, for 
instance, argued that the crisis demonstrated that the PRC was still far from possessing 
the hard and soft power it needed to become a global leader.81 Porch, on the other 
hand, acknowledged that the subsequent PRC investment in anti-access missile 
technology could work to minimise any potential US participation in a future crisis, by 
effectively keeping its naval forces at bay.  Missiles, he stated, ‘remain the near term 
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PLA trump card.’ 82 Lijun did recognise, however, that ‘China’s response to the United 
States was mostly symbolic and stopped short of blatant retaliation.  Beijing remained 
clear headed enough not to jeopardise its overall interests by sidelining China-US 
relations.’83 The PRC’s rise to power will be discussed further later in the Chapter. 
 
One of the longest running political and military operations of the post-Cold War era 
involved ground and air participants, but also included a significant naval diplomatic 
element.  Following the first Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq ‘problem’ was, in effect, 
‘contained’ until the second Gulf War of 2003.  Containment, of course, had been the 
strategy applied by the West to hold communism in check during the Cold War.84  
Western naval forces had been present in the Arabian / Persian Gulf before 1991 and 
remained so throughout the containment period and beyond.  They were tasked with 
presence through routine patrols, reassurance of partner states through bilateral and 
multi-national exercises and operations, interdiction of vessels attempting to breach the 
UN sanctions which had been applied against Iraq and clearance of the residual mine 
threat from both 1991 and, more likely, the earlier Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.85  A long 
standing ‘general’ regional role for extra-regional forces, mainly Western, became more 
focused in the 1990s. In many ways the Gulf mirrored the Adriatic Sea in the same 
period.  It was crowded with the warships of interested parties, their roles were various 
and their underlying rationale for being there wide-ranging.   To classical naval 
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strategists such as Corbett, the naval action in the Gulf would have looked remarkably 
familiar: it would undoubtedly have been described as a blockade.   An Australian naval 
officer and commentator agreed; James Goldrick, writing about the containment 
strategy stated that ‘it stretched over 13 years and was one of the longest blockade 
operations in history.’86   
 
Unlike in East Asia, where the US had long attempted to deter regional conflict by 
applying a balance of power strategy against China, in the Middle East the global 
superpower approached matters in a different way.  Steve Yetiv, discussing an 
apparent lack of coherence in the American approach to foreign policy and geopolitics 
at the time, argued that the US did not attempt to balance power in the Gulf, but rather it 
adopted a ‘balance-of-threat’ approach.  That is, it positioned itself and its allies not 
against the most powerful state but rather against one it perceived as the greatest 
threat.87  Iraq’s influence and power beyond military adventurism was limited in 
comparison to wealthier states like Saudi Arabia or culturally persuasive states such as 
Iran, but nonetheless it did become the main target of the West’s naval diplomacy. 
 
However, the containment strategy did not just apply to Iraq.  The Clinton administration 
from 1993 onwards shifted to a policy of ‘dual containment’ of both Iraq and Iran.88  
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Dual containment had several goals.  First, it aimed not only to impede the ability of Iran 
and Iraq to threaten neighbors [sic] but also to undermine their ability to build 
conventional and unconventional military capabilities.  This approach, unlike deterrence, 
would cripple their ability to be aggressive in the first place rather than deterring already 




Iraqi containment was more militarily aggressive than that targeted at Iran. There were 
substantial numbers of ground troops stationed in the region and airpower was used 
extensively.  The containment of Iran was more subtle in its military dimension.  It would 
have been politically unacceptable to use land and air power in the same way and the 
particular advantages of sea power in this regard, discussed in Chapter 2, meant that 
the burden of responsibility to demonstrate political intent fell to naval forces.   
 
According to James Goldrick, eighteen countries contributed to the naval effort in the 
Gulf at some stage.  The UK was the ‘most consistent’ usually providing a single 
destroyer or frigate, but due to other tasks it was not always on station.90 The building of 
coalitions, which were such a factor in the wars of both 1991 and 2003, also became a 
distinguishing trait of the intervening period.  Interestingly, the mine counter measures 
effort in particular became home to those who were politically unwilling or unable to 
become involved in more direct forms of warfighting; in addition to the US and UK six 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands) contributed.91  
As well as being a visible signal of support to Gulf region states, this naval diplomacy 
was used to demonstrate commitment to the US and European allies.  The coalition 
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building element of the mission was important but there were also tangible, physical 
results to their efforts which could be used as demonstrable evidence of success to 
domestic audiences.  For instance, hundreds of bottom, moored and floating mines 
were located and appropriately dealt with.92 
 
Whenever Iraq failed to act in accordance with the desires of the international 
community, the rheostat of coercion was turned up.  At these times, those less-willing 
contributing states maintained their lower level constabulary and diplomatic action, 
leaving the projection of harder military power to others.  For instance, in December 
1998 following the Iraqi refusal to allow access to UN authorised weapons inspectors, 
the United States and United Kingdom responded with Operation Desert Fox, an 
intense four day bombing campaign against Iraq’s security infrastructure.  Some of the 
ordnance used was land based, but much came from missile firing warships and 
submarines and from aircraft carriers at sea.  It caused a series of uprisings within Iraq 
against the regime and, possibly, a coup attempt.93 
   
Containment of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq lasted for thirteen years but the political mood 
changed in the early 2000s following the al Qaida attacks on the US and the Western 
response, much of it from sea, in Afghanistan in late 2001.  It became apparent that 
containment had run its course and that greater military action was likely.  Even at that 
stage, however, naval diplomacy continued to play a role. William Langenheim, writing 
in late 2002, immediately before the US-led invasion of Iraq, discussed the ongoing 
coercive diplomacy in the Gulf as a means both to garner support for war and to provide 
                                               
92
 Ibid., p196. 
 
93
 Langenheim, William, S.  ‘Give Peace a Chance: First, Try Coercive Diplomacy.’ US Naval 
War College Review 55, No 4 (2002): p65. 
 
  312 
an exit strategy for Iraq.  It was about giving the ‘enemy’ a final chance.94  The 
assumption that rational actors would undertake rational, cognitive decision-making was 
alive and well.  Indeed, playing out such arguments in the specialist naval media could 
be seen as a political act in itself. 
 
The use of the sea for political gain is not limited to states.  Hezbollah, for example, 
‘scored a major strategic coup’ in July 2006 when it attacked the Israeli corvette Hanit 
with anti-ship missiles. 95  The Israeli Navy had been operating in the eastern 
Mediterranean, engaging land targets in Lebanon and enforcing a blockade during its 
small ‘war.’96  Israel was, in effect, exercising its continued sea control in its locality, 
which had gone unchallenged since the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. According 
to Israeli figures, the operation had been successful with its ships spending some 8000 
hours at sea and firing their weapons over 2500 times.97 On 14 July 2006, however, 
Hezbollah fired two missiles from the shore; one hit and sank a Cambodian registered 
cargo ship 60 km offshore whilst the other hit Hanit and killed 4 sailors.98 The attack 
was proof that ‘insurgent groups… do use the sea.’99 The attack did not alter the military 
power dynamics of the region but perceptions were changed. The lasting ‘memory’ of 
the 2006 naval campaign is not the myriad Israeli successes, but one Hezbollah action. 
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The ability of Hezbollah to launch such an attack came as a surprise both to Israel and 
to the international community.  Martin Murphy explains why terrorism and insurgency 
are more likely to be experienced on land: 
 
The reason for the low incidence of maritime terrorism is that the risk-reward ratio rarely 
computes. The resources groups need to undertake acts of violence at sea tend to be 
specialised and therefore cost more than the resources needed to mount equivalent 
attacks on land.  More important, the rewards terrorists look for, publicity in particular, 




However, publicity can be achieved by the unusual.  Within minutes of the Hanit attack 
Hezbollah had used its own TV station, Al Manar, to broadcast the news and reach 
some 200 million viewers; it also posted a film on YouTube.101  It is also believed that 
Hezbollah had acquired the missiles (understood to be the Chinese C802) from Iran, its 
state sponsor, and that Iran was operating by proxy.102  Extrapolating, the Hezbollah 
attack on Israel was an indirect, or proxy, Iranian attack on the United States. 
 
In another instance of a non-state actor using the sea to challenge Israel, the so-called 
Gaza Freedom Flotilla achieved enormous publicity in 2010. As part of the ongoing 
middle-east peace process, Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the Gaza Strip in 
2005, but retained control of its borders. Hamas, a U.S. State Department-designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organization, subsequently won the Palestinian election and took 
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control of the territory in 2007. Israel imposed a blockade of Gaza in response to 
Hamas’s takeover and restricted the flow of goods.103 Israel and the international 
community differed about the severity of the blockade’s effects on the humanitarian 
situation on Palestinian residents of Gaza, but it was clear that the territory’s economy 
and people were affected.104 
 
On 22 May 2010, the MV Mavi Marmara, a former Istanbul passenger ferry owned by 
the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation, rendezvoused with five other ships and the 
flotilla headed for Gaza in an attempt to break the blockade and deliver 10,000 tons of 
humanitarian aid.   In addition to the material cargo, the ships carried about 700 
activists from 38 countries.  On 30 May, the ships refused Israel’s offer to unload at the 
port of Ashdod so that their cargoes could be inspected before delivery.105 
 
The next day, when the ships were in international waters between 80 and 100 miles 
from the Israeli coast, the Israeli Navy intercepted and boarded them. Some activists on 
board the Mavi Marmara resisted and a violent clash ensued; nine passengers were 
killed.106  The ships were diverted to Ashdod, the remaining passengers were detained, 
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the cargo was unloaded and eventually it was delivered to Gaza and distributed under 
the auspices of the UN.107  
 
Though the subsequent UN investigation into the incident, chaired by the former New 
Zealand Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer, determined that the blockade had been 
‘legitimate’ and that the flotilla had acted ‘recklessly’,108 there was near-universal 
condemnation of Israel’s actions. Nicaragua broke off diplomatic relations, while 
Ecuador and South Africa recalled their ambassadors and many other governments 
summoned Israeli ambassadors and chargés d’affair to register their protests. The 
European Union, Russia and China urged Israel to open the borders to Gaza.109 The 
action of the ‘Gaza Freedom Flotilla’ had an impact on the international community out 
of all proportion to that which might have initially been expected by a relative small-
scale humanitarian delivery.  It showed that diplomacy at sea is not the sole preserve of 
state navies. 
 
Pax Americana and Resistance to US Hegemony  
 
The examples of naval diplomacy cited thus far involve, at least in part, the seapower of 
the United States.  There is a privileged discourse in international relations which 
supports the premise that the end of the Cold War left the US, at least for a period of 
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time, as the sole superpower; it might therefore be expected that the US Navy would 
play a significant role in consolidating American hegemony.  Indeed:  
 
With the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the bipolar international system dominating the Cold War period 
disappeared, leaving its place to basically a unipolar system under the leadership of the 




A Congressional Research Service Report of 2009 explained that ‘although US forces 
have traditionally focussed on fighting and winning wars, defense [sic] strategy is now 
evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero”, addressing threats at their 
inception through increased emphasis on theater [sic] security cooperation and capacity 
building of allies.’111 As has already been discussed, navies, particularly leading navies, 
have always acted to further national and political interests by active and latent suasion 
and building partnerships. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, the US Navy re-evaluated 
its basic functions,112 and developed the idea of the Global Fleet Station which, whilst 
not a new concept, did much to formalise a longstanding informal role.  
 
Global Fleet Stations (GFS) were an attempt to put ‘presence’ missions on a more 
permanent footing.  By continuously deploying to areas of interest, it was envisaged 
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that the GFS could exert leverage to strengthen relationships and build capacity within 
the targeted countries and regions.  In addition, they could also be used to indirectly 
counter the attempts by other ‘forward leaning’ states, such as China, to garner 
influence of their own.  They are perhaps a maritime, twenty-first century manifestation 
of the nineteenth century’s ‘Great Game’ or the late twentieth century’s Cold War by 
proxy.  Often working in parts of the world not subject to general public or mainstream 
media attention, the GFS had little in the way of a domestic agenda within the US and 
their political and diplomatic utility was therefore almost entirely concentrated on the 
area with which they were engaged.  With GFS, the US was effectively reasserting its 
place as a naval superpower and putting naval diplomacy at the centre of its strategy. 
 
The US Southern Command sponsored the first pilot GFS mission from April to 
September 2007, using the high speed vessel (HSV 2) Swift.  During the course of its 
deployment Swift visited seven Caribbean and Central American countries and its 
ship’s company conducted 39,890 hours of ‘subject matter expert’ exchanges with 
partners in topics such as leadership, small boat operations, port security and small unit 
tactics.113 
 
The pilot was deemed to be a success with commentators writing such positive reviews 
as, ‘the GFS represents a great opportunity to build civil-military communication and 
coordination practices that can be leveraged in any theater [sic] in the event of war.’114  
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Buoyed by the initial experience of Southern Command, the newly formed Africa 
Command developed its own GFS and concentrated its efforts along the Atlantic 
coastline of West Africa.  Jonathan Stevenson, commenting on the initiative, stated that 
‘it is salutary that the US Navy, rather than the Army, is taking the lead in a new 
strategic effort in Africa.’115 Salutary it may be, but based on historical precedent, it 
should be no surprise. 
 
The Africa Command GFS was named the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and 
consisted of a small and varied group of warships and completed its first six month 
deployment in the Gulf of Guinea in 2008.116  The APS was designed to assist the 
regional maritime community to develop better maritime governance and to serve as a 
base from which to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief if required.117 
Stevenson, again: 
 
The African Partnership Station has already earned the confidence and enthusiastic 
participation of most littoral West African states, and it remains at once the most 
operationally effective and politically agreeable component of the military engagement of 
the United States with sub-Saharan Africa.  In that light it may well prove Africa 
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How the APS went about its business, however, was not necessarily original.  As with 
countless flag-flying or ambassadorial deployments before it, the ships of the APS 
relied on manipulating the basic building blocks of human nature: ‘In addition to 
providing relief assistance during the visit, sailors from Swift will conduct a community 
relations project, meet with local officials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and 
support a diplomatic reception aboard the ship.’119  In 2013 the US Africa Command 
was still employing the APS in support of its primary naval mission, ‘to improve the 
maritime security capability and capacity of African partners.’120  There is much to be 
said about learning from the lessons of history, however trivial they might initially 
appear.   
 
The US Navy engaged in similar ventures in other parts of the world.  A former US 
naval and marine attaché to Vietnam described a visit to Danang in July 2007 by the 
Pacific Partnership, a humanitarian assistance mission conducted in several southeast 
Asian ports by USS Peleliu, an amphibious assault ship, and its embarked medical, 
dental and engineering teams.  Though it was not the first US ship visit since the end of 
the Vietnam War, it was characterised as a ‘watershed in the development of the 
bilateral military relationship.’121 
 
If the early post-Cold War era was a time of Pax Americana, it was not made so by the 
US alone.  Its closest allies and partners adopted much the same methodologies, either 
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by design or dint of circumstance.  Australia’s experiences in East Timor are perhaps a 
good example.  After the withdrawal of the colonial power, Portugal, East Timor’s larger 
neighbour Indonesia overran the state in 1975.  After the invasion the local population 
had an uncomfortable relationship with their new overlords and never accepted 
Indonesian sovereignty.122 Violence periodically erupted and came to a head in 1999.  
In September of that year the United Nations created the International Force East Timor 
(INTERFRET) and it deployed under Australian leadership.  The violent conflict was 
quelled and the operation ended on 23 February 2000 when INTERFRET handed over 
to the UN Transitional Administration East Timor.123 Subsequently, Indonesia accepted 
East Timorese independence.   
 
Like many peace missions, the ultimate success or failure of INTERFRET was 
determined on the ground, amongst the people.  However, the commander of the 
operation, Major General P J Cosgrove, was in no doubt about the contribution that the 
coercive power of navies made:    
  
Another military blinding glimpse of the obvious... the persuasive, intimidating or 
deterrent nature of major warships was not to me as the combined joint force 
commander an incidental, nice to have ‘add on’ but an important indicator of national 
and international resolve and most reassuring to all of us who relied on the sea lifelines.  
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There may be consequences to intervention, however, and East Timor was no 
exception.  Challenges to US-led Western hegemony come in various forms and it has 
been suggested that the bombing of a Bali disco popular with Australian tourists in 2004 
may have been a direct result of Australia’s involvement four years earlier.125 
 
A particular challenge to US and Western hegemony came from a one notoriously 
opportunistic quarter, and one not reluctant to use its own military and naval forces for 
political advantage: North Korea.  As the Taiwanese commentator To-hai Liou has 
written: 
 
There is a Chinese saying that weak countries have no diplomacy at all.  Realists in the 
West, particularly neo-realists, also believe that international engagement is largely 
shaped by major powers.  Minor and middle powers have no choice but to follow the 
rules of the game as constructed by major powers, but not without exception.  North 
Korea’s diplomacy in the post-cold war era is the best example of a minor power making 




To-hai Liou went on to explain that because of its extremely limited economic capacity, 
North Korea had no choice but to focus on strengthening its military capabilities in an 
attempt to negotiate from a position of relative strength.127  Despite being mired in 
economic woes, North Korea has a track record of threatening its more powerful rivals 
with military action. It has ‘deliberately and repeatedly’ resorted to brinkmanship in an 
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attempt to benefit from the crises it creates.  For example, during a 1993-94 crisis 
surrounding North Korea’s attempts to develop a nuclear capability, it overtly threatened 
to wage all out war with the South if the United States dared to initiate any military 
action against it.  It is an approach with historical precedent on the Korean peninsula 
and is perhaps another example of Schelling’s classic game theory being put to 
practical use. Its strategy could be considered successful because, in the end, 
Pyongyang obtained two light water nuclear reactors from the United States along with 
an annual supply of 500,000 tons of heavy oil.128 In these stark terms brinkmanship 
worked.  
 
North Korea’s strategy often relied on playing one adversary off against another, 
particularly South Korea and the United States, and it has been applied at sea.  Its use 
of naval diplomacy is an interesting variation on what might be described as ‘standard’ 
practice.  A notable example took place in September 1996 when a North Korean 
submarine was discovered in South Korean territorial waters.  South Korea regarded 
the incursion as an attempted ‘spying’ mission whilst, at least publicly, the US had to be 
convinced that it was anything more than a navigational error.  Similar incursions by 
Soviet submarines had, of course, been relatively commonplace in European waters 
during the Cold War.  Notwithstanding the fact that Washington acknowledged the 
necessity of a diplomatic apology from North Korea and Pyongyang’s promise not to 
commit the same mistake again, the US did not agree with Seoul’s more aggressive 
approach of attempting to use to the incident as leverage against the construction of the 
North Korean nuclear reactors. North Korea’s mea culpa effectively allowed it to be 
portrayed as the reasonable party, the victim of South Korea’s disproportionate 
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response. However, the Clinton administration did not want to see its previously agreed 
and hard won framework damaged by South Korea’s tough stance toward 
Pyongyang.129 North Korea had, quite simply, applied a simple tactic of submarine 
naval diplomacy to stoke disagreement over response between its two major critics.  
 
A more aggressive application of submarine naval diplomacy by North Korea took place 
some years later in March 2010.  Considered by some in the South to be the severest 
military provocation since the Korean War armistice, the North attacked and sank the 
Southern warship Cheonan.130  Previous conventional naval skirmishes between the 
two Koreas, such as an exchange of fire in the Yellow Sea off Daechung in November 
2009 when warships from the North entered disputed territorial waters,131 had tended to 
end in greater military success for the South.  The North’s solution to its comparable 
naval disadvantage was to turn to asymmetric tactics,132 particularly those which could 
carry a degree of plausible deniability.   
 
Accusations of responsibility for the sinking of Cheonan with the loss of 46 lives were 
rejected by Pyongyang, though there was little doubt amongst the international 
community that the North Korean regime were to blame. What is interesting about the 
Cheonan incident is why North Korea took the seemingly irrational action that it did, and 
the reaction to it by other parties.  Mikyoung Kim, a South Korean academic working at 
the Hiroshima Peace Institute in Japan, wrote that neither Seoul nor Tokyo could 
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provide a convincing motive for the attack. This perhaps underlines an unchanging truth 
about the efficacy of naval diplomacy: outcomes will be limited if the intended audience 
cannot understand the policy which form its context. However, Kim does proffer the 
opinion that Pyongyang’s behaviour could have its genesis in its exaggeration of 
external threats, which it used to consolidate its power with its domestic audience.  
Influence over the succession of leader and forcing the US to the negotiating table in 
order to secure other benefits could also have been factors in its political calculations.133 
Such an exaggeration of threat in order to legitimize subsequent actions is classic 
‘securitization,’ the constructivist hypothesis put forward by Waever, Buzan and the 
Copenhagen School of IR.  Should the Pyongyang’s actions indeed be the product of a 
securitization agenda, it is perhaps a new outlet for naval diplomacy. 
 
Though the UN Security Council condemned the sinking,134 and the United States 
claimed that the incident had ‘strengthened’ its alliance with the South,135 it could be 
argued that North Korea achieved its aim.  The East Asia region was ‘rattled’ by the 
unprovoked action,136 yet there was no immediate decisive response from China, North 
Korea’s only ally, to either condemn or restrain its behaviour.137 Indeed, one leading 
Chinese commentator went so far as to state that since the incident Beijing’s assistance 
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to and investment in North Korea had increased.  From the viewpoint of the Chinese 
leadership the survival of the Pyongyang regime worked to its advantage because it 
forced Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to co-operate on building regional security, rather 
than focus on Chinese military expansion as a source of regional instability in itself.138 
China’s role in the aftermath of the Cheonan affair is not dissimilar to its stance after the 
Pueblo incident of four decades earlier, and discussed in Chapter 5.  As an exercise in 
naval diplomacy, then, the Cheonan incident might be regarded as achieving successful 
outcomes for its instigator, but also indirectly benefiting another, larger neighbour. 
 
 
The Return of Great Power Rivalry  
 
If the immediate post-Cold War period was a moment of superpower victory for the 
United States and its supporting allies, then the newly unipolar world view did not go 
unchallenged for long.  The opportunist and nationalist agendas of some actors have 
already been discussed, but it was the relentless economic rise of the BRICS, but 
perhaps of China and India in particular, which did most to bring about a new global 
multi-polarity.  As the former Prime Minister of India, I K Gujral, wrote: ‘we are […] 
witnessing the emergence of multiple economic power centres that are beginning to 
assert themselves with different perceptions and different goals.’139 Indeed, as another 
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commentator suggested, ‘from an economic/political point of view [...] the international 
system can be said to be multipolar, rather than unipolar.’140 
 
This Indian and Chinese economic ascendency, however, differed significantly from that 
of the late twentieth century powerhouses of Germany and Japan, limited as they were 
from a simultaneous military expansion by post-World War II settlements. Despite the 
fact that in his influential text on China’s ‘peaceful rise’ Zheng Bijiang claimed that his 
country would not pursue hegemony,141 increased Indian and Chinese economic power 
was accompanied by military growth and both countries have recognised the 
importance of the maritime domain when determining their futures.   
 
Indian and Chinese maritime ambitions in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions 
can be understood in starkly realist, geopolitical terms; according to one analysis, the 
assumptions and arguments of the ascendants are unmistakably Mahanian.142 
Commenting specifically on Chinese military diplomacy, the US Center for Naval 
Analyses offered that ‘since the 1990s the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 
become a ubiquitous presence on the world stage.’143 Similarly, speaking at the US 
Naval War College in November 2007, Rear Admiral Chopra of the Indian Navy 
declared that his country should ‘emulate America’s nineteenth century rise to sea 
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power’ as it made its way in the world.144 The two countries are, then, suitable 
candidates for a deeper investigation of naval diplomatic activities in support of national 
power.   
 
Of the two rising Asian powers, India’s naval expansion has arguably received less 
attention in the West, but there has been a definite shift in focus toward the maritime 
domain, as Waheguru Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan noted in 2003, when writing a 
comparative analysis of India and China: 
 
Since the late 1970s, India has shifted its emphasis from the army to the navy..... 
Strategic intentions are to establish predominance in the Indian Ocean.... and prevent 
other powers, such as China and Japan, from making inroads in the area.
145   
 
Indeed, this assertion seems to have been upheld in a 2007 speech by the Indian 
Defence Secretary, Shri Shekhar Dutt, to a New Delhi seminar on Defence, Security 
and Diplomacy.  Dutt stated that although securing his country’s borders remained the 
first priority, India’s area of interest now extended far beyond the confines of the 
subcontinent.  India’s security environment, he argued, ‘extends from the Persian Gulf 
to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean’.146 The environment he was referring 
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to, India’s self-declared ‘extended neighbourhood’,147 was clearly maritime in character 
and geography.  To exert influence over such vast swathes of the globe, by what Dutt 
termed ‘promoting co-operation and understanding’,148 would require a sizeable navy 
capable of deliberate diplomatic missions in pursuit of foreign policy objectives.149   
 
During the Cold War and into the 1990s the Indian Navy’s activities tended to sit at the 
‘hard’ end of the power spectrum, with deployments centred on support of the Sri 
Lankan government’s fight against the Tamil Tigers or, more commonly, on deterrence 
missions against Pakistan.  As an example, in the wake of the Kargil crisis of 1999, 
when Pakistani forces crossed the Line of Control into the disputed territory, India put 
its navy on alert and altered the deployment plans for its Eastern and Western Fleets.  
This overt manoeuvring sent a signal that any ‘misadventure’ by Pakistan would be 
firmly dealt with and India later claimed that its naval response had had a definitive 
effect on the outcome of the crisis.150  
 
However, from around the turn of the twenty-first century India increasingly used its 
navy for soft power purposes.  The Indian Navy declared that its theme for 2000 would 
be ‘Building Bridges of Friendship.’151  Since then it has regularly dispatched its aircraft 
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carrier, INS Viraat, into the Gulf and during one twenty-four month period between 2005 
and 2007 ‘around 40’ Indian warships were deployed either into the Gulf or to Oman for 
diplomatic purposes.152  It commenced the Varuna series of bilateral naval exercises 
with France in 2001, resumed the Malabar exercises with the United States in 2002, the 
Indra exercises with Russia in 2003, and Konkan with the United Kingdom in 2004.153 
After its non-alignment stance during the Cold War, India was using every opportunity 
to build amity, and not only with those states physically bordering its ‘security 
environment’.   
 
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and the subsequent Western-
led war on terror, the Indian Navy was used to signal a small but important message. 
Though it did not contribute directly to the war on terror, under the banner of Operation 
Sagittarius the Indian Navy escorted High Value Vessels through the Strait of Malacca 
choke point en route to the Middle East.154 At Mexican request, the Indian Navy also 
escorted a sail training ship through the Strait in early 2002.155 After the Cold War, 
during which India was viewed with semi-suspicion by the Western bloc, its navy was in 
the forefront of a rehabilitation with the (Western) international community. 
 
Concurrently, India developed its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
capabilities, attributes which were particularly key in its maritime area of interest. The 
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Indian Navy played a part in the aftermath of the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami of 
Boxing Day 2004,156 a role closely watched and later emulated by China, and in 2006 
INS Rajput became the first foreign warship on the scene to conduct relief operations 
after an another earthquake in Indonesia.157  On its return from the Mediterranean in 
2006, a long range sortie which show-cased its expeditionary capabilities to watching 
parties, an Indian naval task group diverted to Lebanon to conduct a non-combatant 
evacuation operation from Beirut; 2280 Indian, Sri Lanka and Nepalese nationals were 
collected and taken to a place of safety.158  
 
In a novel method of winning friends, from the mid-2000s the Indian Navy conducted a 
number of hydrographic surveys of other states’ exclusive economic zones.  One such 
deployment occurred in March and April 2007 when INS Sarvekshak surveyed 
Mauritius and then presented the completed charts to the country’s Prime Minister in a 
special ceremony.159  Of course, such activity may not be entirely altruistic and India 
could be set to profit from the knowledge gained. Nonetheless, both parties were 
content with the arrangement and similar activities have since taken place in co-
operation with the Maldives and Seychelles. 
 
It is possible that India’s non-threatening and ‘independent’ status is in itself an 
attractive proposition to the lesser-developed countries in its ‘extended neighbourhood’, 
making India a partner of choice for those states lacking a national naval capability. For 
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instance, Mozambique, on the far African shores of the Indian Ocean, requested and 
was afforded maritime security by the Indian Navy for a series of major events.  In July 
2003 INS Ranjit and Suvarna deployed there to provide seaward protection during an 
African Union summit in Maputo,160 and the following year INS Savitri and Sujata did the 
same, first during a World Economic Forum meeting and later a Afro-Pacific-Caribbean 
Heads of State meeting. On those occasions the Indian Navy took the opportunity to 
extend Indian influence further by giving medical treatment to 450 patients and training 
to the Mozambique Navy.161  
 
India’s interest in furthering its position in Africa did not end there and in 2008 its ships 
deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy patrols in parallel with the NATO 
deployment Operation Ocean Shield and, importantly, in close proximity to Chinese 
missions in the same region.162     
 
What these examples help to show is that with the end of the Cold War, New Delhi’s 
world view changed.  No longer was the Indian Navy a ‘Cinderella Service’, destined for 
marginalisation in comparison to the other armed forces,163 but a major weapon in its 
government’s diplomatic arsenal.  Becoming a global actor required India to have a 
global navy and it got one.   
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When China is considered in greater detail, it becomes apparent that it too required a 
significant naval element in its ‘pursuit of greatness’.  A noted East Asia specialist, 
Leszek Buszynski, suggested that: 
  
Over the past two decades, China has been steadily developing naval power, which it 
has regarded as a necessary attribute of great power status.  As China rises in 




Of course, twenty-first century China differs from the contemporary, post-Westphalian 
West and from India in the way that its military establishment relates to other elements 
of government.  Consequently, it differs in the way that its political establishment can be 
manifestly influenced by military considerations. The result is perhaps a politico-military 
construct reminiscent of the Cold War, authoritarian East, though the PRC may be 
cognisant of this and slowly changing.  Indeed, ‘strength of numbers and the PLA’s 
historical legacy under Mao have ensured that the Chinese military has retained a role 
in shaping foreign policy but its degree of influence has waxed and waned in the 
decades after Mao’s passing.’ 165  As the US Center for Naval Analyses points out: 
 
The most fundamental point to make is that the PLA’s conduct of foreign military 
relations is considered to be a strategic level activity by the Chinese leadership…. In this 
regard the ‘political’ and the ‘military’ are inseparable. The PLA’s military activities are 
viewed by both the PLA and China’s civilian leadership as a political undertaking using 
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military means for strategic reasons, not as a freestanding set of military initiatives by 




China’s own 2010 White Paper on national defence describes the (at least outwardly) 
social and developmental roles of its armed forces, roles which would be purely political 
activity in the West.  Amongst its strategic objectives it lists the maintenance of social 
harmony, world peace and stability. Within the last point it specifically discusses its 
cooperative military relations, relations that are ‘non-aligned, non-confrontational and 
not directed at any third party.’167 
 
Yoshihara and Holmes have argued that by depicting itself in this way, as an ‘inherently 
defensive power, China has set a standard for its behaviour at sea.’168  It might 
therefore be deduced that the PLAN is being optimised for the exercise of soft, or at 
least smart, power in its growing role on the world stage. 
 
In a 2007 assessment, the US Office of Naval Intelligence stated that the Chinese 
Navy’s interaction with foreign countries had four major components: high level 
exchanges, ship visits, functional exchanges and arms sales and purchases.169  Of 
note, the assessment made no mention of either bilateral or multilateral exercises, a 
strategy which China had been already pursuing for a number of years.  The Chinese 
themselves have described how: 
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Maritime joint exercises have been held on a regular basis.  In 2003 China ran a joint 
maritime search and rescue exercise with Pakistan, the first ever between China and a 
foreign country.  During mutual port calls and other activities the PLAN has run bilateral 
or multilateral joint maritime exercises with the navies of India, France, the UK, 
Australia, Thailand, the US, Russia, Japan, New Zealand and Vietnam…. In 2007 and 
2009 the PLAN participated in multilateral joint maritime exercises organised by the 
Pakistan Navy.  In 2007 the PLAN took part in the joint maritime exercise held in 
Singaporean waters within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.  In 
2010 China held a joint maritime training [sic] with Thailand, the first ever between China 




As American forays into Africa had been led by its Navy so to, as China began to 
exercise its military forces with foreign states, did the PLAN take the van.  Chapter 1 
discussed the relative ease with which naval forces can be turned to low level, symbolic 
engagement; to achieve the same results with their air and land counterparts requires a 
far greater expression of political will by government.  As the Chinese Information Office 
stated above, the PLAN first exercised with Pakistan in 2003, but it was not until 2007 
that the first joint military training on land was carried out.171 
 
The PLAN’s sudden appearance on the world stage after decades of virtual introversion 
did not go unnoticed and, indeed, it triggered some concerns amongst other regional 
actors.  Yoshihara and Holmes have suggested that it made India ‘alarmist, at times 
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almost panicky.’172 How China then adjusted its strategy to meet regional concerns is 
worthy of analysis.  It is interesting to note how the type of bilateral exercise conducted 
could in itself indicate the relative warmth of any particular relationship.  Geoffrey Till 
points out that, ‘in contrast to its exercises with other navies, Sino-Indian exercises 
have so far been largely limited to search and rescue operations.’173 SAR, of course, is 
a low rung on the naval co-operation ladder, but a rung nonetheless.  
 
A similarly low rung, but one which has historically been an effective means of gaining 
and exerting influence, is the port visit.  During the Cold War and in the early 1990s, 
Chinese ships rarely visited foreign ports and when they did, the visits were exclusively 
confined to the Asia-Pacific region.  In the period 1985-97 the PLAN made just fourteen 
foreign visits.  In contrast, in the decade after 1997 the rate of ceremonial visits 
increased three-fold and 46 were made, including six to North America, five to South 
America, eight to Europe and three to African ports.174 It was the beginning of an 
unprecedented outreach strategy. 
 
In its analysis, the US Office of Naval Intelligence identified 1997 as the watershed for 
the Chinese Navy.  Its increased activity starting that year and its use as a means of 
furthering national interests abroad was part of a deliberate attempt to underline the 
PRC’s rise to greatness: 
  
The first year China dispatched two task forces in a single year was 1997. It was also 
the first time a PLAN vessel visited South America. Indeed, this was the first time a 
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PLAN vessel visited anywhere outside the Asia-Pacific region. The growing quantity and 
scope of PLAN voyages beginning in 1997 illustrates the increased foreign-policy role 
China assigns to its naval fleet. During those 1997 voyages, the PLAN assigned 
precedence to showing the Chinese flag abroad at the expense of Chinese military 
readiness. The overriding goal was to illustrate to the people of those countries, 
including overseas Chinese who visited the ships in huge numbers during port calls, that 
China and the PLAN were both open to the outside world and no longer just a backward 
coastal navy. Significantly, China simultaneously deployed its only two relatively 
capable, reasonably modern warships, the two new Luhu-class guided-missile 
destroyers, away from Chinese waters. The readiness of these ships to participate in 
some potential crisis, such as in the Taiwan Strait, was effectively subordinated to the 





Ken Booth’s prestige thesis, discussed in Chapter 2, had found a ready home in 
modern China. 
 
The People’s Republic of China may have been relatively late in coming to a realisation 
of the value of diplomatic port visits by its ships, but it did learn from the practice of 
others.  Its broad objectives for ship visits (reported as being improving political and 
military relations between China and host country, learning lessons that may prove 
useful in the PLAN’s modernization, and improving relations at the person to person 
level176) may again differ from the West’s, but the format for a visit is remarkably similar 
to those made by the more experienced world navies: 
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The Navy has also drawn the attention of local Chinese, such as during their visit to 
Seattle in 2000 where hundreds of overseas Chinese adults and students, as well as 
100 children from a local Chinese-language school, participated in the open house. 
PLAN sailors have engaged in soccer and basketball competition with the host country’s 
sailors. Meanwhile, the host country usually provides some type of honor ceremony and 
provides local entertainment for the crew, such as when Malaysian native tribes 
performed traditional singing and dance. During the training ship Zhenghe’s visit to 
Hawaii in 1989, the local Chinese-American community in Honolulu held several special 




Indian analysts were amongst the first to perceive a change of tack in China’s use of 
the PLAN.  A New Delhi analysis from 2001 noted that ‘port calls to various countries 
signified the active role of the PLAN in the making of China’s foreign policy.’ 178  It also 
noted that when compared to earlier periods when the Chinese Navy was effectively a 
coastal defence force rather than an outward-looking blue-water navy, its visits had 
become showcases for China’s long reach.  In particular, it asserted that China was 
exhibiting the ‘political and strategic resolve to contain its adversaries’,179 through its 
deployments.  Given that India had been at war with China as recently as 1962 and the 
two countries had been regional competitors since, it might consider itself one of the 
‘adversaries’ to be contained.  
 
Beyond ship visits and the occasional exercise, China also began to develop strategic 
dialogues with other actors that it perceived to be important in shaping the international 
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security situation, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and Japan.180 
The PLAN conducted joint patrols of the Beibu Gulf / Gulf of Tonkin with the 
Vietnamese Navy and, of course, it contributed to the multi-national counter-piracy 
effort off the Horn of Africa. China itself claimed to take ‘a proactive and open attitude to 
international escort cooperation’ and by 2010 had established mechanisms for regular 
intelligence sharing with several countries and international organisations, including the 
EU, NATO, Russia, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and Japan.181 As the US 
Center for Naval Analyses pointed out, ‘China’s footprint is no longer confined to the 
Asia Pacific region.’182   
 
The PLAN foray into Horn of Africa counter-piracy operations, commencing in 2008, is 
perhaps the best example of this extended footprint.  The destroyers Wuhan and 
Haikou, accompanied by their replenishment vessel Weishan Hu, were their country’s 
first extra-regional deploying vessels and were able to remain on task for three months; 
many more similar deployments followed.183  As well as according the PLAN an 
opportunity to challenge itself at range from its home bases and to operate alongside 
other navies, the counter-piracy effort significantly altered how other powers viewed 
China.  As one Indian commentator wrote, ‘the Chinese Navy is here to stay for a long 
time to come – piracy or no piracy.’184 A deeper, more insightful analysis, which 
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identified a number of domestic, regional and international stakeholders in China’s 
naval counter-piracy strategy, was offered by the Dutch academics Susanne Kamerling 
and Frans-Paul van der Putten: 
 
The Chinese government has multiple interests at stake when it comes to addressing 
Somali piracy. 
 
1. The presence of the Chinese navy signals to the rest of the word that China 
is among the leading actors regarding maritime security in the Indian 
Ocean. 
2. It contributes to Beijing’s ability to protect its interests in a region of great 
economic importance. Both shipping lanes and the countries of the Middle 
East and Africa play a major part in China’s external economic relations. 
3. Beijing has shown its own population that it is capable of protecting Chinese 
property and lives from piracy attacks, and that the Chinese vessels need 
not rely on foreign navies for their protection.  In other words, this shows 
that China is a great power and the leadership of the CCP [Chinese 
Communist Party] is taking up this responsibility. 
4. The counter-piracy mission serves to underscore the fact that China – not 
the Taiwanese government – protects Taiwan’s shipping interests.  Thus the 
Chinese claim that Taiwan is part of China is bolstered.
185
 
   
China appears to be self-satisfied with its naval outreach strategy, openly lauding its 
own achievements.  Its 2010 Defence White Paper declared that ‘the Chinese Navy has 
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dispatched, in seven sorties, 18 ship deployments, 16 helicopters, and 490 Special 
Operation Force (SOF) soldiers on escort missions.  Through accompanying escort, 
area patrol, and onboard escort, the Chinese Navy has provided protection for 3139 
ships sailing under Chinese and foreign flags, rescued 29 ships from pirate attacks, and 
recovered nine ships released from captivity.’186 It was telling its own people and the 
world of its contribution to the international community. 
 
China had also taken note of the reputational gains to be made by fielding a credible 
ability to contribute to humanitarian operations.  Following the West’s, and India’s, 
response to the 2006 Asian tsunami, which the PLAN had been largely powerless to 
mirror, it launched a new hospital ship called the Peace Ark. 187  Entry into the 
humanitarian assistance ‘club’ was a shrewd move for a country with a rather dubious 
record of human rights.  As Holmes and Yoshihara have written: 
 
China’s soft power strategy seems based on the premise that a nation can store up 
international good will by supplying ‘international public goods’ like maritime security, 




Though the PLAN may have been optimised for soft power in pursuit of its diplomatic 
role, it did not ignore the harder end of the spectrum.  The PRC’s troubled relationship 
with Taiwan has already been discussed and one commentator, unconvinced by 
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China’s new ‘soft’ approach, went so far as to suggest that the PLAN ‘now seems 
almost wholly, even obsessively, focussed on the Taiwan problem… These factors 
already seem to be seriously intruding into Chinese strategic thinking.’189  However, an 
effective combination of soft and hard power is not impossible to achieve and the PRC 
was either potentially very adept at balancing both, or content to permit constructive 
debate over the future direction of its sea power.  
 
Leszek Buszynski expanded on that hypothesis, identifying causal relationships 
between the American support for Taiwan, and China’s handling of its territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea:   
 
From a Chinese perspective, the US naval presence in the western Pacific prevents the 
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland and emboldens the ASEAN claimants in the 




The South China, East China and Yellow Seas are rife with maritime territorial disputes 
involving the PRC, the Republic of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei 
and Indonesia.  Over the past several decades China has been accused of bullying 
behaviour in the region,191 and it has been suggested that it has also attempted to ‘alter 
international norms concerning freedom of navigation for military purposes and to roll 
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back the balance of coastal state and international rights in coastal zones that were 
negotiated in the development of UNCLOS.’192  However, Lyle Goldstein of the US 
Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute suggested that there had been 
much rhetoric or ‘bluster’ about the seas from the PRC:   
 
A stereotypical view of the Chinese Navy in the West and especially in the United States 
is that of a group inclined, whether by professional disposition, nationalist inclination, or 
bureaucratic self interest to favour aggressive naval expansion.  However, the [Chinese 
language] sources illustrate a considerably more complex picture. There are hawkish 
views on the South China Sea, to be sure, but these views exist alongside more 




That the disparate positions, the ‘hawkish’ and the ‘enlightened’ can exist concurrently 
is not necessarily an indication of weakness or uncertainty in the PLAN leadership’s 
strategy; it may merely be an indication of ongoing refinement. Naval diplomacy can 
exist on many levels simultaneously and, by doing so, offers choice and flexibility to the 
wielder.   
 
At the more aggressive end of the scale, China built quite a track record.  In 1995, for 
example, it seized the appropriately named Mischief Reef, an islet located 130 miles 
from the Philippines' Palawan Island and adjacent to the Palawan Strait, one of the 
region’s key sea-lanes. Despite repeated Filipino requests to withdraw, China continued 
its military build up in the reef and its naval forces there would be well positioned to be 
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used to disrupt passing maritime traffic.194 In 2004 there was posturing between China 
and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku (Japanese) / Diaoyu (Chinese) Islands 
in the East China Sea, including the deployment of a PLAN Han class nuclear 
submarine in the area. 195 In 2005 Vietnam claimed that China had started to seize its 
fishing boats in the South China Sea and detain their crews,196 escalating to a total of 
17 boats and 21 fishermen detained in 2009 alone.197 Finally, in 2010, China objected 
to a planned U.S.-South Korean military exercise in the Yellow Sea, which had been 
organized as a response to North Korea's sinking of the South Korean Cheonan. 
Beijing criticized the participation of the USS George Washington, arguing that 
deploying an aircraft carrier to the Yellow Sea would be provocative, even though the 
carrier had conducted operations in the Yellow Sea earlier in the year without incident.  
 
The challenge turned out to be a significant diplomatic victory for China, because 
though the exercise went ahead George Washington did not participate.198 This could 
be viewed as a failure of naval diplomacy by the US; it was later explained to the US 
Congress that the Navy, ‘refrained from staging exercises in the Yellow Sea area,’ 
because of Chinese ‘sensitivity.’199   
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Without doubt, as the post-Cold War period progressed, the South China Sea became 
a ‘focal point for US-China rivalry in the western Pacific’,200 which the USNS Impeccable 
‘incident’ of 2009 ably demonstrated.  Impeccable, a tactical auxiliary general ocean 
surveillance (TAGOS) vessel, was challenged by a PLAN warship and five Chinese 
‘civilian’ ships approximately 120km south of Hainan Island, which housed a PLAN 
base.201 China claimed that Impeccable’s presence in its exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) had been a violation of domestic and international law.202  Though the 
surveillance of the sea area was galling to Beijing, its legal objection was weak, for ‘in 
short, nothing in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) changes 
the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in the exclusive 
economic zone’.203 The Chinese ships (a government fisheries patrol vessel, a maritime 
surveillance service vessel of the State Oceanographic Administration, and two small 
fishing trawlers) attempted to stop Impeccable’s data gathering. The fishing vessels 
manoeuvred to within eight metres of Impeccable and people on board the trawlers 
used a grappling hook to try to snag Impeccable’s towed cable and its related acoustic 
equipment.  The vessels involved show that naval diplomacy, even that by a state, need 
not be limited to naval forces. ‘Impeccable left the scene in order to reduce immediate 
tensions but returned to the exact location several days later in the company of an 
American warship, USS Chung Hoon’.204  
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DEDUCTIONS 
 
This chapter has pointed out that the early post-Cold War period was one of rapid 
change in the global order and the resultant security situation was far from stable.  
Whilst there was a notable decrease in inter-state conflict there was a corresponding 
increase in what Muzaffer Yilmaz described as non- or intra-state ‘ethnopolitical 
conflict.’205 The Cold War victors were quick to reap the peace dividend, but ‘...by not 
paying sufficient attention to places most people would characterise as obscure – 
Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan – the local has turned global.’206  However, the 
most capable navies were well suited to respond to the emerging order for, as James 
George wrote, only they regularly operated throughout the world and ‘thus could 
probably be the only force available for ongoing, sustained deterrence – as it has been 
for virtually all crises.’207  
 
The specific examples of naval diplomacy cited have shown that there is little doubt that 
any or all of the models identified in Chapter 2 could be applied to the post-Cold War 
years.  As the eastern bloc fragmented seapower was used to garner influence and 
build amity with new partners.  As stringent nationalism took hold in some quarters, 
naval forces both coerced and deterred. Opportunists, state and non-state, made use of 
the sea for prestige and established powers, even the hegemonic, increased their 
efforts to convince and persuade.  Coalition or alliance building was a feature 
throughout, as was the inescapable truth of the value of forward presence.  Rising 
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powers, in particular India and China, have found naval expansion to be a necessary 
accompaniment to economic growth and global influence – ever was the case. 
 
However, as has been alluded to, the existing models have not been sufficient to 
understand every nuance of naval diplomacy since 1991.  Nor have the enduring 
themes, derived from the writing which provided the bedrock for the models, completely 
withstood scrutiny.  The actions in the Adriatic and the containment of Iraq in the 1990s, 
for instance, were taken under mandate of the United Nations.  Non-state actors such 
as the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah and the organisers of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla have 
challenged the assumption that naval diplomacy is purely a state-centric business.  
America’s flexing of muscles in the Taiwan Strait was as much a message to its 
domestic audience and Taiwan as it was to mainland China; similarly, North Korea’s 
securitization and Russia’s gain from US miscalculation of Black Sea relationships 
undermine the existing models’ dogma that naval diplomacy is an interaction between 
two actors, an assailant and a victim.  Nonetheless, one enduring theme does hold true: 
at its core every conscious application of seapower to communicate political intent 
assumes rationality on the part of the audience at the receiving end. 
 
This thesis contends that a brief qualitative analysis of post-Cold War naval diplomacy 
has uncovered some previously overlooked principles.  Naval diplomacy can support an 
internationalist, liberal agenda; it can target multiple audiences simultaneously and it 
can be a tool for the non-state actor.  Levels of naval co-operation and interoperability 
can indicate the health of an international relationship, yet even at its simplest level it 
can also provide a politically acceptable degree of diplomatic engagement.  These 
principles can be taken forward into the development of a new, 21st century model for 
naval diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TOWARDS A FOUNDATIONAL MODEL FOR POST-COLD WAR NAVAL 
DIPLOMACY 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the existing understanding of naval diplomacy, 
derived from the writings of historians and strategists from the nineteenth century to the 
end of the twentieth, can be plainly expressed.  To reiterate, the topic is generally seen 
from a realist international relations perspective, it tends to be state-centric and it 
assumes binary, mechanistic relationships which presuppose rational cognitive decision 
making processes on the parts of both instigator and recipient.   
 
However, after building a compendium of over 500 examples of naval diplomacy in 
action, and by conducting a series of selected case studies, this thesis moves to 
challenge the accepted wisdom.  Naval diplomacy can support either realist or liberal IR 
agendas; it is more often used by states than by non-state actors, but the latter are 
more active than might be supposed; and, it is rarely limited to just two parties but 
commonly involves multiple actors and stakeholders in the relationship.  Of equal 
importance naval diplomacy is more likely to be conducted on a regional basis than on 
a global scale; the actors involved range from military navies and coast guards to 
commercial organisations, NGOs and terrorist or criminal groups of all sizes; 
quantitatively it is far more prevalent in the pursuit of amity than enmity; there are 
varying degrees of engagement and disengagement, and the act of not doing or 
stopping to do something that is expected (the null hypothesis), can be as important as 
its more visible opposite.  In short, evidence has been gathered to show that there are 
sufficient differences between theory and reality, differences which continue to grow as 
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the international system evolves, to prompt the construction of a new model of naval 
diplomacy. 
 
A Proposed Alternative 
 
Before attempting to construct a new model from the qualitative and quantitative data 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4, it would be useful to briefly restate the role of models in 
political science.  Models are simple ‘representations of reality’1 which can be used to 
investigate causal mechanisms, to generate comparative statics and to understand the 
conditions under which certain outcomes might be expected.2  Clarke and Primo identify 
four types of model which can serve different roles – foundational, organizational, 
exploratory and predictive.3  The basic models which have already been derived in 
Chapter 2 from the writings of naval historians and theorists are ‘foundational’; that is, 
they take disparate generalisations of known facts under a single framework and 
provide an overall insight into the topic.4 In order to maintain a consistent approach, the 
same foundational methodology is applied in this Chapter. The research can thus serve 
as a basis for further model building5 and provide a framework ‘flexible enough to be 
adapted to answer different kinds of questions’6 of naval diplomacy in the post-Cold 
War period and beyond.     
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Why? – Purpose in Post-Cold War Naval Diplomacy  
 
In its most straightforward form, an alternative model for twenty-first century naval 
diplomacy should begin by posing a fundamental question.  What is the purpose behind 
any particular scenario, interaction or relationship being considered?   In the realist 
tradition the purpose of diplomacy is to be a means by which to ‘act in accordance with 
the logic said to inhere in an anarchical system of power distributed between self-
interested, self-helping, power-maximisers.’7  It could equally be applied to revisionist 
actors, determined to alter the balance of power, or to those more interested in the 
maintenance of the status quo.8 In short, it is about competitive advantage. 
 
However, this thesis contends that diplomacy is more specific than simply being a 
means to further self-interest.  It is a multi-directional communicative tool and naval 
diplomacy, a niche available to some, is the use of naval and maritime assets as 
communicative instruments in international power relationships to further the interests 
of one or more of the actors involved.  The difference may be subtle, but it is there.  The 
thesis also contends that a liberal interpretation can also be applied to naval diplomacy, 
taking into account the presence and influence of international institutions and law, 
alliances and coalitions, non-state actors and interdependent global trade – all of which 
shape and constrain world politics. 
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Purpose in naval diplomacy, therefore, is always to communicate a message, whether 
that be explicitly or implicitly, to a single recipient or many.  To understand purpose, the 
‘why’ of a situation, an analyst must pose a simple triad of inter-relating questions:  
What is being communicated?  Who is involved? And, How is it manifested?  Each 
question depends on the others; for example, the message to be passed must surely 
depend on the motivations of the actors involved, and the method of delivery will 
depend on the means available – North Korea, for instance, will not attempt to coerce 
the South by positioning an aircraft carrier off its coast because it does not possess that 
capability.  Similarly, when considering how to garner prestige with a potential ally, the 
United States may well determine to deploy an aircraft carrier on a goodwill visit 
because it does possess one. 
 
Figure 5.1 below shows the basic elements of a foundational model of 21st century 
naval diplomacy.  Purpose sits firmly at the centre with the triad of What, Who and How 
bounding it.  Each question can be explored further according to its constituent parts to 
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What? – Basic Communication Theory 
 
In Chapter 1 a proposal was presented which argued that diplomacy was, in essence, a 
communications process which sought to further the interests of an international actor.  
Naval diplomacy was merely a subset of that construct and was likely to be used by 
maritime actors with the appropriate means at their disposal. To develop that argument 
further a brief detour into basic communication theory is required. 
 
During the Cold War a model of communication was developed which became known 
as the ‘message influence model’. The model was based on Shannon and Weaver’s 
The Mathematical Theory of Communication, published in 1949, and was originally 
devised to explain telephony.  However, the model was found to be instructive in other 
fields and came to be developed and applied to describe all human communication.9  
According to the message influence model, a source will transmit a message and the 












Figure 5.2.  A Simplified Representation of the Message Influence Model (From 
Tatham10) 
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 As can be seen from Figure 5.2, message influence is highly simplistic and has been 
criticised as ‘an outdated, twentieth century […] model that is no longer effective in the 
complex global war of ideas.’11 It assumes that there is no outside interference to the 
message being sent, that the audience is always a passive recipient and it offers no 
contextualisation.  It also indirectly suggests that communication only occurs when a 
message is being deliberately transmitted; in reality, of course, communication is a 
constant and often subconscious process taking place through ongoing actions, deeds 
and words.12  Nonetheless, the model does provide a useful introduction to the 
communications process and, this thesis argues, is remarkably consistent with the 
contemporaneously-produced concepts of naval diplomacy developed in the Cold War.  
That is, the ‘assailant’ (source) uses naval means (the message) to reach the ‘victim’ 
(the audience). 
 
Writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, Paul Kecskemeti produced a 
significant article on communication and influence.  Though admittedly writing about the 
experiences of totalitarian propaganda during the war, Kecskemeti’s work nevertheless 
is transferable to other spheres and ages and says much about the approach of 
‘forcing’ a message to an audience through repetition: 
 
 Public opinion control is the suggestive effect of constantly repeated stimuli: what you 
 say often enough will in the end come to be believed.
13
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The implication of this assertion for naval diplomacy is that a steady drumbeat of 
preventive deployments, presence in areas and regions deemed to be of national 
interest, and ongoing demonstrations of credibility and capability could lead to a general 
acceptance of the instigator’s ‘message.’ The global activities of the world’s most 
powerful navies, from persistent presence in the Arabian Gulf to the strategic 
deterrence posture suggested by the USN’s Project 60 in the early 1970s supports this 
premise – the world has come to believe that the Western naval powers dominate the 
seas because that is the image that has been presented to them over decades.  To 
challenge that belief an actor is faced with a difficult task, having to overcome both 
reality and perception.  
 
However, towards the end of the twentieth century the message influence model was 
overtaken in prominence as researchers developed alternative perspectives on 
complex, multiple audience communications which better reflected the ‘real’ world. In an 
influential work written in the 1990s, Niklas Luhmann described communication as a 
complex system requiring the interpretation of actions, thoughts, motivations and 
intentions.14  A decade later researchers at the Arizona State University Consortium for 
Strategic Communication built on Luhmann’s work and introduced the ‘pragmatic 
complexity’ model.  Pragmatic complexity adopted a systems approach, in which the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts, where it is not necessary to have an 
independent source or audience, and where actors are ‘locked into a relationship of 
simultaneous, mutual interdependence.’15  In addition, it might be assumed to take into 
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account the difficult question of who controls the medium being used: it is striking how 
the same event can be described very differently in different parts of the global media, 
and striking how much faith respective audiences put into their source of choice.  There 
is no doubt, for example, that the 2006 sinking of the Israeli ship Hanit was portrayed 
very differently on Hezbollah’s TV channel Al Manar than in the Israeli news media. 
 
Pragmatic complexity therefore attempts to do something which message influence 
does not – it attempts to interpret reality. Clearly, in such a model uncertainty and 
ambiguity may develop which could either assist or hinder the parties involved in the 
messaging process.  The pitfalls of uncertainty are self-evident, but Jonsson and Hall 
have commented on the potential benefits of ambiguity in diplomatic communication, 
ambiguity which may allow the originator to claim that the interpretation of a message 
was not that which was meant:16     
 
Ambiguity is often prompted by the need to take multiple audiences into account.  
Explicit and unambiguous signalling, while desirable vis-à-vis one category of receivers, 
might have disastrous effects on the sender’s relations with another category of 





The lessons for naval diplomacy are worthy of consideration.  The means in use may 
be ambiguous; a flotilla’s deployment may be interpreted very differently in the minds of 
the parties involved.  To the deployer it may be a message of friendship, to the 
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neighbour it could be seen as a bid for prestige, to the primary target – or indeed to 
another state not intended as a target at all – it could be considered a threat. Similarly, 
any means of communication, including naval diplomacy, could be temporal.  In a 2011 
PhD thesis by Steve Tatham, the concept of the ‘communications moment’ was 
discussed and it was determined to be that point in time at which a message is 
exchanged.  The central idea being proposed was that communication ‘is highly time 
and condition sensitive.  Messages that work one week may not work the next.’18 The 
timing of naval deployments therefore, must be cognisant of other factors, as the case 
study of Exercise Sea Breeze in the Black Sea discussed in Chapter 4 demonstrated.  
In that example the purpose of the exercise was ambiguous – to the US it was a 
bilateral endeavour aimed at friendship, to Russia it was a NATO encroachment into its 
area of influence and interest, to Ukraine it was a stepping stone to potential 
membership of the Western Alliance.  In addition its timing and location were ill-
considered – Russo-Ukraine relations were at a low ebb, a BLACKSEAFOR exercise 
(involving Russia) was about to start, and Sea Breeze was centred on the ethnically 
Russian area of the Crimea, rather than on the less controversial port of Odessa as it 
had been in previous years.19 
 
Finally, there is the prospect of deliberate disinformation in communication and 
messaging, in which one party’s intent is portrayed as something else to the target 
audience.  This could be a tactic by the source of the message in order to hide its true 
intentions, or it could potentially be a calculated misportrayal by the media, the target 
audience itself or a third party.  As Holmes, Winner and Toshihara noted when 
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discussing the challenges facing the ascendancy of the Indian Navy in the twenty-first 
century, India’s well considered strategy of benign, non-intrusive outreach to fellow 
maritime nations in the Indian Ocean could be impeded by misperception or 
disinformation.20  Who might be the instigator of such disinformation could be deduced 
by an appreciation of the winners and losers of the tactic; an analysis of all of the 
stakeholders involved and not just the primary participants would therefore be 
warranted. 
 
When considering naval diplomacy, therefore, the question of ‘what’ relates directly to 
‘why’, the purpose, and it proves to be neither straightforward nor consistent over time.  
When applying the findings of Chapters 3 and 4, naval diplomacy should be viewed as 
messaging either degrees of amity or enmity or both, and its purpose determined in 
terms of the effects that those chapters identified: coercion, deterrence, picture building, 
prestige, reassurance, co-operation, attraction or assistance – or a combination of any 
number of them.  There might also be unintended consequences or systemic side 
effects of diplomatic activity at sea which could be visible to a participant or observer 
but, equally, might be hidden or unrecognised at the time.   
 
Who? – Basic Stakeholder Theory 
 
The next question in the simplified proposed model is ‘who’ is involved.  Chapter 2 
discussed how existing realist models assume the presence of a rational actor at the 
heart of the decision-making process.  However, it also discussed how the reality is 
often more complex and that there will inevitably be a number of actors consciously or 
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unconsciously party to any given situation.  These stakeholders must be taken into 
account in any analysis; stakeholder theory, therefore, should be understood.   
 
Stakeholder theory originated in the world of business studies.  In what is commonly 
seen to be a landmark publication,21 R Edward Freeman challenged the accepted view 
of the commercial corporation.  In his Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, 
Freeman questioned the simplistic ‘production view of the firm’ which placed 
corporations in the centre of the process of turning raw resources from suppliers into 










   
 
Figure 5.3. The Production View of the Firm (From Freeman)22. 
 
 
As can be seen, the production view of business is not dissimilar to the simple message 
influence model of basic communication theory, or the assailant-victim model of naval 
diplomacy, and many recognisable shortcomings are shared.  However, the theory, 
though useful in forging understanding, simply does not reflect reality and Freeman 
proposed an alternative perspective which attempted to describe how businesses really 
work and the interconnections between the active and passive actors involved.  He 
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developed the concept of business ‘stakeholders’, whom he defined as the ‘wide range 
of groups who can affect or are affected by a corporation.’23  Examples of such groups 
included owners, government, political groups, the financial community, suppliers, 
activists, customers, unions, employees, trade association and competitors.24  They can 




















Figure 5.4. Stakeholder Mapping (From Freeman)25. 
 
It is clear that stakeholder theory has wider applicability than just the world of business, 
and since Freeman’s work first appeared in 1984 it has been used in economics, 
political science, education and the environmental sciences.26  As the World Bank 
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suggests, stakeholder theory has wide applicability and is relevant to not only to the 
subject for which it was derived, but also to international relations.27  Brian Hocking has 
taken the IR point further, proposing that although the bilateral model of international 
discourse may still survive, it is increasingly challenged in the globalised world by the 
myriad of interconnected interests: 
  
 The older state-based form of diplomacy exists alongside emergent forms, one label for 




This is an argument that could be compared directly with that made in Chapter 2, which 
suggested that in the maritime domain modern, or industrial, naval forces might have to 
co-exist with and operate alongside the post-modern navies of states which fully 
embrace globalisation.  It is another example of shifting emphasis in the post-Cold War 
global order; the changes are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 
 
Of course, stakeholder theory has not been without its critics.  It has, variously, been 
accused of impracticality because of its excessively broad definition of stakeholders 
over whom an organisation may have little or no control,29 and of undermining the basic 
principles of capitalism in favour of ‘ethical values’.30  Orts and Strudler argued that 
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though stakeholder theory might ‘prove useful in identifying interests’, for other 
purposes its claims were ‘overblown’.31 However, for the purposes of this research its 
strength, that of identifying interests, is the most important factor.  As the analyses of 
actors in Chapter 3 showed, there are rarely (if ever) just two parties involved in naval 
diplomacy and a credible mechanism to understand the roles played by other direct or 
indirect participants would be useful.  Adapting Freeman’s definition, one might assume 
the stakeholders in this context to be the wide range of actors who can affect or be 
affected by naval diplomacy. Self-evidently, not all stakeholders in any given situation 
carry equal weighting – there will inevitably be a hierarchy of influence and significance.  
 
Building on Freeman’s map Lynda Bourne and David Walker devised what has become 
known as the ‘stakeholder circle’, showing not only the actors who affect or could be 










Figure 5.5  Stakeholder Circle (From Bourne and Weaver)32 
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It is apparent from the diagram that Bourne and Walker continued to place the firm or 
corporation at the centre of their ‘map’ but they situated the other stakeholders in one of 
three expanding, concentric circles representing the firm’s internal actors, external 
directly affected actors and then those who may be indirectly affected; influence was 
deemed to decrease as distance from the centre increased.  Put another way, 
functional proximity to the rational decision-making body was deemed to be an indicator 
of influence over it.  The three groups might also be called primary, secondary and 
tertiary stakeholders. 
 
Though the term had not been coined at the time, a form of stakeholder analysis was 
conducted in the classic 1969 article on the Cuban Missile Crisis by Graham Allison.  
Allison challenged the assumption of a single ‘rational, unitary decision-maker’ in 
government.33  Instead he suggested alternatives to the rational actor model, which 
acknowledged ‘the fact that a government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, 
loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own.’34 He also pointed out 
that even then leaders do not sit on top of ‘monolithic groups’ but are subject to 
bureaucratic politics and competitive bargaining.35  These could be considered the 
internal stakeholders in Bourne and Walker’s circle.  Allison delved deeply into the 
make-up of government machinery to avoid oversimplification; the same level of 
analysis can, of course, be applied to non-government and non-state stakeholders in 
other conflict or diplomatic, communicative engagement scenarios. 
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When stakeholder theory has been applied directly to a post-Cold War military context, 
however, it has predominantly been within a discussion of morality and ethics.  For 
example, Geoffrey Murat, writing in a US Marine Corps Press publication in 2013, 
applied stakeholder theory to counter insurgency, identifying the local population, non-
governmental organisations and the media as stakeholders in a conflict, and then 
encouraging active troops to display empathy the various audiences.36   
 
As with the application of basic communication theory, the general principle of 
determining the primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders in any given 
communications moment is reasonable and useful in the study of naval diplomacy.  If, 
as has been claimed, power and influence can result from ‘connectedness’,37 then 
analysis of connectivity must be able to provide a valuable insight into the nature and 
effectiveness of that power.  In terms of naval diplomacy, understanding which actors 
are involved, their motivations and their relationship to each other can result in better 
application or, alternatively, circumvention of the means.   
 
Chapter 4’s study of naval activity in the Adriatic in the 1990s is an interesting case of 
multiple actors with various motivations operating singly, in concert or both at different 
times.  Mapping their ‘connectedness’ could provide insight into purpose.  In that case 
study it might be reasonably assumed that one of the primary stakeholders was the 
Serbian state – but who were the others?  Though fourteen countries eventually 
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contributed maritime forces to the Adriatic, most did so intermittently as members of 
supra-state organisations such as NATO and the WEU who in turn were operating 
under the remit of the United Nations.38  It could be argued, therefore, that international 
organisations, particularly multi-national military alliances, were the primary 
stakeholders facing Serbia and that their constituent members were influential but 
secondary stakeholders.  Motivations varied but the contributing states were arguably 
participating as much to prove their commitment as trusted allies and partners (and, for 
their domestic audience’s consumption, as responsible members of the international 
community) as they were to simply counter Serbian aggression in the Balkans and 
enforce UNSCRs.  It was, in effect, a low risk strategy of demonstrating ‘action’.  Other 
former Yugoslavian states were also secondary or tertiary stakeholders affected by the 
activity at sea.  Some other non-participating but interested third party states, such as 
Russia, were also tertiary stakeholders.  Serb sponsored or affiliated groups in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, though not directly involved on the maritime front, were 
certainly affected by the blockade and should be considered.  Domestic and 
international audiences were clearly also part of the mix, as were those commercial 
organisations with an interest in seaborne trade with the former Yugoslavia or in the 
Adriatic region more generally.  Figure 5.6 below is a simple attempt to place these 
actors in a stakeholder circle. 
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Figure 5.6  Adriatic 1990s Stakeholder Circle 
 
In developing a twenty-first century model of naval diplomacy, therefore, primary, 
secondary and tertiary audiences and their interconnectedness should be included, 
acknowledging, however, that such mapping is always a subjective and inaccurate 
science.  Actors may include the direct participants but also the international, regional 
or domestic communities, including alliances and international institutions, or even a 
different part of the initiator’s own government, along with multi-national corporations 
and non-governmental organisations who may sit in one or more audience categories 
depending on the scenario. 
 
Approached this way, it is apparent that the ability to contribute to, to affect or to be 
affected by naval diplomacy is not necessarily a function of either scale or type of actor 
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an opportunity (or threat) for regional, adjacent force projection, coastal or even token 
navies and coast guards, and a range of supra-state or non-state actors and audiences 
from NGOs to commercial corporations and local populations.  
 
How? – Ways and Means 
 
Finally, the third leg of the triad of the proposed model is ‘how’ naval diplomacy is 
manifested. Writing in 2011, J.J. Widen stated that ‘to categorise different kinds of 
operations in naval diplomacy, that is functional definitions, is not sufficient.’39 The 
implication is that by describing naval diplomacy in terms of its ways, the context may 
be missed and the strategic argument consequently lost.40 However, although 
categorisation by ways and means may not be ‘sufficient’, it is an essential part of the 
whole. Naval historians have produced volumes on the tactical employment of 
seapower; those tactical activities are indispensible pixels in the greater, strategic 
picture.   
 
Christian Le Mière questioned whether maritime diplomatic events could ever be 
classified beyond groupings based on underlying purpose, as each incident appears 
unique. However, he did go on to categorise some tactical methods into the kinetic (ie., 
those involving physical force) and the non-kinetic, suggesting that the degree of force 
employed gave a useful guide to intentions;41 this approach is in keeping with Cable’s, 
whose  definitive, purposeful, catalytic and expressive modes referred, of course, to the 
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use or threat of force.  From this perspective, therefore, explicitness of message would 
appear to be hinged in part on explicitness of method. 
 
Le Mière’s question of whether functional classification is possible can be addressed by 
the analysis of empirical evidence.  It is true to state that of the examples of naval 
diplomacy cited in the survey in Chapter 3 few, if any, share identical tactics. 
Nevertheless, they can be grouped by their general ways and means.  One potential 
approach to do this could be to use the method of categorising activity according to the 
widely accepted (in official doctrine and academic literature) attributes which grant 
navies particular advantage. For instance, the British doctrinal attributes of access, 
mobility, lift, reach, versatility, poise, resilience  and leverage are still lauded as the 
‘ways’ in which the Royal Navy achieves its ‘ends’.42  
 
However, as Chapter 1 stated, those attributes have largely gone unchallenged and 
may not be an appropriate prism through which to view the contemporary maritime 
operating environment.  The trait of versatility, for example, arguably requires breadth of 
capability and is therefore questionable when applied to small and token navies or 
coast guards.  The US Navy is certainly versatile but the navy of, say, the Republic of 
Ireland, with its rather limited focus on patrolling its territorial seas and immediate area 
of ‘jurisdiction’, 43 could not be viewed as particularly flexible in its offer of political 
choice to the Irish state.  By comparison, the Irish Army, though small, has operated 
nationally and globally in peace support missions since 1958 and is therefore more of a 
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diplomatic tool.44  Perhaps relative versatility amongst and between maritime, land and 
air armed forces is partly a function of scale, and therefore the assumption of particular 
advantage may only be valid for larger, multi-role navies with extra-regional reach.   
 
Similarly, technological change could bring into doubt the longevity of other ‘enduring’ 
attributes.  The development of anti-access, area-denial capabilities (A2AD),45 for 
instance, might challenge the notion of poise, as Iran demonstrated in early 2015 with 
its very public demonstration of a missile attack against a mock-up of a US aircraft 
carrier.46 This is perhaps an outlet for a different form of naval diplomacy, in which 
relatively weak naval powers can challenge the relatively strong by overtly targeting 
perceived ‘strengths’ and turning them into critical vulnerabilities. 
 
Additionally, in the information age the high seas are rapidly losing their monopoly as 
the world’s only global commons.  The new global common of cyberspace is 
increasingly a manoeuvre environment of choice for state and non-state actors alike, 
with its advantages of reach and penetration, low cost and plausible deniability.47  
Similarly, unmanned aerial systems are increasingly persistent and resilient (though still 
significantly short of naval platforms) and thus picture building, the gathering of 
intelligence or generation of domain awareness, may perhaps be better conducted in 
future from the air or from space than from the sea.  John Klein, for instance, has 
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applied some traditional maritime thinking to the military use of space and determines 
that it fits well.48 There may be other comparable parallels to draw as technology 
advances. 
 
There may also be legal, societal or ethical challenges to the naval attribute of access.  
As the example which follows later in this chapter shows, Greenpeace’s presumption of 
an unfettered use of the high seas was not shared by Russia in 2013, when MY Arctic 
Sunrise became the subject of state-led duress.  Nor was Israel’s assumption of 
freedom of maritime manoeuvre shared by Hezbollah in 2006, as discussed in Chapter 
4.  As the boundaries between state and non-state, and between the functions of naval 
activity become ever more ‘fuzzy’,49 long held beliefs about a rules based order and 
what can be done, by whom, to whom and where, may need to be recalibrated.  The 
point is not merely the applicability to naval diplomacy, but the perception of the value 
of naval forces relative to other instruments of power.  
 
There remain, however, many proponents of naval power and this thesis is not 
predicting its complete demise; Christopher Layne, for instance, suggested a change in 
American grand strategy after the Cold War.  As the sole world power the United 
States, he argued, could afford to sharply reduce the size and role of its ground forces 
whilst simultaneously increasing ‘overwhelming naval presence.’  He called his strategy 
‘offshore balancing.’50  Whether it could ever be a practical strategy for the United 
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States or any other country is debateable, but the point is that it was suggested by a 
credible academic.  There are at least some commentators who believe that naval 
power, if applied correctly, can be sufficiently robust to be the basis for contemporary 
strategy. 
 
In discussing the ‘how’ of naval diplomacy, therefore, analysis through functional 
definitions of specific tactics or operations should not be attempted solely on the basis 
of debatably passé concepts.  Though they have up until now stood the test of time, the 
attributes which gave advantage in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries might not 
remain such unique selling points in the twenty-first and thus complementary 
alternatives should be sought.  This thesis returns to the quantitative and qualitative 
evidence provided in Chapters 3 and 4 to identify a number of methods, used by both 
state and non-state actors alike, by the relatively powerful and relatively weak, and 
applicable irrespective of scale.  Rather than group them according to kinetic force as 
Le Mière contended (and thereby implicitly reinforcing the definition of naval diplomacy 
as an act as opposed to a means of communication), this thesis proposes the 
classification of tactics, of ‘how’, as movable points along Nye’s spectrum soft and hard 
power. 
 
At the soft end of the spectrum, for instance, actors might pay goodwill visits, gift or sell 
arms, or engage in simple, intermediate or complex capacity building exercises to forge 
amity; they may conduct basic operations together or, ultimately, work towards and 
achieve interoperability at the highest end of warfighting capabilities. To express enmity 
they may protest (as may a secondary or tertiary stakeholder), arrest, interdict or poise 
near an offending location; at the hardest end of the scale they could blockade, mount 
physical strikes or occupy sovereign seas, property or territories.  Of course, at the 
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most aggressive end, where the distinction between the ‘limited’ force of naval 
diplomacy becomes blurred with the more fulsome version of major combat operations, 
the interpretation of tactics and functions requires even greater scrutiny; what may 
appear ‘limited’ to one actor may appear extreme to another.  The mapping of the 
differences between limited force and physical conflict, if indeed they exist, is an area 
worthy of further research.   
 
Clearly, there may be a close correlation between the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of naval 
diplomacy.  For example, if the message to be passed is one of enmity through 
coercion, then a credible and explicit tactic could be to mount a limited physical strike 
by naval air, surface or submarine capabilities.  Likewise, communicating amity through 
assistance following a natural disaster might naturally mean the provision of help or aid.  
However, that correlation is not always the case.  The tactics themselves are not 
necessarily exclusive and are often used in combination, supporting the hypothesis that 
naval diplomacy is not a binary endeavour.  There are times when identical tactics 
could be used be used to express very different messages, resulting in very different 
effects.  For example, exercises between actors might be an initial foray into friendship 
or co-existence, as many Arab-Israeli interactions are, or means to improve 
interoperability between close allies such as the United States and United Kingdom, or 
they might be a demonstration of capability targeted against a third party, as in the 
series of US-South Korean Team Spirit exercises aimed in significant part at the 
deterrence of North Korea. 
 
This thesis proposes a series of eleven tactics, evident in and derived from the 
research, which together cover a broad spectrum of naval diplomacy from the hard to 
the soft.  They range from the overtly hostile, the hard power tactic of occupying 
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territory or property which has been a rare occurrence in the immediate post-Cold War 
maritime environment (Chapters 3 and 4 explore China’s occupation of Mischief Island 
in 1995 as an example), to the benign, such as the ages old goodwill visit, sitting at the 
soft end of the scale and very commonplace.  But even these opposite-end tactics, 
perhaps instinctively associated with the military navies of recognised states, have 
potential for alternative manifestations.  A form of dissent could see non-state groups 
attempting to occupy that which does not legally belong to them; the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), for example, seized Nigerian ships in 2009,51 
and, as will be discussed later, Greenpeace have temporarily occupied (if not 
controlled) oil platforms.  Similarly, port visits may be the stock-in-trade of warships but 
they are also conducted by Coast Guards52 and, of course, commercial companies.  An 
interesting variation on the latter is the ongoing case of an attempt by campaigning 
groups and council members opposed to Arctic drilling to prevent the Royal Dutch Shell 
company from using and visiting the port of Seattle.53 
 
Between these tactics are others such as the use of physical strike to inflict punitive 
damage at or from the sea.  As Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers and the Mumbai terrorist 
attackers of 2008 have shown, the use of strike is most definitely not the preserve of 
state actors.  Nor, as New Zealand has shown in its anti-nuclear testing stance, is 
protest the preserve of the non-state actor.  Similarly, the implementation of formal or 
informal blockades by state or non-state actors; the various modes of interdiction and 
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protection, which are vital policing components of maritime security; the provision of aid 
(itself very much a multi-stakeholder affair); and, the varying degrees of engagement 
and disengagement that are central to exercises and interoperability between actors, 
are all tactics employed in naval diplomacy. 
 
The list is not exhaustive but it is representative.  Though they are shown in Figure 5.6 
below at intervals along the hard/soft spectrum, their relative place need not be 
permanently set.  They are also portrayed as common verbs, non-unique expressions 
of definite actions; they are therefore independent of specific technological capabilities 
which will inevitably change over time, but they remain functions or roles which have 
been inherent, at least to some degree, in seapower historically.  They also differ from 
Cable’s descriptive approach, discussed in Chapter 2, which emphasised an assailant’s 


















Figure 5.7 Tactics Employed in Naval Diplomacy 
 
 
In sum, the ‘how’ of naval diplomacy, the actions or tactics employed by all of the actors 
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stakeholder analysis and communicative aims, aids understanding.  Together, ‘what’, 
‘who’ and ‘how’ help to determine of purpose and are therefore an essential part of the 
development of a model or framework for the analysis of naval diplomacy.   
 
A Foundational Model for Twenty-first Century Naval Diplomacy 
 
Figure 5.1 above was a simplistic, diagrammatical representation of three points which 
might be considered in the contemporary study of naval diplomacy and its purpose: 
what, who and how.  By expanding on those points, which can be taken in any order, 
and developing second and third order levels of analysis, a more comprehensive 
foundational model for twenty-first century naval diplomacy may be determined: 
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Figure 5.8    A foundational model of 21st century naval diplomacy.  
 
Figure 5.7 shows a proposed model for naval diplomacy in the post-Cold War global 
order, but one which could arguably also be used to analyse historical scenarios from 
any period.  The enduring what, who and how questions are given substance by 
subordinate questions of enmity and amity, of hard and soft power tactics and of target 
audience analysis.  The suggested building blocks of those are effects, stakeholders 
and ways and means derived from both theory and evidence.  Of course, they could be 
added to or removed as the analyst requires. 
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TESTING THE MODEL 
 
As was stated in the Introduction, it is accepted that using the same evidence to both 
create and test a theory is an invalid approach in research design – it exacerbates the 
risk of confirmation bias.54  Therefore, whereas the basis of the proposed model lies in 
the events which took place in the period 1991-2010, the cases chosen to test it are 
selected from outwith that period.  The theoretical framework was tested against a 
renowned case study of naval diplomacy from the height of the Cold War and a further 
three examples from the period 2011-2015, representing state-on-state confrontation, 
the involvement of non-state actors, and trans-national concerns respectively.  These 
cases were selected for their diversity rather than their resemblance to any ‘typical’ 
example of naval diplomacy of the past century.  Each test case is divided into two brief 
sections: the first provides historical and geopolitical context by outlining key events; the 
second provides a short analysis based on the triad of questions described above.  Of 
course, other cases could be chosen for examination and whilst the model takes into 
account new developments, the fact that it draws on ideas and literature from naval 
theory and other academic disciplines means that it could also be used to reconsider 
earlier periods. 
 
A Re-evaluation of the USS Pueblo Incident 
 
The USS Pueblo incident is one of the most oft-cited examples of Cold War naval 
diplomacy.  Cable covers it extensively55 and it has spawned a number of memoirs, 
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books and articles.56  It is included here precisely because it is well known and has 
been exhaustively studied.  Though there are many analyses, they habitually differ in 
detail and emphasis with few, if any, containing all aspects of the incident.  The test in 
this example, therefore, is to determine whether the foundational model provides an 
adequate framework for comprehension, by organising a logical research agenda to 
capture pertinent details.  
 
The widely accepted narrative of events describes how in early 1968 USS Pueblo, an 
intelligence gathering ship, was on patrol in the East Sea off the coast of North Korea.  
By 22 January of that year it had become clear that Pueblo’s presence was known to 
North Korea after it had been passed by a patrol craft and approached and then circled 
by two North Korean fishing vessels.  Pueblo was unescorted, the US having made the 
assumption that she would be safe in international waters, an assumption which with 
hindsight turned out to be unwise.57  A day later, on 23 January, another patrol boat 
approached Pueblo at high speed, ordered her to heave to and threatened to open fire 
if she did not comply.  Within the hour a further three patrol vessels had joined the first 
and two North Korean MiG-21 fighter aircraft were overflying the area.  Pueblo 
attempted to depart from the scene at her maximum speed but could not outrun the 
faster North Korean vessels. The North Korean craft fired on Pueblo and one of the 
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aircraft fired warning shots into the sea; left with little choice, Pueblo’s commanding 
officer surrendered his ship and followed the patrol boats into the port of Wonsan.58   
 
During the intense diplomatic negotiations which followed the capture of USS Pueblo, 
confessions of spying were obtained and the ship’s crew were regularly photographed 
and appeared in the domestic press.  Eventually, in December 1968, in exchange for a 
US acknowledgement of the validity of the confessions and an admission that the ship 
had been seized in North Korean territorial waters, the crew were released.59  
 
Taken as an isolated example of naval diplomacy, the Pueblo incident is ostensibly an 
altercation between North Korea and the United States.  Indeed, Cable describes it as 
such in his analysis.  However, to fully appreciate the situation the wider context must 
be understood.  In this respect a 2009 PhD thesis by Giseong Lee on US coercive 
diplomacy against North Korea, gives a good background to the situation leading up to 
the capture of Pueblo and to the interwoven relationships involved.  For instance, North 
Korea had attempted, and failed, to assassinate the South Korean President three days 
earlier, Pyongyang was experiencing difficult and complex relationships with both the 
USSR and China, and the United States was giving unquestioning support to South 
Korea.  Similarly, in his classic Cold War work, John Lewis Gaddis (without reference to 
the Pueblo incident) discusses the Soviet-North Korean relationship and concludes that 
the former disliked the latter but could not let it fail for fear of a perceived American 
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‘victory’ in the region.60  For its part, China (North Korea’s longstanding if, at times, 
reluctant ally) played no direct physical role but was mindful of its own influence within 
the communist world and provided tacit support to Pyongyang.61 Of no lesser 
importance, Lee situates the confrontation in the Cold War in Asia and, crucially, 
alongside the ongoing Vietnam War and approaching Tet Offensive.62  By the time of 
the Pueblo incident the Johnson White House was already under ‘intense pressure’ to 
unwind American commitments in South East Asia which the additional demands of an 
unfolding situation off the Korean coast can have done little to ease.63 
 
In the context of the time, it has been widely argued that there was an underlying 
assumption in Washington that all incidents, wherever they occurred, were connected 
with the broader Cold War and must, therefore, be orchestrated by Moscow; it would 
have been incomprehensible for US decision makers in Washington to think that North 
Korea could have acted alone against the United States and Pueblo.64  Indeed, recently 
released contemporary testimony shows that the US House Armed Services Committee 
were briefed that it was ‘reasonable to assume … that the documentation captured from 
the Pueblo has been turned over to the Soviets and possibly the CHICOMS [Chinese 
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Communists].’65  Of course, the fact that documentation was turned over does not 
necessarily mean that North Korea acted at Moscow’s behest when first seizing the 
ship. 
 
Cable ignores these factors in his analysis, though he does discuss the American 
assumption that, despite Cold War rhetoric, surveillance vessels operating on the high 
seas would not be directly interfered with by the other side; a convention had evidently 
evolved between the US, the USSR and their allies, the violation of which would upset 
the strategic balance.66  As with all communicative relationships there is inherent risk in 
assuming the norms and perceptions of one participant necessarily apply to the others.  
The US Navy reassessed its policy of sailing surveillance ships unescorted after the 
Pueblo incident but found the cost of providing protection prohibitively high.  By mid-
1969 the US Chief of Naval Operation, Admiral Thomas H Moorer, recommended 
decommissioning all ‘spy’ ships; within six months they had been removed from 
service.67 
 
Cable also chose not to mention the subsequent manoeuvring by the various 
stakeholders in his textual analysis; instead, he reports the late January 1968 USN 
deployment of three aircraft carriers into the Sea of Japan and the February 1968 
Soviet deployment of cruisers and destroyers to the same area as entirely separate 
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incidents in his chronological index.68 As has been discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to 
Cable’s analysis of the Falklands Conflict, in any analysis there will inevitably be a 
subjective assessment of the temporal boundaries of any incident.  Timescales matter, 
particularly when considering the effectiveness of any action, and this can then skew 
subsequent statistical or comparative analysis.   
 
In contrast, in their analysis of Soviet naval diplomacy, Dismukes and McConnell 
considered the Pueblo incident to be, in part, a message of support from North Korea to 
North Vietnam at a time when practical assistance to Hanoi from the USSR and China 
was all but absent.69 In addition they describe how the Soviet Union was reluctant to 
jeopardize progress in its improving relationship with North Korea and thus responded 
negatively to a US request for assistance in negotiation.  However, they also point out 
how the only overt Soviet display of support for North Korea, the deployment of ships to 
the area, occurred several weeks into the incident when it was apparent to all sides that 
US naval presence in the region was reducing.70  This clearly suggests that the Soviet 
target audience was North Korea and, perhaps, its own domestic populace – though the 
time lag could also have been a carefully considered signal of reassurance to the US 
that no further confrontation was wanted. That account differs slightly from that given by 
David Winkler in his book Cold War at Sea which describes how the Soviet intelligence 
gathering ship Gidrolog attempted to physically block the passage of USS Enterprise in 
the Sea of Japan as the latter was making its way towards the stricken Pueblo.71   
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Nonetheless, returning to Lee’s analysis of the incident, there is another strong 
argument which suggests that the primary political motive for the incident was domestic 
rather than international.  Lee states that North Korea ‘largely ignored the ship’s 
intelligence value’ and exploited the incident for domestic propaganda.72  The North 
Korean population needed a ‘boost’ and, he contends, the discovery of USS Pueblo 
presented a relatively easy target of opportunity for Pyongyang to portray the regime as 
heroically resisting a powerful external threat and that opportunity was grasped.73 The 
actions which followed were then impulsive reactions to a developing international 
situation based on differing interpretations of events in different national capitals.   
 
It is clear that there are many and varied interpretations of the Pueblo incident 
suggesting that there were a range of factors and motivations at play.  Applying the 
foundational model to the incident may assist in providing retrospective understanding.  
Firstly, when attempting to establish ‘what’ communicative message was being 
conveyed, one might determine that there were many and that they changed in 
emphasis and priority as time went on.  Initially, the United States was actively 
embarked on a process of picture building against North Korea – primarily indicative of 
a state of enmity between the two countries, but also a positive message of 
reassurance to the South.  Subsequently, North Korea’s interference with Pueblo on the 
high seas indicates enmity in a coercive, yet limited form.74  Later, as the situation 
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developed, both the United States and North Korea exploited the incident in order to 
boost their own credibility and ‘masculinity’ with their domestic audiences and the 
USSR gave half-hearted reassurance to its client state but was careful not to push its 
superpower rival too far when doing so. 
 
The stakeholders in the Pueblo incident, of course, are numerous.  The primary 
participants were clearly the governments, armed forces and in particular the navies of 
the United States and North Korea, and members of the civilian maritime community of 
the latter.  Secondary state audiences included the Soviet Union and South Korea, but 
China, North Vietnam, Japan and the international community as a whole could be 
considered at the tertiary level.  Linkages between each were not necessarily direct. 
Finally, as already stated, domestic constituencies and populations – in North Korea, 
the US and USSR – had to be satisfied and these may be placed in the secondary or 
tertiary fields with equal validity at different times during the crisis.  Indeed, once the 
incident had transitioned from the high seas to the airwaves, domestic audiences 
arguably became the primary targets in the political manoeuvring taking place. 
 
The ‘how’ of the incident is perhaps more apparent.   In terms of Nye’s spectrum of 
behaviour, the physical means employed by all players tended to the ‘hard’.  The United 
States poised with Pueblo and again with its aircraft carrier flotilla after the event, as did 
the USSR with their deployment of cruisers and destroyers.  North Korea’s action was 
one of interdiction whilst other regional actors watched with interest but did not take an 
active, physical role.  The United States used the best capability it had for picture 
building, but due to resource constraints (particularly given its commitments to fighting 
the war in Vietnam) and erroneous assumptions based on an altogether different 
context (ie. the Cold War against the Soviet Union), it chose not to protect Pueblo with 
  383 
other warships.  North Korea’s tapestry of fishing vessels to report and patrol boats to 
interdict, however, represent an impressive degree of co-ordination of the seapower 
available to the state, something which Gorshkov would have recognised. 
 
The Pueblo incident has been much written about and few of the considerations raised 
above are new.  However, as a vehicle for comprehension this thesis contends that the 
foundational model provides a viable framework for this Cold War cause célèbre.  
Compared to the traditional, often narrow, approaches, 75 it provides a wider, more 
satisfactory explanation and analysis of the incident and opens up alternative avenues 
of research.  Of course, the purpose of the foundational model is to assist in both 
comprehension and analysis of cases such as this, but it does not necessarily lead to 
one result – two analysts could quite conceivably use it to reflect on a particular incident 
and end up with two (or more) quite different accounts.  In this case the model does aid 




The Case of the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai Islands 
 
Japan, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan all lay claim to a grouping of 
uninhabited rocks and islands in the East China Sea.  The Japanese name for the 
islands is Senkaku, China refers to them as Diaoyu and Taiwan calls them Diaoyutai.  
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The three states competing for sovereignty all see military and economic advantages to 
the resolution of the dispute in their favour.76 
 
Historically, following annexation by the Ming dynasty in the sixteenth century, the 
islands had been part of China but were largely considered unimportant by Peking / 
Beijing.  They were annexed by Japan in 1885, with Tokyo claiming that they had 
effectively been ungoverned and not under the control of any state up until that point.  
Over half a century later, after the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World 
War, the islands were placed under US administration, and remained so until 1971.77  
Taiwan made a claim for the islands in 1959 but took no further action.  
 
Alessio Patalano, commenting in 2013 on the main protagonists in the territorial 
dispute, wrote that the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai islands were not a significant issue 
throughout much of the Cold War, since China was attempting to consolidate its land 
borders and Japan was concentrating on its economic development.78  To that analysis 
can perhaps be added Taiwan’s pre-occupation with self preservation and quest for 
international acceptance.  Throughout the Cold War and immediately afterwards, 
therefore, it was arguably domestic politics, rather than international or inter-regional 
relations, which periodically raised the profile of the East China Sea territorial disputes. 
In support of this argument Patalano contended that: 
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The impact of domestic politics on these [territorial] disputes derives from the import of 





However, economic factors also added to the islands’ strategic importance and 
provided considerable motivation for increased activity in support of the various claims 
which became apparent from the 1990s onwards.  A 2013 report for the European 
Union Library discussed the economic importance of the East China Sea shipping 
lanes80 and Patalano noted that the region is structurally a maritime system in which the 
sea is central to trade and commerce, military power and political influence.81 Some 
commentators have also questioned whether the East China Sea dispute is connected 
with the possibility of oil and gas deposits in the region,82 as it is estimated that mineral 
reserves in the disputed zone could be as much as 100 billion barrels of oil and two 
trillion cubic feet of gas;83 a comparable quantity to the reserves already exploited and 
estimated to remain in the North Sea. Control of the islands, therefore, is an attractive 
proposition to each of the parties concerned over and above their traditional rhetoric 
and indulgence of popular domestic opinion. 
 
As a series of entries in the survey in Chapter 3 shows, direct interaction over the 
islands took place periodically throughout the immediate post-Cold War period. In 1994, 
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for instance, Hong Kong-registered vessels protested against Japanese sovereignty 
after Tokyo proclaimed an EEZ around the islands.  Several Hong Kong vessels were 
blocked by Japanese patrol boats, some protesters jumped into the sea and one 
drowned.84 In 1998 Chinese protesters landed on the islands and clashed with the 
Japanese Coast Guard; in 2000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Navy) vessels 
exercised near the islands, and in 2004 Japanese patrol boats were again involved in 
an altercation with Chinese fishing vessels.85 According to official Japanese sources 
two Chinese oceanographic research ships entered territorial waters off the islands in 
2008,86 and in September 2010 bilateral relations between China and Japan were 
exacerbated when a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately collided with a Japanese Coast 
Guard ship.87 
 
It is interesting to note that each of the claimants employed different maritime activity in 
connection with the disputed islands.  Until 2012 China had sent naval vessels adjacent 
to Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai, but had never ventured into their territorial waters to 
‘avoid antagonising relations with Japan.’88  However, throughout the 2000s China had 
increased its constabulary and maritime enforcement efforts in the region through the 
Coast Guard, Maritime Safety Administration, China Maritime Surveillance, the General 
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Administration of Customs and the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, each of 
which, along with commercial fishing vessels, effectively represented state interests.89  
It is clear China did not always rely on the ‘official’ PLA(N) for its at-sea diplomacy.  
Echoes of Gorshkov’s multi-stranded approach to maritime and naval diplomacy, 
described in Seapower of the State, can perhaps again be heard. 
 
Japanese maritime activity, on the other hand, centred almost exclusively on its 
Maritime Self Defence Force and Coast Guard which regularly patrolled the East China 
Sea but also undertook capacity building and assistance activities with regional 
neighbours.90 These activities were designed to consolidate the Japanese position as a 
good neighbour and indirectly strengthened their customary sovereignty claim on the 
international stage.    
 
However, the diplomatic dispute escalated significantly in 2012 when the Japanese 
government purchased the islands from their private owners.  The move, ironically 
intended to be de-escalatory in Japan, was deemed provocative in China and resulted 
in mass protests in some Chinese cities.91 Such ‘protests’ under an authoritarian regime 
are potentially orchestrated centrally by the state and might, therefore, be seen as a 
carefully considered signal in their own right, rather than as a consequence of naturally 
occurring public opinion. Taiwan subsequently launched an East China Sea Peace 
Initiative and, though not withdrawing its own claim to the islands, resolved to seek a 
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diplomatic solution to the issue.  In return Japan rewarded Taiwan with access to 
surrounding waters for its fishing vessels.92  China, in contrast, deployed ‘paramilitary 
forces’ to the area and in January 2013 the confrontation escalated further when a 
Chinese naval vessel locked its fire control radar, usually considered to be a highly 
aggressive act as it indicates preparations to opening fire, onto a Japanese destroyer.93 
The situation was such that some in the West thought that it ‘could lead to conflict.’94 
 
In November 2013, China announced the creation of an Air Defence Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) above the islands, a move which Japan labelled ‘unilateral escalation’ of the 
dispute.95  Taiwan expressed ‘regret’ at the creation of the ADIZ and promised that its 
military would take measures to protect Taiwanese national security if necessary. 
Following the declaration of the ADIZ, Chinese ships then repeatedly sailed into 
Japanese-claimed, and internationally recognised, territorial waters.96  Japan’s principal 
ally and security guarantor, the United States, publicly backed Tokyo, dispatching two 
B-52 bombers from Guam to overfly the ADIZ without notifying Beijing,97 and promising 
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support should conflict occur while at the same time stressing that it had no position on 
the specific boundary / sovereignty issue.98 
 
Applying the foundational model to the Senkaku / Diaoyu / Diaoyutai dispute, and 
beginning with a stakeholder analysis, it can be seen that there are two primary state 
actors involved, China and Japan.  Alongside these, the United States and Taiwan may 
be considered secondary players, as could the domestic audiences of each of the major 
protagonists.  Tertiary actors include those east Asian regional states with their own 
maritime sovereignty disagreements with China, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and 
Malaysia.  The plethora of non-state actors concerned include fishermen and the 
commercial shipping corporations with an interest in maritime security in the East China 
Sea.     
 
Tactics used range from the employment of maritime soft power by Japan to support 
their own claim, including port visits, exercises and capacity building, to China’s hard 
power approach through orchestrated civil and naval protest, poise and temporary 
occupation.  The declaration of the ADIZ could be considered a limited form of 
blockade,99 and also suggests that further, more aggressive action could follow. The US 
Navy’s Seventh Fleet, effectively a permanently deployed fleet-in-being poised in 
Japan, can also be factored into the equation. 
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The resultant messaging between the stakeholders, therefore, exhibits the 
characteristics of every trait identified in earlier chapters.  There is coercion (by China 
and Japan, of each other), deterrence and reassurance (by the physical presence of 
Japanese naval and Coast Guard vessels, by the US Seventh Fleet and by the Chinese 
ADIZ), picture building and the pursuit of prestige by all parties, and co-operation, 
attraction and assistance (particularly on the part of Japan and Taiwan).  Whether in 
that respect the foundational model offers a useful framework for analysis or a mere 
itemised checklist is perhaps debateable.  However, in conjunction with the stakeholder 
analysis and tactical appreciation, it can be argued that the model as a whole is 
applicable to this example and can be used to help determine purpose.  The purpose 
for China and Japan was sovereignty; for the US, Taiwan and the tertiary stakeholders 
it was the maintenance of the status quo and maritime security in he region. 
 
Greenpeace, Russia and the Arctic 
 
In 2010 Greenpeace commenced its ‘Save the Arctic’ campaign.  Its objectives were to 
secure international agreement to create a global sanctuary in the uninhabited and 
sparsely habited areas around the North Pole and to ban offshore oil drilling and 
industrial-scale fishing in Arctic waters.100  The physical manifestations of the campaign 
were often in the form of at-sea protests against energy exploration companies.  
Amongst their protests Greenpeace list action against Cairn Energy off Greenland, 
against Royal Dutch Shell in the Beaufort Sea, and against Rosneft and its 
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concessions, Statoil, ExxonMobil and ENI in the Barents and Kara Seas.  For each, 
Greenpeace claim the protests had been conducted peacefully and safely.101 
 
In August 2012 Greenpeace began protesting against the Prirazlomnaya oil platform 
operated in the Pechora Sea by the Russian state-controlled energy company 
Gazprom.  The platform was situated on the Russian continental shelf and within the 
Russian Federation’s Exclusive Economic Zone and, since 2011, Russian authorities 
had declared a three nautical mile ‘safety zone’ around it.  The first protest involved 
several activists suspending themselves from the sides of the platform in order to draw 
public attention to the dangers Prirazlomnaya posed to the environment, particularly if it 
suffered an oil spill.102  Later, in August 2013, Greenpeace had an altercation with 
Russian authorities after attempting to sail its ship, MY Arctic Sunrise, into the Northern 
Sea Route through the Arctic without permission.103 
 
However, it was in September 2013 that Greenpeace again mounted a protest against 
Gazprom and the Prirazlomnaya platform with the intention of scaling the structure and 
unfurling a banner below its main deck.104  Greenpeace launched inflatable boats from 
Arctic Sunrise to carry activists to the platform and they were intercepted by inflatable 
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craft from the Russian Coast Guard vessel Ladoga.  Collisions between the inflatables 
and violence ensued, including, Greenpeace claimed, the firing of weapons from the 
Coast Guard boats.105  The crew of Prirazlomnaya also intervened, using water hoses 
to stop activists climbing the rig.  Two Greenpeace members were arrested and taken 
on board Ladoga.106  The following day Arctic Sunrise was boarded by Russian Coast 
Guard personnel via helicopter whilst outside Russian territorial waters and outside the 
three mile rig safety zone, but inside the Russian EEZ.  The ship, and 30 crew 
members of 19 different nationalities, were detained and taken to the port of Murmansk 
with accusations ranging from piracy to hooliganism to terrorism levelled at the 
protesters.107 Much of the action was then replayed in the world’s media;108 by mid-
October an estimated one and a half million emails had been sent to Russian 
Embassies worldwide, demanding the release of the ‘Arctic 30’.109   
 
Perhaps inevitably given the human interest story unfolding between Greenpeace and 
the Russian state, some commentators argue that much of the media coverage at the 
time focused on the welfare of those individuals arrested and not on the potentially 
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more important matters of the legal and institutional frameworks governing the Arctic.110 
The UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea heard the case of the arrest of 
Arctic Sunrise and, in November 2013, ordered its release.111 The Netherlands, as the 
flag state of the ship, provided a surety of 3.6 million Euros and by early December all 
activists had been freed.112 Nonetheless, Prirazlomnaya remained active in the Arctic 
and mineral exploitation continued. 
 
This example of diplomatic play at sea is important because the principal protagonists 
were, initially, non-state actors, albeit on the Russian side much more closely 
connected to the state than oil companies in the West.  Very rapidly however both state 
support and international opinion was brought to bear to affect both sides in the dispute.  
Applying the foundational model here it is perhaps best to again start with an attempt to 
identify stakeholders.  Greenpeace was certainly a primary actor, but it is a non-
governmental organisation which derives its ‘power’ from its global mass membership, 
who might then be considered an important, though nebulous, secondary audience. 
Moreover, Greenpeace does have a headquarters in the Netherlands and its maritime 
asset, MV Arctic Sunrise, was also registered there.  In the days and weeks following 
the arrest of MV Arctic Sunrise and the ‘Arctic 30’, the Netherlands became 
Greenpeace’s de facto sponsor.  
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In the opposing camp the Gazprom was, superficially at least, a multinational 
corporation with business interests worldwide and its own economic network of 
suppliers and customers, many of them states. Nonetheless, its origin lay within the 
USSR Gas Industry Ministry and the Russian state remains its majority shareholder.113 
Russia, therefore, with a navy and coast guard at its disposal, was a key interlocutor 
and the source of Gazprom’s authority and power at sea.  As the situation developed it 
became no simple task to differentiate the actions and tactics of Gazprom from those of 
the Russian government.  Russia should thus be considered a primary stakeholder and 
Greenpeace would have been keenly aware of this when they began their campaign.   
 
Greenpeace’s aims were clearly stated.  At the strategic level they wished to see an 
end to drilling in the Arctic and their communicated objective in 2012-13 was to raise 
global awareness.  To do so they balanced an amity agenda of appealing to popular 
environmentalism through non-violent but ‘risky’ action against an adversarial posture 
toward their target for change. Both were necessary if they were to achieve their goal.  
Their tactics, then, were similarly a combination of hard and soft techniques, from 
physical protest and coercive behaviour, to picture building (gathering evidence and 
publicising Gazprom’s activities and their inherent dangers) and attraction to their 
cause.  Throughout, the prestige associated with Greenpeace as a respected 
campaigning NGO was critical. 
 
Gazprom and Russia had a different challenge.  Their commercial activities were not 
illegal and when confronted by Greenpeace they attempted to achieve their aim of 
continuing mineral exploitation through visible law-enforcement means.  The Coast 
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Guard initially poised in the vicinity of Prirazlomnaya to act as a deterrent to MY Arctic 
Sunrise.  Once deterrence failed Russia turned to interdiction and arrest, both to deal 
with the immediate situation and, perhaps, to send a message about any future attempt 
by Greenpeace or another organisation intent on preventing drilling.  Russia’s actions 
were undoubtedly at the hard end of the spectrum and they did little by way of public 
diplomacy to appease the international community.  It is probable that the external, 
international audience was far less important to Moscow than its own domestic 
constituency.  The Russian strategic narrative, consistent over centuries, is one of 
external plots, pressures and threats which need strong, centralised government to 
counter. 
 
This example shows that diplomatic activity at sea is not always a zero-sum game.  
Both Greenpeace and Russia / Gazprom achieved their short term objective.  Drilling 
was not stopped but global awareness was certainly raised and public sympathy 
undoubtedly lay with the protesters.  This thesis argues that Cable would not have 
chosen to include this incident in his catalogue of naval diplomacy, as it would not fit his 
limited criteria of state actors, ‘assailants’, ‘victims’, winners and losers; but it can be 
analysed through the framework of the foundational model.  
 
Trans-national Concerns and Ballistic Missile Defence 
 
The final example to test the proposed model was selected because it did not fit the 
generally accepted mould of traditional naval diplomacy.  The majority of case studies 
in the literature and, indeed, in the qualitative and quantitative analysis sections of this 
thesis, consist of discrete incidents with clear beginnings, middles and ends.  The 
transnational concerns over ballistic missiles and the (primarily American) network of 
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defences around the globe, however, are different and reflect that much activity takes 
place in the grey area between overt war and supposed peace.  They represent an 
ongoing diplomacy in which picture building, deterrence, coercion, reassurance, 
assistance, prestige and more can be readily identified.  If the foundational model is 
able to provide an analytical framework for the naval element of such scenarios then it 
would prove to be a valuable methodological tool. 
 
Ballistic missiles are not a new phenomenon.  The Second World War German V2 
rocket was a ballistic missile and the United Kingdom, United States, France, Russia 
and China all employ ballistic missiles as delivery mechanisms for their nuclear 
deterrents.  Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Israel and North Korea can also be added to that list.  
The attractiveness and utility of ballistic missiles to those who have them rests on two 
factors – their ability to carry a high-effect payload (nuclear, biological, chemical or 
conventional) and, importantly, on the degree of difficulty in defending against them.  
Flight profiles make conventional air defence sensors and weapons systems unsuitable 
counters – conceptually, intercepting a ballistic missile at any stage of its trajectory is 
akin to “hitting a bullet with a bullet.”114  
 
Ballistic missiles are often seen as symbols of national prestige and scientific 
competence and are thus a tempting investment for the ambitious power, whether that 
be a state or a non-state actor.  Importantly, they have diplomatic value in terms of 
deterrence and coercion and military value because of their psychological, political and 
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kinetic impact.115  Tactical and symbolic use of ballistic missiles is not uncommon: Iraq 
used them in the First Gulf War, North Korea has fired them into the Sea of Japan, 
Syria has seen them used extensively in its civil war,116 but to use them at the inter-
regional or inter-continental strategic level, such as against centres of population or 
points of critical national infrastructure during a period of tension or confrontation has, to 
date, been held in reserve.  For instance, during a potential turning point in the Syrian 
civil war in 2013 when it appeared that Western powers might resort to military 
intervention, the Assad regime did not use ballistic missiles against third parties, despite 
having the capability to do so. 
 
It is in this context that ballistic missile defence (BMD) can become both a military and 
diplomatic tool.  BMD is high on the US defence agenda and enjoys broad bi-partisan 
support in the US Congress.117 The US uses a series of bilateral arrangements with 
Turkey, Israel, Japan and the United Arab Emirates for mutual advantage and forms the 
bedrock of NATO BMD capability in Europe.118  The first level of NATO BMD, the Active 
Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System (ALTBMD) was declared to be at 
‘interim capability’ at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012.119  It consists of situational 
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awareness systems in Germany, a mobile radar site in Turkey and a naval element, a 
US Navy Aegis warship (the weapon ‘shooter’ in the architecture) stationed in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.  ALTBMD is synonymous with the US European Phased 
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which contributes not only to European NATO but also to 
the protection of the continental USA from long range ballistic missiles.120 
 
Despite its role in underwriting ALTBMD, the US is keen for partner states to ‘shoulder 
more of the burden’ in European defence; BMD is a hugely expensive enterprise with all 
elements of an integrated system costing billions of dollars.  The Netherlands has plans 
to upgrade four of its air defence frigates with long range early warning radars as its 
contribution121 and Spain has agreed to permit the basing of four US Aegis ships at 
Rota on its southern coast.122  There is thus a complex mix of international interests 
incorporating elements on land and at sea, operational contributions, logistic support 
and forward presence by allies.  In addition, there is the message to potential 
belligerents with ballistic missiles that such an attack would be fruitless and, by 
inference, result in a costly retaliation to no useful end. BMD, in essence, provides 
deterrence by denial and assumes rationality on the part of the actors involved. 
 
One pillar of the foundational model’s triad has already been discussed.  The ‘what?’, 
those communicative messages associated with ballistic missiles and the defence 
against them, are complex but largely unambiguous.  The international actors fielding 
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the weapons do so for reasons of prestige, reassurance, deterrence and coercion.  
Those involved in BMD likewise pursue deterrence, coercion and, perhaps, an element 
of prestige, but they also aim to build alliances, assist and co-operate with their backers 
and reassure junior partners.  
 
It is probable that BMD also carries with it a degree of securitization.123  The financial 
cost of defensive systems can be of such magnitude that investment in them becomes 
attractive only when a very real ballistic missile threat is perceived.  The Japanese 
investment in direct (Aegis warships) and indirect (permitting US basing) BMD in the 
face of North Korean unpredictability perhaps exemplifies this approach. 
 
The ‘who’ and ‘how’ are equally apparent.  Though weapon proliferation cannot be 
dismissed, those state and non-state actors in possession of ballistic missiles are 
believed to be known,124 and those involved in countering them are, at present, limited 
to state actors who are identifiable through their association with the network of the 
BMD ‘shield’.  Secondary and tertiary stakeholders include those states and 
organisations which feel disadvantaged by the presence of offensive or defensive 
systems in their own areas of concern or interest (examples here could include Russian 
concern at American BMD systems in eastern Europe) and those who wish for a role 
but who have not yet been able to obtain systems (such as South East Asian states 
within range of North Korean missiles).  Forward presence, co-operative agreements, 
logistical support, procurement of interoperable systems, protest, and demonstrations of 
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capability are commonly used tactics amongst both offensive and defensive ballistic 
missile actors.125  In many cases, consistent with the particular advantages of naval 
forces in diplomatic activity outlined in Chapter 1, participating in the maritime 
component of BMD may be more politically acceptable to the states involved than fully 
committing to its land-based element.  The framework developed in the proposed 
foundational model enables both comprehension of such factors and analysis of 
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AN ALTERNATIVE PRISM 
 
 ‘Assailant-victim’ models of naval diplomacy are not appropriate in the twenty-first 
century.  The centrality of the nation state, of mechanistic relationships and the focus on 
coercive rather than cooperative action that are common in many texts on the subject 
are only just beginning to be challenged by naval commentators in the globalised, post-
modern era.  
 
Of course, there is a large literature re-examining the importance of the nation state in 
the post-Cold War world, and of the place of force.  James Goldgeier and Michael 
McFaul, for example, predict a coming system which they call a ‘great power society’, 
comprised not of states but of ‘non-unitary actors’ focused on maximising wealth. Such 
a system would not settle conflict through force or threats, but through negotiation and 
compromise.126  Terrorism, environmental politics, the globalisation of trade,127 the 
significance of inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations and the 
importance of international law,128 are more issues set to challenge ‘traditional’ 
concepts of naval diplomacy.  This thesis does not argue that these assertions of global 
transformation must be accepted in their entirety – we have not yet seen the predicted 
‘end of history’129 – but it does support the idea that the global order has evolved over 
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the last quarter of a century, is continuing to evolve, and that these changes will affect 
seapower. 
 
Consequently, this chapter has attempted to scrutinise naval diplomacy through a new 
prism.  Building on the earlier conclusion that existing frameworks were inadequate 
means of capturing the realities of post-Cold War activity at sea, it adopted an 
interdisciplinary approach involving basic communication and stakeholder theories, to 
construct an alternative, foundational model from the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4. Using its definition of naval diplomacy as a 
communicative endeavour, it has derived a new framework in which the questions of 
what is being communicated, who is involved and how it is being done can be posed.  It 
has suggested themes by which amity and enmity may be expressed, it has 
demonstrated how actors affecting and affected by naval diplomacy may be identified 
and their connectedness and relative influence plotted, and it has outlined a series of 
non-unique tactics or means which may be available to maritime stakeholders to 
achieve their aim. 
 
However, the thesis does not claim that the model that it proposes is the only viable 
approach to the study of contemporary naval diplomacy.  Indeed, history is replete with 
attempts to construct generalisations and ‘law-like principles’ about international politics 
and relations from the detection of patterns.130 Different approaches are equally valid 
but this thesis does contend that the foundational model developed here is the first 
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attempt since the end of the Cold War to articulate a practical representation of naval 
diplomacy based not only in theory but also in the reality of events in recent history.    





Though not the raison d’être of navies, naval diplomacy does have an enduring role to 
play in the exercise of seapower.  From Thucydides’ accounts of the coercive power of 
the Athenian Fleet to the hegemonic stability delivered by the Royal Navy in nineteenth 
century Pax Britannica, great powers have used their naval forces to shape the world 
according to their vision.  Rising powers have followed suit; Germany, the United 
States, the Soviet Union, China and India all staked their claim for global status, in part, 
through their fleets and their activities at sea.  The Cold War may have seen a different 
pattern of naval diplomacy from that which went before, primarily based on the might of 
the Eastern and Western blocs, but it was all, in the main, a state-centric understanding 
of effect.   
 
But what of now?  Is coercive diplomacy involving the threat and actual use of naval 
force alive and well? The two Koreas or China and Japan might believe that it is.  Are 
alliances and coalitions built at sea?  It is certainly an expectation, because states 
invest substantial amounts of time, effort and money pursuing them.  Does naval 
diplomacy even have to be carried out by the uniformed forces of a recognised state?  
The Gaza Freedom Flotilla’s interaction with Israel in 2010 certainly made news and 
grabbed the attention of powerful states, as did Greenpeace’s 2013 attempts to stop 
resource exploitation in Russian seas.  Perhaps getting the message across is a good 
enough outcome in this essentially communicative process.   
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Is it merely a subset of coercive diplomacy?  Not necessarily, because there are a 
myriad of ‘soft’ power initiatives from capacity building to the cultivation of friendships, 
the reassurance of allies, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, ‘being there’ for 
nationals abroad and providing venues for defence sales.  To return to the comment 
made by one former practitioner, naval diplomacy is about what navies actually do, 
rather than what they train for.  One might add to that statement that it is certainly what 
navies do, but what naval theorists tend not to write about. 
 
Mahan in America and Corbett in England – the writers with perhaps the greatest 
lasting impact on naval strategy – had much to say about seapower but a reader must 
look hard at their work to find anything more an oblique reference to the utility of navies 
in the pursuit of national political goals when not fighting wars.  In the Cold War Thomas 
Schelling, the economist, game theorist and Nobel laureate published Arms and 
Influence which set out the principles of a coercive strategy and its effect on decision 
makers.  Much of his work informed that which was to come later.  Only in the 1970s 
did naval diplomacy begin to be studied as a subject in its own right.  In the East Sergei 
Gorshkov, the man who shaped the Soviet Navy, wrote about it in his classic work, The 
Sea Power of the State.  Simultaneously, in the West naval presence became a core 
mission of the US Navy and the American Edward Luttwak wrote of ‘naval suasion’, but 
scratch the surface and the political motivations of those works quickly become 
apparent.   
 
Ken Booth set out what navies were for (the trinity of military, constabulary and 
diplomatic roles) and his thoughts were subsumed into the official doctrine of numerous 
western powers, but it was the seminal study by Sir James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 
first published in the 1970s and running to three editions, which most influenced the 
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understanding of the topic for the rest of the century. However, post-Cold War 
commentators such as Joseph Nye provided a fresh understanding of power, and naval 
practitioners and academics such as Mike Mullen and Geoffrey Till looked at old ideas 
through a new, ‘post-modern’ lens.   
 
But what were the ideas?  If the body of work by the various theorists, practitioners and 
commentators is combined, it can be seen that both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches were put to use.   Mahan never used the term naval diplomacy but he did 
describe various acts which might be classified as such today.  Cable took a dataset of 
over 100 naval incidents over seven decades of the twentieth century and analysed 
them to support of his hypothesis.  Those writings can be used to construct models 
which can then aid the analysis of particular scenarios.  A principal objective of this 
research has been to determine if those models or frameworks remain valid and fit for 




In the Introduction a series of research questions and hypotheses identified were posed 
which, when answered, would address the place and utility of naval diplomacy in the 
post-Cold War global order.  Returning to these: 
 
(1) What is naval diplomacy?  How does it differ from or build upon other forms of 
military / defence diplomacy? 
 
It was determined in Chapter 1 that diplomacy is a communicative process that seeks to 
further the interests of an international actor, and not just through codified discourse.  
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Bargaining, lobbying and non-verbal communication are the norms of human interaction 
and an integral part of diplomatic practice.  The process need not be limited to 
recognised states and there are numerous examples of international institutions, multi-
national corporations, non-governmental organisations and de facto territorial 
administrations which partake in diplomatic dialogue.    
 
The concept of niche diplomacy was then introduced, which refers to actors in 
possession of particular strengths, relative to other actors, bringing them to bear in their 
power relationships.  The employment of military forces in pursuit of political advantage 
short of war would therefore be a form of niche diplomacy by those with appropriate 
capabilities, particularly the militarily strong, which could be applied along a spectrum of 
behaviour from the ‘hard’ (deterrence and coercion, up to and including kinetic force) to 
the ‘soft’ (the range of outreach and engagement now commonly referred to as defence 
diplomacy).  From time to time weaker actors might also resort to the employment of 
military forces to communicate their messages either through choice, including at times 
when the stronger actor is politically more constrained in its use of the military 
instrument, or because they believe they have no better alternative at their disposal.  
The subtle or limited use of military force could even enhance its effectiveness over an 
overt threat or ultimatum as a policy instrument for both the strong and the weak.  Paul 
Sharp, the diplomacy theorist, acknowledged this line of reasoning and suggested that 
it was on the increase in international relations: 
 
… the trend in the last half century has been towards wars of both a limited and 
unofficial character.  Limiting wars has underlined their communicative significance while 
keeping them unofficial has made communications between belligerents easier.
1
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Land and air forces can be, and of course are, used as diplomatic instruments at 
specific points along the sliding scale of operations but it is naval forces which offer the 
greatest choice to those wielding them.  The particular advantages of flexibility, 
presence without commitment, political leverage, reach and sustainability make naval 
forces ideally suited to the task of international communication.  These attributes may 
not necessarily endure forever but they have stood the test of time until now.  Naval 
forces are not the hammers of the tool box, able to bang home a nail; they are the 
spanners, able to tighten or loosen as the situation dictates.2  Instinctively, navies and 
their people know this; as Roger Barnett wrote in his book with the intriguing subtitle 
Why Navies Think Differently, ‘whereas controls over visitors from other countries are 
imposed on land and permission must be obtained for overflight of another international 
state, the open seas are available for use by all.  This near absence of political control 
means that the legal regimen for the high seas tends to be modest in scope.  The 
politically uncontrolled nature of the oceans [ … ] makes the maritime environment 
unique.’3 
 
The terms ‘naval’ and ‘maritime’ are used variously by commentators to describe at-sea 
activity, including diplomatic, communicative engagements.  Etymologically, ‘maritime’ 
has its roots in ‘of the sea’, whereas the meaning of ‘naval’ is found in ‘of ships’ or ‘of 
navies’, ie fleets of ships.  This thesis contends that though the activities under 
investigation take place in the maritime environment, they are characterised by the tools 
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of their delivery – the fleets of ships, submarines and, at times, aircraft which actors 
employ.  Therefore, although both terms are acceptable, ‘naval’ is arguably more 
accurate when applied to the diplomatic use of seapower.   
 
The research, therefore, supports the first hypothesis described in the Introduction.  
Naval diplomacy is a subset of general diplomacy and will be used as a means of 
communication by maritime states in pursuit of their national interest.  More specifically, 
it can be defined as the use of naval assets as communicative instruments in 
international power relationships to further the interests of the actors involved.  
 
(2) What are the traditional models of naval diplomacy? Who conducts it, how, with 
what aim and against whom?    
 
The temporal classification of naval diplomacy into pre-, Cold War, and post-Cold War 
periods is purely a construct of this research.  It was done because the accepted 
theories largely emanated from the bipolar geopolitical world of the Cold War and thus 
did not necessarily fully account for that which went before or that which would come 
afterwards. 
 
Reviewing other periods revealed different interpretations of the utility of naval forces in 
peacetime or, at least, when not engaged in total war.  In the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, for example, the writers focussed on the deterrent effect of navies, 
on the ‘status’ that they could embody, and on their usefulness in building international 
relationships and alliances.   
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Cable’s hierarchy of definitive, purposeful, catalytic and expressive modes, which 
ranged from hard to soft power and from the highly effective to the token, became the 
standard in the Cold War.  However, other Cold War commentators returned to familiar 
themes of coercion, non-coercive influence and alliance building, always with one eye 
on the prestige value of naval power.  It was the post-Cold War, post-modern 
commentators who widened the debate, bringing into focus a continuum of hard to soft 
power effects through coercion, protection, persuasion and assistance. 
 
Nonetheless, whether ‘classical’, Cold War or ‘post-modern’, the models or frameworks 
for naval diplomacy derived from the writing of the major theorists explored in Chapter 
2, display a number of enduring themes. 
 
Firstly, the earliest models are based in the realist or liberal realist theoretical traditions 
of international relations.  Classical naval writers such as Mahan and Corbett saw their 
advocacy of seapower, including the use of force in peacetime, as a means to further 
the interests of the user at the expense of the recipient.  Similarly, observers of the Cold 
War protagonists, including Sir James Cable with his ‘strong and weak’, ‘assailant and 
victim’ themes, speak directly to realism.   
 
Secondly, and closely linked to the realist tradition, each model is essentially state-
centric.  Though the post-Cold War, ‘post-modern’ commentators place less overt 
emphasis on the state, couching their words in terms such as ‘globalism’ and 
acknowledging the importance of institutions, international law and coalitions, the state 
remains the basic unit of discourse.  Mike Mullen, for instance, did not propose his 
vision of a thousand ship navy or global maritime partnership for altruistic reasons.  He 
wanted the United States, his country, to be at the heart of it and to lead it. 
  411 
 
Thirdly, each model is based on a mechanistic methodology in which one ‘side’ does 
something and the ‘other side’ reacts.  That the models rely on this action-reaction 
process between the (primarily) state actors involved means that they are essentially 
binary in nature. 
 
Fourthly, and following on from the previous three observations, the realist, state-
centric, binary models of naval diplomacy are all outcome based and they thus demand 
that decisions be made. In Schelling’s theory of arms and influence, success depends 
on the individual’s assumption of rationality and on the individual’s accuracy of 
prediction of outcomes. In other words, the models are based on attempts to 
manipulate the cognitive process: ‘actions are chosen for both their immediate effect 
and for the effect they have on the other player’s choice.’4   
 
Existing models, then, can be described as event-based approximations of state actors’ 
use of the ‘spare capacity’ inherent in military navies when not at war to influence other 
state actors.  The hypotheses that existing models were conceived in the Cold War and 
are products of their time, and that they assume a binary, mechanistic relationship 
between the actors involved, are supported by the research. 
 
(3) What, if anything, is new in the post-Cold War era?  Have ‘globalisation’ and the 
perceived increasing importance of non-state actors affected naval diplomacy?  
Has the incidence of naval diplomacy changed over time? 
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To understand what is new in the post-Cold War world, one must understand that which 
went before.  Chapters 1 and 2 largely explored the past but it is Chapters 3 and 4 
which delve in greater detail on more contemporary scenarios in order to determine the 
degrees of continuity and change in naval diplomacy over time.  
  
Globalisation did not begin with the fall of the Soviet Union, but the cross-border flow of 
goods and services, the transnational nature of political decision making, the 
interdependence between states and the proliferation of problems requiring global 
rather than local solutions, all increased apace after 1991.5  Both the quantitative survey 
and the selected case studies provide useful but inevitably incomplete overviews of 
naval diplomacy in this context, and show that it was the most capable navies which 
were best suited to respond to the emerging global order.  However, opportunists, both 
state and non-state, also made use of the sea to further their aims and rising powers, in 
particular India and China, found naval expansion to be a necessary accompaniment to 
economic growth and global influence.  As Simon Serfaty stated when introducing the 
idea of a post-western world, it is ‘not about the decline of the West, but the 
ascendency of everyone else.’6 
 
The survey also shows that naval diplomacy is primarily but not exclusively carried out 
by states and that the appetite of non-state actors to become involved in international 
communication on the global seas appears to be increasing.  As a 2009 US Naval 
Institute Proceedings article which discussed the ‘contested commons’ stated: 
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There is a consensus that rising state and non-state powers, combined with continued 




That pressure will inevitably need to be managed, but not necessarily through force.  
The survey shows that the instruments of seapower are used numerically more for 
purposes of amity than for enmity; however, at the ‘harder’ end of the spectrum of 
operations there is little discernible difference in the desired outcomes of incidents 
before, during or after the Cold War.  At the ‘softer’ end of the scale there are degrees 
of engagement which, when considered objectively, can be used to judge the health of 
any particular international relationship.  However, the impact of disengagement, or 
proactively not doing something, should not be underestimated.  Navies are, and have 
always been, used for symbolic purposes and that symbolism perhaps approached a 
new zenith in the post-Cold War era with an international doctrine of humanitarianism 
and friendly co-operation, fuelled by public opinion informed in turn by global media 
coverage. 
 
In sum, the principles of naval diplomacy have in all probability changed little over time 
but, as hypothesised, its use is more prevalent than the literature suggests, and if we 
look to the future we may start to see new aspects of an old role; ballistic missile 
defence at sea, theatre security co-operation, the enforcement of no-fly zones, forward 
presence and global fleet stations are already forms of naval diplomacy.  Others may 
follow.  The hypothesis that naval diplomacy spans a broad spectrum from hard to soft 
power can certainly be supported but, as the strategies of the sea powers testify, there 
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is always advantage to be had from a ‘decided preponderance at sea’ – a Mahanian 
phrase which is every bit as valuable in peacetime as it is in war, now as a century 
ago.8 
 
(4) Are the existing models for naval diplomacy still valid?  To what extent do they 
require revision?  Do they appropriately encompass likely target audiences 
(potential adversaries, potential allies and domestic audiences)? 
 
The existing models of naval diplomacy, due to their limited scope, particularly their 
state-centrism and relative focus of hard power effects, are not sufficient to understand 
every nuance of the naval diplomacy practiced either at their time of conception nor 
since 1991.  Indeed, many of the examples of cited in this research would not have 
qualified for inclusion in Cable, Luttwak or Booth’s frameworks, but they are 
nonetheless valid uses of seapower.   
 
In addition, the enduring themes outlined above have not completely withstood scrutiny 
through the quantitative and qualitative analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  The 
actions in the Adriatic and the containment of Iraq in the 1990s, for instance, were taken 
under the mandate of the United Nations and not by states acting in isolation. Non-state 
actors such as the Tamil Tigers, Hezbollah, the organisers of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla 
and Greenpeace have challenged the assumption that naval diplomacy is purely a 
state-centric business.  Indeed, as Yezid Sayigh wrote in 1998, ‘strategic coercion 
involving non-state actors is likely to be part of inseparable, continuous adversary 
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relationships rather than one-off episodes.’9  The United States’ flexing of muscles in 
the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s was as much a message to its own domestic 
audience and to Taiwan as it was to mainland China.  Similarly, North Korea’s 
securitization and Russia’s gain from US miscalculation of Black Sea relationships in 
the mid-2000s undermine the existing models’ doctrine that naval diplomacy is a binary, 
mechanistic interaction between an assailant and a victim.  Nonetheless, one enduring 
theme does hold true: at its core every conscious application of seapower to 
communicate political intent assumes rationality on the part of the audience at the 
receiving end; the difficulty can be identifying that audience. 
 
The empirical survey and the case studies show that incidents of naval diplomacy are 
seldom limited to just two parties.  In a significant number of cases three or more actors 
are involved and, often, there is also a plain intent to send a message to the domestic, 
regional or international community.  A case in point could be the Persian or Arabian 
Gulf at any time in the last few decades.  Are Western powers there to contain? To 
reassure?  To build relationships?  To protect oil supplies? Is it true to assert that ‘my 
enemy’s enemy is my friend?’  Who is doing what, to whom or with whom is not 
necessarily a straight forward question to answer.  There are numerous examples 
described in this research which show the complexity of international relations and the 
corresponding intricacy of naval diplomacy.  Any attempt to describe the incident in 
bilateral terms between any of the actors would be unsophisticated and erroneous.  
 
This thesis contends that its brief qualitative analysis of post-Cold War naval diplomacy 
has uncovered some simple yet previously overlooked principles.  Naval diplomacy can 
                                               
9
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support an internationalist, liberal agenda; it can target multiple audiences 
simultaneously and it can be a tool for the non-state actor.  Size may permit versatility 
and flexibility of means, but in essence scale is not a pre-determinant of naval 
diplomatic success.  Levels of co-operation and interoperability at sea can indicate the 
health of an international relationship, but even at its most basic level it can also provide 
a politically acceptable degree of diplomatic engagement.   
 
From these findings it is concluded that the existing understanding of naval diplomacy is 
insufficient.   As the hypothesis in Chapter 1 stated, an alternative foundational model, 
not based solely on events, but drawing on basic communication and stakeholder 
theories, is therefore required.  
 
 
(5) Can a new model be constructed?  If so, what should be its key tenets?  What 
perspectives or bodies of literature should be used? 
 
This thesis proposes a new foundational model for naval diplomacy which takes into 
account the strengths and shortcomings of previous frameworks and the realities of 
contemporary seapower. To provide a framework for comprehension and a vehicle for 
determining purpose, the why? of naval diplomacy, the model asks three basic and 
inter-dependent questions – who? what? and how? – before expanding to second and 
third order levels of analysis through the application of basic communication theory, 
basic stakeholder theory and the common understanding of naval roles and methods, 
particularly those ‘composite’ missions and tactics derived from the research.  Different 
approaches are equally valid but this thesis does contend that the foundational model 
developed here is the first attempt since the end of the Cold War to construct a practical 
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framework based not only in theory but also in the reality of events in recent history.   It 
is not presented as the model for naval diplomacy in the twenty-first century, but as a 
model which may complement those which have gone before in order to provide a 
useful, alternative tool for analysis in future.  
 
The model, as a culmination of the work, is worth showing again in its entirety: 
 
    
Figure 6.1: The Foundational Model. 
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As the implications below explain, the final hypothesis posed in the Introduction, that 
understanding of contemporary naval diplomacy can aid the development of 
appropriate force structures and capabilities of maritime states, can be supported; 
however, the research also points to more. Though developed for the study of naval 
diplomacy, the simple inter-disciplinary approach taken in the construction of the 
proposed model may make it useful for other purposes.  It could certainly be applied in 
the study of other ‘niche’ areas of military, defence or diplomatic activity such as 
peacekeeping operations, international development and the provision of foreign aid.  It 
may assist in the understanding of conflict resolution by unpicking the constituent parts 
of any dispute.  It may also be pertinent to trading relationships, particularly technology 
proliferation, and their impact on security.  Analysis of non-international relations fields 
such as business, education and environmental studies could also be potentially 
conducted through the model, subject to its appropriate adjustment for specialisation.  
The list is not exhaustive, merely illustrative of the range of possible applications.   
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
It would reveal a certain degree of hubris for this thesis to make extravagant or 
excessive claims for the implications of its research.  Conversely, it would be 
remarkable if the research had yielded none at all.  Through the scrutiny of existing 
literature on naval diplomacy, the qualitative and quantitative analysis of examples from 
the immediate post-Cold War era and the construction of a new analytical model, an 
alternative perspective has been developed which could aid future understanding.  The 
claim made by Christian Le Miere in his Conclusion to Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st 
Century applies equally here: 
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For maritime diplomacy is useful not only to those actors who use it, but also to analysts 
seeking to interpret the wider implications of the use of maritime diplomacy.  It is a 
predictive tool and an analytical one that can reveal tensions, allude to current frictions, 
underline shifts in the international order and balance of power, identify changing 




To add to Le Miere’s assessment, the implications of this research may also relate 
directly to national and international security.  For instance, naval deployments could be 
more effectively targeted; foreign activity at sea could be better understood and, if 
necessary, countered; and the ability of non-state actors to further their own interests, 
or to support national or even supra-national interests, from the sea could, potentially, 
be better harnessed.   The implications of this research can be addressed in three 
broad and overlapping categories: its contribution to theoretical debate, its meaning for 
policy makers and, finally, its utility for practitioners. 
 
The research has contributed what are, in essence, incremental developments to the 
theoretical understanding of naval diplomacy in three principal ways.  Firstly, it has 
examined the existing literature on seapower in a manner that had not previously been 
attempted at this scale.  From that textual analysis various models for naval diplomacy 
were derived, models which are, in most cases, constructs based on subjective 
interpretations of the writing of renowned maritime theorists.  However, though 
subjective, they do provide a fresh, alternative perspective on an important, yet largely 
marginalised, aspect of naval business.   
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In the course of the research the thesis has acknowledged Gunboat Diplomacy to be an 
accepted, standard discourse on the topic, particularly its treatment of the coercive 
element of naval diplomacy.  The second contribution to theoretical development, 
therefore, has been to take Sir James Cable’s framework forward into the post-Cold 
War global order.  No other known work has applied Cable’s methodology and 
categorisation to post-1991 events, and certainly not for the number and range of 
examples (over 500 from all parts of the world) examined in Chapter 3.   The dataset 
that has been produced will be a useful practical resource to other researchers and 
analysts in future.  
 
Thirdly, whilst providing a continuation of Cable’s work into the twenty-first century, the 
thesis has also challenged its validity, especially its widely accepted notions of state 
centricity, ‘action-reaction’ processes and ready dismissal of ‘soft’ power methods.  
Instead, it has amassed sufficient evidence to suggest a different reality, open to either 
realist or liberal interpretations, state or non-state actors, both large and small, and 
which speaks to communicators not assailants, to audiences not victims.  It is the 
culmination of these findings that led to the development of the new foundational model.   
 
Other novel contributions to theoretical development include the challenge to the widely 
accepted series of ‘enduring’ naval attributes, the association of securitization with 
naval diplomacy, and the application of multi-disciplinary concepts such as basic 
communication and basic stakeholder theories to its core principles.  These may spark 
further debate. 
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Sir James Cable announced in his final edition of Gunboat Diplomacy that ‘coercive 
diplomacy will be less costly and less of a risk than war’.11 This thesis supports that 
assertion and extends it to include the range of other possible activities beyond hard 
power effects carried out by state actors.  Naval diplomacy is, and will continue to be, a 
cost effective use of seapower in peacetime and is not merely ‘less risky’ than war, but 
could actually reduce the risk of war.  This is a point that policy makers should be 
cognizant of and the research’s massing of data could contribute to understanding and, 
consequently, facilitate evidence based decision making for those in the policy arena. 
 
By using practical evidence to inform decisions rather than relying on potentially 
skewed, politically motivated assessments, policy makers should be better able to make 
logical choices which will in turn lead to better value for money and, eventually, more 
successful pursuit of their interests at and from the sea.  The research assists in this by 
its layered what?, who? and how? framework, connecting message with audience, 
tactic with platform and, ultimately, purpose with outcome. 
 
For states, the research could be used to help inform investment decisions which will 
inevitably be made according to scale of national ambition.  For instance, the 
quantitative survey could be used to support a proposition that a state with limited 
military capability or resource should invest in, say, hydrographic survey ships to 
provide a niche service in its region, if such a thing were lacking.  Alternatively, it may 
be determined that a state with global aspirations should invest in hospital ships or 
disaster relief capabilities if it sought to extend its international influence through non-
coercive means and shed any legacy image of a poor human rights record.  Of course, 
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the diplomatic role is not necessarily the defining mission of navies and these insights 
must be assessed alongside other requirements, particularly the military ‘war-fighting’ 
and constabulary roles of naval forces. 
 
Similarly, the evidence base could be used to suggest procurement of multi-purpose 
rather than single role platforms, given the range of tasks and the unpredictability of 
employment which navies commonly face.  Paradoxically, greater specialisation has 
historically meant higher unit costs, therefore fewer hulls and consequently fewer 
opportunities to demonstrate forward presence.  The quantity versus quality debate, 
prevalent in much contemporary naval commentary, could be fed from the examples 
cited in the research.   
 
Persistent forward presence, such as the UK’s decades-long mission in the Arabian 
Gulf, or infrequent, targeted deployments, such as the UK’s engagement in the Far 
Eastern Five Power Defence Arrangement,12 both have purpose and reason, but which 
works better?  How to employ a navy is undoubtedly a question which has vexed policy 
makers for generations, and there are no straight forward answers.  However, subject 
to a more refined determination of ‘success’ criteria, the research may provide some 
data on the relative merits of deployment type when considering diplomatic messaging 
and assist in planning based on outcome, rather than simply founded on ease of 
delivery.  In short, there is a rich seam of evidence to assist decision making on 
acquisition, force structures and deployment priorities.    
 
                                               
12
 The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) is a sub-Treaty level multinational security 
arrangement between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. 
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For non-state actors the research may be similarly enlightening. The research captures 
numerous cases of non-state actors attempting to communicate enmity and amity 
through various means, but their incidence is still not as ubiquitous as states.  
Understanding the nature of the maritime ‘global commons’ and the possibilities 
inherent in its use as a communication medium, could fuel growth in this area of activity.  
  
Finally, all decision makers could call on the evidence and the proposed model to better 
understand the actions of others.  Is another actor’s deployment a signal of amity or 
enmity, is it aiming its message at its competitors or its own population, and is the 
demonstration of high levels of interoperability with a third party a thing of concern?  
Again, the research may not directly provide the answer, but it could provide a 
framework within which to logically ask the questions. 
 
For practitioners, the research and its findings might be used in a number of ways.  
Firstly, the sheer scale of naval diplomatic activity could be acknowledged and its 
principles incorporated into future doctrine, education and training.  For too long the 
ability to engage in naval diplomacy has been seen as a ‘free good’ born of military 
seapower.13 This need not necessarily be the case. Appreciating, for instance, that the 
strategic purpose of a bilateral exercise is at least in part the existence of the exercise 
itself and not just the quality of the tactical training it affords, could be a valuable insight 
to those involved, and ultimately lead to improved outcomes.  Arab-Israeli exercises, for 
example, fall into this category, as do US-South Korean exercises undertaken in full 
                                               
13
 There was an erroneous assumption in many Western post-Cold War navies that preparation 
for ‘high end’ war fighting meant that ‘lesser’ roles such as peace support, humanitarian 
assistance and diplomacy could be automatically achieved.  Costly experience showed that this 
was not the case and each required doctrine, planning, training and refinement. 
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view of Pyongyang, and US-Japanese shows of strength in the vicinity of the Senkaku / 
Diaoyu / Diaoyutai islands.  
 
Secondly, practitioners will continue to question whether post-modern navies can 
sustain the full spectrum of operations that they took for granted in the past.  The 
diplomatic utility of military forces does depend on credibility and capability,14 but as 
force structures change and navies, certainly in the West, reduce in size, the necessary 
combination of credibility and capability may well be achieved through partnerships, 
coalitions and alliances.  In the future there could be a real need for closer co-operation 
and greater collaboration to further self interest – the ‘thousand ship navy’ aspiration 
offers one such vision.  This research can be used to identify those actors already 
embarked on this process of global or regional maritime partnership and, importantly, to 
ascertain which rung they occupy on the engagement ‘ladder’. Likewise, it could 
indicate where comparable opportunities lie for other actors considering similar moves.  
By understanding intent, practitioners can more effectively acknowledge their own 
strengths and vulnerabilities and spot those of competitors. 
 
Thirdly, harnessing the communicative element of the political war for ideas will play an 
increasing part in conflict in future.  This is a point articulated in the comments of David 
Ayalon, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister during the Gaza Freedom Flotilla encounter in 
2010, who said: 
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In practical terms this means that practitioners should incorporate their strategic 
communication messages into each stage of the planning process for routine and 
bespoke deployments and determine the best means to deliver them.  The use of the 
media, including new or social media channels, to maximise and target the 
communicative element of naval diplomatic activity employment, would be a logical 
progression of business, and this research could, through its incorporation of basic 
communication theory and espousal of target audience analysis, prompt such 
considerations.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
 
This thesis has uncovered much but it has also raised a number of secondary and 
tertiary questions worthy of further research.  Though broad issues pertaining to the 
place of seapower in defence and security arise throughout the thesis, they are there to 
provide context and related questions are subject to regular commentary by naval 
specialists; therefore, they are not considered further here.  Instead, the 
recommendations for further work are those which result from the tackling of the 
principal research questions and relate to the detail of post-Cold War naval diplomacy. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this research has largely concentrated on the diplomatic 
activities of the seven or eight most capable ‘military’ navies of the day.  The more 
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 Tatham, Strategic Communication, p178.  The quote is attributed to David Ayalon in 
“Reactions to Raid on Flotilla”, by Gal Beckerman. New York Jewish Daily, 2 June 2010. 
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detailed study of smaller, coastal navies and coast guards may reveal different patterns; 
conversely, it might confirm the series of enduring principles and deem them applicable 
to all shapes and sizes of force and in all corners of the globe.  Such research would be 
a logical extension to this thesis. 
 
Similarly, the principles and methodology employed in this research could be applied to 
different periods.  It could certainly be taken forward and used as a framework for the 
analysis of future events but, equally, it could provide alternative insights to the past.  
Extending it to cover the whole of the Cold War, for example, rather than just the two 
control periods in Chapter 3, would be an interesting challenge, as would its application 
to earlier times, such as the nineteenth century Pax Britannica. 
 
The empirical survey and selected case studies revealed a trend of increasing activity 
at sea by non- and semi-state actors.  Greater analysis of the range of actors engaged 
and the type of activity they practice would be valuable.  This could include, but should 
not be limited to, study of semi-governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations, 
multi-national corporations, independent research authorities, fishing communities, 
criminal organisations, terrorist or paramilitary groups and those who use the sea for 
leisure purposes.  As an example, a future research question could ask whether there is 
a communicative, environmental campaigning element to the activities of the latter 
group when they mount ‘expeditions’ to the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.  If so, how 
does it work and how well is it received?  If such expeditions grew in size and number 
how would the international community react?  This would not be a study of tourism, but 
a study of messaging at sea. 
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Multi-national acquisition projects and the ‘gifting’ of naval platforms have been briefly 
discussed and they may also offer a rich vein for further analysis.  If, as this thesis 
contends, the type of exercise or activity practiced is an indicator of the health of the 
relationship between the actors involved, then the same would almost certainly apply to 
the degree of collaborative procurement and joint technological development carried out 
between actors.  Highly technical and specialist industries such as aerospace, 
weaponry and advanced warship design and construction are commonly developed by 
multi-national consortia, suggesting close, trusting relationships. Is there evidence that 
these politico-industrial partnerships translate into politico-military alliances?  What of 
defence sales to potentially hostile competitors?  France’s 2014 decision to put on hold 
the export of amphibious shipping to Russia after the latter’s perceived adventurism in 
Ukraine is an interesting diversion.  Research into major military and naval acquisition 
decisions and an assessment of their diplomatic implications would be beneficial. 
 
The foundational model developed in Chapter 5 should be subjected to further 
refinement and testing.  Utility has been drawn from the application of rudimentary 
communication and stakeholder theories; it would be interesting to explore the literature 
on these topics further to determine if a more in-depth, systematic use could provide 
greater understanding of naval diplomacy. 
 
Finally, deeper analysis of the survey itself could, and should, be conducted to 
determine what else there is to be revealed.  There is a tendency in the existing 
literature to equate naval diplomacy with the overt presence of surface warships, 
typified by Edward Luttwak’s advocacy of ‘visibility’ over ‘viability’ and Sir James 
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Cable’s repeated dismissal of submarines as useful diplomatic instruments.16  The 
reality, as this thesis has shown, is different.  To achieve a greater fidelity in 
understanding this difference the type of platform (submarine, aircraft carrier, frigate or 
patrol vessel) used could be mapped against the type of activity practiced to determine 
whether or not there is an optimum configuration to express amity or enmity, soft or 
hard power, or to reach the desired target audience.  The impact of technology could 
also be better understood as it pertains to naval diplomacy; was Robert Gates wrong? 
Do you actually need ‘a billion dollar warship’ if you are to impress, educate and attract 
another actor to your cause?   
 
The common denominator of all these things is, of course, the measure of effectiveness 
of any particular example.  Perhaps the most difficult question which needs to be 
addressed is that of the definition of success and failure in naval diplomacy.  
Frustratingly it has been, and remains, intangible. 
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especially’, as the ‘perfect’ vehicles for representing their country. 
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